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Analyzing the Environmental Injustices of Carbon Offsetting: The Limits of the 
California-REDD+ Linkage  
 
By Matthew Lithgow 
 Emissions from greenhouses gases (GHGs), especially carbon dioxide (CO2), have 
driven anthropogenic climate change. In response, global policymakers have promoted 
carbon trading and its subset, carbon offsetting, as approaches to lower these emissions by 
commodifying GHG reductions for market exchange. Recently, the US state of California 
has sought to incorporate carbon offsets from a “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation” (REDD+) program in the state of Acre, Brazil, into its own 
carbon trading scheme. Using a theoretical framework drawn from Marxist Political 
Economy, I argue that the “California-REDD+ linkage” is an ineffective and unjust 
method of climate change mitigation, because it prioritizes economic growth over 
substantial and equitable emissions reductions. By interrogating the environmental and 
social credibility of REDD+ offsetting, this thesis exposes the limits of market-based 
environmental strategies to mitigate climate change in a fossil fuel-powered capitalist 
society.  
 
March 8, 2017 
  
 ii 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... i 
Table of Contents .............................................................................................................. ii 
List of Acronyms & Abbreviations ................................................................................ iv 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Carbon Trading: Climate Policy at The Dawn of Climate Catastrophe ....................2 
1.2 REDD+ Offsetting: A Place for Forest Preservation in Carbon Markets? ................8 
1.3 Thesis Statement ......................................................................................................12 
1.4 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................12 
1.5 Methodological Overview .......................................................................................17 
1.6 Chapter Outline ........................................................................................................18 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ........................................................................................ 21 
2.1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................21 
2.2 Fossil Capitalism and the Climate Crisis .................................................................23 
2.3 The Origins of and Arguments for Carbon Trading ................................................34 
2.3.1 Carbon Forestry: The Beginnings of REDD+ .............................................................. 47 
2.4 Analyzing the Critiques of Carbon Trading and Carbon Forestry ...........................53 
2.5 Conclusion ...............................................................................................................71 
Chapter 3: Market Environmentalism or Environmental Justice? Debates on Carbon 
Trading and Offsetting in California ............................................................................ 73 
3.1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................73 
 iii 
3.2 A History of Carbon Trading in California..............................................................74 
3.3 Room for REDD+? International, Sector-Based Offsets in California ...................87 
3.4 Conclusion ...............................................................................................................92 
Chapter 4: Deforestation, Carbon Forestry, and Conflict in Brazil and Acre ......... 94 
4.1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................94 
4.2 Land Tenure, Deforestation, and Environmental Policy in Brazil ...........................96 
4.3 SISA: Jurisdictional REDD+ in Acre ....................................................................104 
4.4 Carbon Forestry and Green Grabs: Cases from Brazil and Nigeria.......................109 
4.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................118 
Chapter 5: Analyzing the Environmental Injustices of the California-REDD+ 
Linkage........................................................................................................................... 120 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................120 
5.2 Environmental Integrity .........................................................................................121 
5.3 Environmental Injustice, Carbon Colonialism, and Green Grabs..........................129 
5.4 Conclusion: Capitalism Drives Ineffective Climate Policy ...................................133 
5.5 Beyond Carbon Trading: Towards Effective and Just Climate Change Mitigation… 
………………………………………………………………………………………..135 




List of Acronyms & Abbreviations 
AB  Assembly Bill 
AB 32  Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 
AR  Afforestation and Reforestation 
ATF  anti-deforestation Task Force 
BAU  Business-As-Usual 
BNDES Brazilian National Development Bank 
BRL  Brazilian Real  
CAR  Rural Environmental Registry  
CARB  California Air Resources Board 
CCBS  Climate, Community, & Biodiversity Standards 
CCI  California Climate Investments 
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism 
CER  Certified Emission Reduction 
CfRN  Coalition of Rainforest Nations 
COSATU  Congress of South African Trade Unions 
COP  Conference of the Parties 
CO2  Carbon Dioxide 
EDF  Environmental Defense Fund 
EJAC  Environmental Justice Advisory Committee 
ERU  Emissions Reduction Unit 
EU  European Union 
 v 
EUR  European Union Currency 
FCPF  World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
GCF  Governors’ Climate and Forests Task Force 
GHG  Greenhouse Gas 
IEA  International Energy Agency 
IMC  Institute of Climate Change and Regulation of Environmental Services 
INCRA Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform 
INDC  Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
JI  Joint Implementation 
KM2  Square Kilometers 
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding 
MPE  Marxist Political Economy  
MRV  Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification 
Mt  Million Tonnes  
MtCO2  Million Tonnes of Carbon Dioxide 
MtCO2e Million Tonnes of Carbon Dioxide Equivalent 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization 
NUMSA National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa 
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
PPM  Parts Per Million 
REDD  Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
 vi 
REDD+  Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, plus 
conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of 
forest carbon stocks 
ROW  REDD Offset Working Group 
SB  Senate Bill 
SISA  State System of Incentives for Environmental Services 
SPVS  Society for Wildlife Research and Environmental Education 
tCO2  Tonne of Carbon Dioxide  
tCO2e  Tonne of Carbon Dioxide Equivalent 
tCO2/capita Tonne of Carbon Dioxide Emitted per Person  
UN  United Nations 
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
USD  United States Dollars 
VCM  Voluntary Carbon Market 
VCS  Verified Carbon Standard 
 
WCI  Western Climate Initiative  
 
WMO   World Meteorological Organization  
 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The emission reductions associated with REDD programs are not only cost-effective 
compared to other options for abating emissions because of the low opportunity costs, 
but also because of the flexibility it would give covered entities in the REDD+ 
Program…more options mean that covered entities have more emissions reductions 
opportunities allowing them to determine the least-cost compliance methods.  
–An excerpt from the California Air Resources Board (CARB) White Paper on 
the use of international, sector-based offset credits in the state’s carbon market 
(CARB, 2015 p. 12)i 
For years our organizations, most of which are based in California, have been working 
toward the protection of forests, preventing catastrophic climate change, and promoting 
ecological justice and social equity. In this context we applaud the State of California for 
considering new ways to curb its emissions and protect the last remaining tropical 
forests. However, ROW’s [the REDD Offset Working Group] proposal to use rainforests 
as an offset to replace industrial emissions would achieve none of these objectives.  
-A letter from 27 environmental and social justice organizations to California 
Governor Jerry Brown and CARB Chairwoman Mary Nichols, opposing the use 
of REDD+ offsets in the California Cap-and-Trade Program (qtd. in Lang, 
2013a)ii  
They want us to stay in here all huddled up in a corner, without being able to do 
anything, so that a few days from now, we won’t even have fields to plant our crops in. I 
want someone to explain to me what carbon is, because all I know is that this carbon 
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isn’t any good to us. It’s no use to us. They’re removing it from here to take to the U.S.… 
They will sell it there and walk all over us? And us? What are we going to do?  
-A rubber tapper expressing his concern about the Purus REDD+ project in the 
state of Acre, Brazil (qtd. in Faustino & Furtado, 2014, pp. 16-17)iii 
1.1 Carbon Trading: Climate Policy at The Dawn of Climate Catastrophe  
In December 2015, nations from around the globe convened at the 21st 
Conference of the Parties (COP 21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris, France. The goal of the two-week summit was to 
forge a new international climate treaty to succeed the Kyoto Protocol, the previous 
climate treaty signed at COP 3 in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997. The outcome of the discussions 
at COP 21 was the Paris Agreement, which was widely praised for its goal to limit global 
temperature rise to 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and ideally, 1.5°C (UNFCCC, 2015, 
p. 2). To date, 194 countries have signed the treaty, which took effect on November 4, 
2016.  
Indeed, the time for swift and robust action to mitigate climate change has never 
been more urgent, given the worrying trend in global temperatures and extreme weather 
events. 2016 was the warmest year since record-keeping began, and the third year in a 
row to set a record. At present, global temperatures have risen by 1.1°C since 1880, and 
16 of the 17 warmest years on record have all occurred since 2001 (NASA, 2017). 
Perhaps the starkest indicator of what unchecked temperature rise will look like comes 
from the projection that global temperatures could warm by 4°C above pre-industrial 
levels by the end of the 21st century (World Bank, 2012, pp. xii-xvi). Albeit in the 
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opposite direction, 4°C is nearly the same distance as the 4.5°-7°C difference that 
separates the present climate from that during the last ice age, when several regions in the 
Northern Hemisphere were covered with ice (p. xvi).   
The adverse effects of climate change are becoming pronounced in multiple ways. 
The August 12-14, 2016, floods in the US state of Louisiana, responsible for the deaths of 
13 people and an estimated USD 10-15 billion in damage, were linked to climate change 
in a recent study. Van der Wiel et al. (2016) found that the odds of a similar-magnitude 
storm occurring had increased by at least 40% since 1900 due to climate change (p. 2). 
This type of heavy precipitation and flooding should be expected as the Earth warms, 
since the atmosphere can hold 7% more water vapour for every 1°C increase in 
temperature (Trenberth, 2011, p. 124). At the current rate of global warming, areas of the 
globe located at high latitudes are slated to receive more average precipitation each year 
through the end of the 21st century (IPCC, 2013, p. 23).  
On the other side of the precipitation spectrum, the state of California has 
experienced a severe, multi-year drought. A persistent, blocking ridge in the jet stream 
over the northern Pacific Ocean guided winter storms away from California throughout 
the early 2010s. Researchers concluded that the presence of the massive blocking ridge 
was three times as likely to occur due to climate change (Swain et al., 2014, p. S6). The 
consequences of the drought in California’s agriculture sector alone were estimated to 
have cost a total of USD 2.7 billion and contributed to a loss of 21,000 jobs (Howit, 
MacEwan, Medellín-Azuara, Lund, & Sumner, 2015, ES-1). Dry regions of the globe 
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located in the mid-latitudes – like California – and the subtropics are also expected to see 
a decline in precipitation by the end of this century (IPCC, 2013, p. 23).  
An outlook for more extreme weather events and long-standing shifts in climate 
patterns could also jeopardize the livelihoods of millions of people worldwide. 36% of 
the planet’s workforce primarily relies on agriculture for their livelihoods, particularly 
residents of Asia and the Pacific (40-50%) and Sub-Saharan Africa (66%) (FAO, 2008, p. 
1). Due to changes in rainfall patterns and rising temperatures under climate change, 
global food production may decline by about 10% in 2030 and by more than 20% in 
2050, which would seriously endanger these groups’ survival (von Braun, 2016). Even 
for those not fully dependent on agriculture for their existence, elevated food prices from 
decreased production could still seriously affect many low-income and vulnerable 
populations. One report predicts that the average price of maize, wheat, and rice in 2050 
will increase between 18.4% and 34.1% above what they would otherwise in the absence 
of climate change (Nelsen et al., 2010, p. 21).  
Additionally, when the earth heats up, sea levels rise as polar ice caps melt and 
water grows in volume by the property of thermal expansion (IPCC, 2013, p. 25). At the 
current rate of warming, coastal populations will be vulnerable to sea level rise between 
0.26 and 0.82 metres, if not higher, by 2100 (p. 25). This threat is already causing the 
populations of small island states in the Pacific to consider relocating entirely, as 
residents of the island nation of Kiribati will do beginning in 2020 (Pashley, 2016). 
Already, the nation of Tuvalu has witnessed 15% of its residents emigrate between 2006 
and 2015, while another small island state in the Pacific, Nauru, has seen 10% of its 
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population leave over the same period (Bawden, 2015). It is not just island nations being 
affected, though, as a 0.9 metre rise in sea levels by 2100 would also inundate the homes 
of a projected 4.2 million people in the US alone (Hauer, Evans, & Mishra, 2016, p. 691).   
Climate change-induced migration is not confined to low-lying coastal regions either. 
According to the International Displacement Monitoring Centre (2015), 17.5 million 
people were displaced by weather-related disasters in 2014, and climate change is 
expected to amplify this trend in the coming years (p. 8).  
Together, these statistics reinforce why the wide-ranging and dire ramifications of 
climate change should be a top priority for international mitigation efforts, including 
those outlined in the Paris Agreement. One way that signatories to the treaty are to 
mitigate climate change is by aligning their country’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions – 
the principal drivers of anthropogenic climate change – with the 1.5°C and 2.0°C 
temperature goals, and the treaty expresses a desire for countries to peak their GHG 
emissions as soon as possible (UNFCCC, 2015, pp. 2, 22). However, of the twenty-four 
times GHGs are mentioned in the Paris Agreement, not once does the text connect GHGs 
to the main source behind them, global fossil fuel usage. Emissions from carbon dioxide 
(CO2) – the most prevalent and longest-lasting GHG – and other GHGs result primarily 
from the widespread combustion of fossil fuels (IPCC, 2013, p. 17). 1 In fact, between 
2006 and 2015, CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industrial processes accounted for 
91% of all CO2 emissions worldwide (Le Quéré et al., 2016, p. 625).  
                                                 
1 Although CO2 is the greenhouse gas that causes climate change, the term “carbon” is 
often used in environmental policy discourse to refer to CO2, despite the molecular 
differences between carbon and carbon dioxide. In this piece, any mention of carbon (i.e. 
carbon trading, carbon offsetting) also refers to CO2.      
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Fossil fuels, which include coal, oil, and natural gas, supply 81.1% of the world’s 
total energy, and their production has risen anywhere between 50% (oil) and 193% 
(natural gas) from 1973 to 2015 (IEA, 2016, p. 6). This trend has also correlated with 
increased CO2 levels and temperatures. CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion rose 
from 15,458 million tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) in 1973 to 32,381 MtCO2 in 2014, while the 
average global temperature climbed by an average of 0.18°C each decade over roughly 
the same period (Ciais, 2013, p. 467; Milman, 2016). Due to the embeddedness of fossil 
fuels in global production, cutting down on CO2 and other GHG emissions to mitigate 
climate change remains a daunting task.  
Over the past several decades, though, a collection of economists, 
environmentalists, politicians, and business leaders have proposed a strategy to reduce 
these fossil fuel-based GHG emissions, known as carbon pricing. Supporters of carbon 
pricing argue that climate change has come about because firms and industries have not 
factored in the environmental cost of emitting GHGs into their daily business operations 
(Sandor, Bettelheim, & Swingland, 2002, p. 1608). However, if GHG emissions were 
assigned a price, or “internalized”, as part of an industry’s expenses, activities that 
involved fossil fuels would become more expensive, incentivizing cutbacks in emissions-
intensive production methods and consumption patterns (Ervine, 2016, p. 10). Over the 
past two decades, this strategy has caught on, as 40 national and 20 municipal and 
subnational governments have put a price on 13% of global GHG emissions (World 
Bank, 2016, p. 11).  
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Usually, carbon pricing takes place either through a carbon tax, where a 
government sets the price to emit a certain quantity of GHGs (usually measured as one 
tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent, or tCO2e), or emissions trading, where a government 
puts a limit on the total amount of GHG emissions allowed in a certain timeframe 
(Farley, Filho, Burke, & Farr, 2015, p. 244). In the latter method, industries that find it 
physically difficult or expensive (or both) to reduce their emissions at the source may buy 
surplus “permits” or “allowances” to cover their emissions from more efficient industries 
in the scheme, all while staying below the total emissions “cap”. This constitutes the 
“trading” portion of the program (Reyes & Gilbertson, 2010, pp. 90-91).  
Emissions trading, also known as “cap-and-trade”, has especially caught on. By 
the end of 2017, 19 cap-and-trade schemes are expected to operate across the globe, 
which would cover more than 15% of the world’s GHG emissions (ICAP, 2017, pp. 20, 
22). Proponents assert that cap-and-trade lets industries seek out the cheapest sources of 
emissions reductions across an entire market, allowing them to lower the cost of 
mitigating climate change (Sandor et al., 2002, p. 1608; World Bank, 2016, pp. 16, 83). 
Instead, opponents contend that cap-and-trade is a political project, designed to protect 
the economic models of fossil fuel-dependent businesses and governments from policies 
that would require more substantial cuts in GHGs. (Böhm, Misoczky, & Moog, 2012, p. 
1624; Ervine, 2012, p. 6). Rather than reducing emissions at the source, entities in a cap-
and-trade scheme can purchase surplus allowances in the market to continue business-as-
usual (BAU) production that drives climate change.  
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Another trading option for participants in a cap-and-trade program is a subset 
known as carbon offsetting. In this arrangement, industries purchase credits (i.e. offsets) 
from projects that reduce emissions – which are not covered by the cap-and-trade scheme 
– to compensate for their own continued emissions (Reyes & Gilbertson, 2010, pp. 93-
94). However, the environmental and social legitimacy of carbon offsetting as a means of 
climate change mitigation has been called into question. This is especially true for a type 
of offsetting known as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, 
or REDD+. Moving forward, I examine the proposed “linkage” between the California 
Cap-and-Trade Program and a REDD+ scheme in the state of Acre, Brazil. Drawing on a 
Marxist Political Economy (MPE) framework, the thesis analyzes the environmental and 
social components of carbon trading and REDD+ to understand the possible impacts of 
the so-called “California-REDD+ linkage” in each state. In so doing, it seeks to answer 
the following related questions: can the California-REDD+ linkage be used to effectively 
and equitably mitigate climate change; and, how might this linkage affect populations in 
both California and Acre from an environmental and socio-economic standpoint? Before 
answering, it is useful to provide some context that underlines the basic arguments for 
and against REDD+.   
1.2 REDD+ Offsetting: A Place for Forest Preservation in Carbon Markets? 
As mentioned above, when an entity offsets its emissions, it buys emissions 
reduction credits to use as its own from a project that is not subject to the requirements of 
the cap-and-trade scheme (Lovell, Bulkeley, & Liverman, 2009, p. 2361). Emitters are 
thus given added flexibility in reducing their emissions, which may benefit fossil fuel-
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dependent entities that find it cheaper to pay others to mitigate climate change than cut 
their own GHGs at the source. In the past several decades, numerous offset projects have 
popped up in low-income, developing countries (the Global South, hereafter referred to 
as simply “the South”) and have attracted investment from heavy emitters in high-
income, industrialized states (the Global North, hereafter referred to as simply “the 
North”). According to proponents, lower costs of land and labour in the South give offset 
projects there a competitive advantage at producing emissions reductions, compared to 
the higher costs of these components in the North (Böhm & Dabhi, 2009, p. 11).  
Many countries in the South also possess large expanses of tropical forests, a 
critical source for storing CO2 emissions. Tropical forests absorb nearly 20% of fossil 
fuel-based CO2 emissions globally, but this rate is shrinking with widespread 
deforestation. Between 2000 and 2010, 13 million hectares of forests were lost to human 
or natural causes every year (Hall, 2012, p. 4). Additionally, CO2 emissions from land 
use change, which includes deforestation for agriculture and logging, were estimated to 
comprise 9% of global CO2 emissions from 2006 to 2015 (Le Quéré et al., 2016, p. 625). 
Therefore, implementing strategies that prevent deforestation and forest degradation-
related emissions from occurring – the basis of REDD+ – is an important part of 
combatting climate change and preserving the role of rainforests as the “lungs of the 
earth”, taking in CO2 to regulate the climate and releasing oxygen to sustain life.  
Noting the integral climatic function that trees provide, many businesses, 
government policymakers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and financial 
institutions have sought to invest in REDD+ projects as a source of carbon offsets 
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(CARB, 2015; Code REDD, 2013; ROW, 2013). Supporters claim that REDD+ offsets 
represent a “win-win” solution, a cost-effective method for Northern emitters to combat 
climate change while channelling funding for development and conservation initiatives to 
populations in the South (Angelsen & McNeil, 2012, p. 35). REDD+ offsets, advocates 
contend, give industries a cost-effective means to mitigate climate change, and generate 
economic growth opportunities for businesses that develop offset projects and 
technologies to measure and monitor emissions reductions (Code REDD, 2013). As 
former Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg bluntly put it, REDD+ makes sense 
as a quick and easy solution to climate change because “everybody knows how not to cut 
down a tree” (qtd. in Angelsen & McNeil, 2012, p. 35). Article 5 of the Paris Agreement 
also identifies REDD+ as a mechanism for mitigating climate change, possibly as part of 
a post-2020, UN-administered international carbon market (UNFCCC, 2015, p. 23).  
On the other hand, critics of REDD+ offsetting reject the notion that emissions 
reduction credits from avoided deforestation projects contribute to a “win” of any sort. 
Environmentally speaking, an industry purchases a tCO2e offset credit to compensate for 
an actual tCO2e it emits from fossil fuel combustion, meaning that overall, emissions do 
not decline (Lang, 2009, p. 216). Carbon forestry projects like REDD+ also face 
significant obstacles to ensuring that reductions in deforestation would not have occurred 
without industry payments (“additionality”), are not lost to human or natural causes 
(“non-permanence”), and are not cancelled out if forest clearing activities simply relocate 
outside the project boundaries (“leakage”) (McAfee, 2015, p. 340).  
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Opponents also argue that REDD+ offsetting, like all carbon trading strategies, 
favours cuts where emissions reductions are cheapest, not where they are most necessary. 
This is evident as heavy emitters in the North outsource the responsibility to reduce 
emissions to cheap offset project sites in the South, including REDD+ schemes 
(Bachram, 2004; Bond, 2011). However, given that countries in the South have 
contributed far less to climate change over the last 200 years than wealthy, industrialized 
countries in the North, offsetting is not an equitable emissions reduction strategy. Poor, 
disadvantaged groups in both the North and South also bear a disproportionate risk to the 
effects of continued GHG emissions through higher costs for food and energy and 
vulnerability to the extreme weather events described earlier. Thereby, programs that 
merely compensate for emissions, rather than reduce them, will continue to expose the 
poor far more than the wealthy to the costs of climate change (Storm, 2009, p. 1021).    
Furthermore, studies of past and current carbon forestry projects have revealed 
some troubling effects. Some forest dwelling communities have been evicted from areas 
slated for offset credit generation (Beymer-Farris & Bassett, 2012; Cavanagh & 
Benjaminsen, 2014). Others have experienced negative alterations in their traditional and 
customary rights to hunt, cut trees, and engage in other subsistence and income-
generating activities in forested areas when offset projects commence (Asiyanbi, 2016; 
Faustino & Furtado, 2014; Kill, 2014). Drops in the market price for offsets have also 
deprived rural communities of carbon revenues that were expected to follow from the 
sale of REDD+ credits (Chomba, Kariuki, Lund, & Sinclair, 2016).  
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1.3 Thesis Statement 
By utilizing a MPE framework, which locates capitalist production as the cause of 
the climate crisis, I argue that the California-REDD+ linkage, like carbon trading in 
general, cannot be used as an effective or equitable solution to mitigate climate change. I 
posit this because sufficient evidence exists to demonstrate that REDD+ offsetting 
favours capitalist, economic growth over significant and credible reductions in GHG 
emissions, while also negatively impacting the livelihoods of communities incorporated 
into these trading networks. To illustrate this point, I build off the vast literature on 
carbon trading and carbon forestry offset projects and examine the likely, detrimental 
effects of the California-REDD+ linkage in both California and Acre. The selection of 
these case studies exemplifies how carbon trading and REDD+ programs can yield 
negative environmental impacts (false emissions reductions) and socio-economic 
consequences (restricting or altering access to land and resources). These ramifications 
affect populations in both the Global North and South, a testament to the wide-ranging 
effects of future carbon market development. Above all, I plan to demonstrate that 
market-based forms of climate change mitigation, like REDD+ offsetting, are 
incompatible with the tremendous cuts in GHGs required to avoid climate catastrophe. 
This last point brings me to a clearer description of the theoretical framework I have used 
to develop my argument.  
1.4 Theoretical Framework 
 In this thesis, I use MPE to explain the environmental and social implications of 
carbon trading as a response to the climate crisis, and to analyze the potential California-
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REDD+ linkage. Broadly speaking, MPE stems from the extensive writings of Karl Marx 
on how capitalism as a socio-economic system contains numerous contradictions that 
threaten its very existence. Capitalist development is driven by a growth imperative, 
which compels industries to lower their costs in order to gain ever-larger profits. These 
profits are then used to expand production, which industries must do to avoid going out 
of business in competitive marketplaces (Luxemburg, 1951). Applied to the environment, 
a Marxist perspective points to the ways in which capitalist industries deplete natural 
resources (like fossil fuels) to continue growing and profiting, but simultaneously neglect 
to account for the cost of this degradation (like releasing GHG emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion) (Malm, 2013, pp. 52-53; O’Connor, 1988, 1991). Consequently, as fossil 
fuels become rooted in the circuit of capitalist production as a central means of obtaining 
greater profits, so do GHG emissions (Malm, 2013, p. 53). Therefore, understanding the 
growth imperative of capitalism is key to explaining the present climate crisis (Foster, 
2011).  
 MPE is a useful framework for this thesis because it helps unravel why carbon 
trading has emerged as the dominant method of global climate change mitigation. In the 
past, capitalist firms and governments in the North have responded to their growth 
imperative through imperialism, seizing resources and assets from populations in the 
South (Harvey, 2004, p. 74). More recently, carbon markets have accommodated this 
growth imperative by allowing industries to purchase allowances or offsets to continue 
BAU growth, while leaving emissions at the source untouched (Ervine, 2013, p. 656). By 
enclosing, pricing, and marketizing (in all, “commodifying”) GHG emissions for 
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exchange, carbon markets also provide a boon to traders, consultants, project developers, 
and others that can turn a profit off the new trade in GHG commodities (Ervine, 2013, p. 
656; Lohmann, 2005, p. 205).  
Additionally, MPE provides insight on why REDD+ offsets have become a 
desired source of emissions reductions for capped industries. In a carbon trading 
program, all GHG emissions are deemed to have the same impact on the planet, no matter 
where or how they were produced. Because of this, low-cost emissions reductions are 
prioritized over more effective and expensive strategies that could permanently lead away 
from fossil fuel usage (Lohmann, 2012, p. 91). One may view REDD+ offsets as a recent 
extension of this practice, as wealthy, industrialized emitters in the North seek out 
cheaper offset commodities in the South to alleviate the costs of complying with 
environmental policies (Bachram, 2004; Bumpus & Liverman, 2008).  
This thesis also uses MPE to address the socioeconomic effects of REDD+ offset 
projects, specifically related to how forest dwellers, indigenous communities, and others 
in the North and South are affected by this new phase of capitalist expansion. Carbon 
forestry project developers have taken often harmful measures to guarantee the 
environmental integrity of offset commodities, such as evicting communities from 
forested spaces or restricting their interactions with forests (Beymer-Farris & Bassett, 
2012, Cavanagh & Benjaminsen, 2014; Kill, 2014). An MPE perspective sees these acts 
as enabled by a distinct power asymmetry, where wealthier project developers and offset 
buyers demand enclosed spaces to generate offsets and assist growth, negatively affecting 
the human-environment interactions, income-generating opportunities, and use and 
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access rights of poorer communities (Böhm et al., 2012, p. 1624; Fairhead, Leach, & 
Scoones, 2012, pp. 238-239).  
In contrast, other approaches do not challenge global capitalism and market-based 
environmental strategies nearly to this extent. For example, a neoclassical economic 
approach, promoted in the works of Sandor et al. (2002) and Stern (2009), takes the 
commodification of GHGs for market trade as a prerequisite for climate change 
mitigation. These economists are primarily concerned with how to provide firms, 
industries, and other market actors with a clear price signal through which to cost-
effectively reduce their emissions. (Sandor et al., 2002, pp. 1608-1609; Stern, 2009, pp. 
99-100, 107). This includes giving industries the flexibility to invest in cheaper projects 
that preserve or plant trees in tropical forested countries (Sandor et al., 2002, p. 1614; 
Stern, 2009, p. 166).  
However, the neoclassical approach falters because it assumes that market trade in 
GHGs is a politically neutral strategy. Conversely, a strict focus on price signal disguises 
the power relations that reveal to whom a given solution to climate change is most cost 
effective for (McAfee, 2015, p. 343). For instance, an oil refinery may find it cheaper to 
offset its emissions via a REDD+ project than to cut them at the source. Yet, populations 
in the REDD+ project location, who may not have contributed to climate change at even 
a fraction of the refinery’s rate, are now tasked with a new cost of withholding from 
deforestation activities in the project area, which offset payments may not fully 
compensate for. Furthermore, the potential for a clear carbon price to correct the “market 
failure” of climate change is slim when carbon trading does not confront the root cause of 
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climate change in the first place, the capitalist growth imperative (Storm, 2009, p. 1016-
1017).  
An MPE framework also goes deeper its analysis of carbon trading than many 
existing critiques on the subject do. This observation is inspired by Böhm et al. (2012), 
who highlight the wide spectrum that critiques of carbon markets fall on (p. 1624). What 
these critiques do have in common is that they reject a strictly neoclassical approach to 
carbon market design, and acknowledge the many environmental and social problems of 
carbon trading schemes so far. However, as Böhm et al. (2012, p. 1624) note, even some 
critical political economists (see Bailey, Gouldson, & Newell, 2011; Newell & Paterson, 
2010) believe that the structure in which carbon markets operate can be improved 
through stronger regulation and better integration across economies.2 Other authors are 
even more critical (see Bachram, 2004; Bond, 2012; Lohmann 2005, 2012, 2015), and 
dismiss the idea that carbon markets can seriously or equitably mitigate climate change 
even through comprehensive reform. In their view, carbon markets are designed first and 
foremost to protect the business models of fossil fuel-dependent entities, and additionally 
to spur new growth opportunities through the commodification of GHG emissions (Böhm 
et al., 2012, p. 1624; Ervine, 2013, p. 656).  
MPE pushes even the most rigorous critiques of carbon trading further by firmly 
positioning global capitalism as the cause of the climate crisis. Moreover, an MPE 
framework vitally situates carbon markets within the historical development of 
                                                 
2 Newell & Paterson (2010), for example, advocate for “Climate Keynesianism”, where 
“markets are not abandoned, merely better governed to direct them more closely towards 
the goal of decarbonisation and to ensure the ‘environmental integrity’ of offsets both in 
the CDM [Clean Development Mechanism] and the voluntary markets” (p. 173).  
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capitalism, creating new accumulation opportunities for some and protecting fossil fuel-
dependent growth for others (Böhm et al., 2012; Ervine, 2013). While criticisms of 
carbon markets from a variety of perspectives are welcome and essential, an MPE 
framework is best at sufficiently explaining the environmental and social consequences 
of carbon market development thus far. Otherwise, any efforts to reform carbon trading 
schemes will be forever constrained by the limitations of the capitalist system that they 
both operate in and accommodate.  
1.5 Methodological Overview  
This thesis was developed through an extensive, qualitative literature review. This 
was undertaken to situate the case study at hand within the greater debates on carbon 
trading and REDD+ as responses to the climate crisis. The types of works consulted 
include scientific papers, peer-reviewed journal articles and books, and reports and 
statements from NGOs, policy institutes, international institutions, and environmental and 
social organizations, which are readily available online. The results of this search helped 
to establish MPE as the best framework through which to analyze the rise of carbon 
trading and assess the theoretical and empirical implications of carbon trading schemes.  
For the case study, a content analysis of written material was utilized to connect 
the theoretical framework and earlier literature review to the environmental and social 
consequences of a California-REDD+ linkage. The material reviewed includes: reports, 
data, and documents from CARB and outside research bodies on the design, current 
statistics, and possible changes to the California Cap-and-Trade Program; reports, 
statements, and letters from environmental and social groups, international institutions, 
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NGOs, consultants, and media sources advocating for or against REDD+ offsets; and 
peer-reviewed journal articles and NGO reports presenting case studies of carbon forestry 
projects in Brazil and elsewhere. These documents are also available online, and 
furthermore provide a wealth of information regarding the diverging opinions on the 
California-REDD+ linkage and the rationales for these viewpoints. 
Additional ethnographic observation was conducted at the Carbon Expo 
conference, May 25-27, 2016, in Cologne, Germany. Hosted by the World Bank and the 
International Emissions Trading Association, the 2016 Carbon Expo attracted one of the 
largest collection of players and proponents of global carbon markets internationally. 
Among the 2,000 attendees were representatives from large international organizations 
(the UN, World Bank), national governments (Germany, Spain), banks, private 
companies, NGOs, and others involved in market-based climate policy. Providing over 
20 hours of participant observation, the conference served as a valuable tool in 
connecting the literature on carbon markets, offsetting, and REDD+ to current events and 
discussions on the trajectory of carbon trading programs. Research Ethics Board approval 
was attained from Saint Mary’s University prior to the conference.  
1.6 Chapter Outline  
 This thesis is presented in five chapters. Chapter 2 serves as the literature review 
and explains why fossil fuel-led capitalist development is responsible for the climate 
crisis, and how carbon trading has become the dominant global strategy to mitigate 
climate change. The chapter situates the development of carbon trading within the rise of 
neoliberal capitalism, in which free markets are believed to be capable of both 
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stimulating economic growth and protecting the environment. It also examines the 
environmentally and socially-based critiques of carbon trading that are rooted in MPE, 
with special attention paid to research and case studies on carbon forestry offsetting. 
These carbon forestry projects have emerged from the compliance-based carbon market 
of the UN’s Clean Development Mechanism, as well as projects that have originated 
outside of this channel in the voluntary carbon market (VCM).  
 Chapter 3 focuses on the California-REDD+ linkage in relation to California, and 
examines the political-economic history of the state’s Cap-and-Trade Program in the 
lead-up to the possible linkage. This history illuminates why private industries and the 
state government have promoted cap-and-trade and offsetting, and why the 
environmental justice community and its allies have opposed market-based climate 
policies. Additionally, the chapter documents how REDD+ offsets may figure into the 
future of the Cap-and-Trade Program, and outlines the main arguments and concerns 
regarding the California-REDD+ linkage from the perspective of supporters and critics. 
 Chapter 4 examines the development of REDD+ in Acre, located within the 
context and history of environmental policy and land tenure in Brazil more broadly. This 
information provides the basis for describing how Acre came to adopt its State System of 
Incentives for Environmental Services (SISA) program, which observers have dubbed the 
world’s first jurisdictional REDD+ program. Furthermore, this section utilizes case 
studies from past and present carbon forestry projects in Brazil and Nigeria to analyze 
how the linkage may negatively impact forest dwelling communities in Acre. I utilize 
Fairhead et al.’s (2012) concept of “green grabbing”, where rich, powerful entities 
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appropriate resources from poorer populations for environmental ends, to explain the 
theoretical backing behind the detrimental effects of carbon forestry projects.  
 Chapter 5 analyzes whether or not the California-REDD+ linkage would 
contribute to effective and equitable climate change mitigation. Specifically, I frame my 
closing argument under the concepts of environmental integrity, environmental injustice, 
“carbon colonialism”, and green grabbing, gained from the information laid out in 
Chapters 2 through 4. The chapter also summarizes the overall themes and lessons to take 
away from this thesis, which centre on identifying the dominance of global capitalism as 
the key obstacle in forging effective climate policy. A final section considers the 
tremendous struggle of overcoming the twin hurdles of fossil fuel dependency and 
capitalist development to combat climate change. As a result, the push for effective and 
just alternatives to the present market-led model of climate policy will require widespread 
mobilization and coordination on an unforeseen scale.
                                                 
i The full title of the paper is, Scoping Next Steps for Evaluating the Potential of Sector-
Based Offset Credits under the California Cap-and-Trade Program, including from 
Jurisdictional “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation” 
Programs 
ii The letter from these organizations came in response to the REDD Offset Working 
Group’s final recommendations on how CARB should utilize REDD+ offsets in its Cap-
and-Trade Program. CARB organized the REDD Offset Working Group in 2011 to 
formulate how California might “link” its carbon market to jurisdictional REDD+ 
schemes 
iii The state of Acre could supply the California Cap-and-Trade Program with REDD+ 
offsets as early as 2018.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
 Climate change – brought on primarily by fossil fuel-based GHG emissions – is 
an immediate and dangerous threat to the planet, capable of unleashing extreme weather 
events, jeopardizing food security, and provoking mass population displacement. Global 
policymakers have touted carbon pricing as a logical response to lower these emissions, 
and carbon trading has emerged as the most popular method of doing so. While some 
form of carbon pricing covered 13% of global GHG emissions in 2016, cap-and-trade 
schemes made up most of this, at 9% of global GHG emissions (ICAP, 2016, p. 26; 
World Bank, 2016, p. 11). Yet, carbon trading is not by any means the only choice of 
climate policy. Government policies that phase out or restrict the usage of fossil fuels, 
like coal, have in recent years demonstrated how strict regulations can drive significant 
emissions reductions (Littlecott & Schwartzkopff, 2015, pp. 11-12). Why then, has 
carbon trading become a more popular method to mitigate climate change globally?  
 Drawing from the MPE framework outlined in Chapter 1, this chapter argues that 
carbon trading is a distinctly capitalist response to the climate crisis, and protects the 
business models of heavy emitters over more substantial, credible, and equitable 
mitigation strategies. Section 2.2 begins by detailing the role of global capitalism in 
giving way to the present climate crisis. Under the growth imperative of capitalism, fossil 
fuels have become entrenched in the circuit of capitalist production to lower costs and 
increase profits. However, fossil fuel combustion, largely in the Global North and in 
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rapidly industrializing countries like China and India, releases vast quantities of planet-
warming GHGs like CO2, causing the climate crisis.  
Section 2.3 explains how carbon trading has aligned with the market-centred, 
growth-oriented theory of neoliberalism from the 1970s onward. Proponents of neoliberal 
environmentalism argue that by commodifying GHG emissions from all sources and 
locations, free markets will reveal the most cost-effective places for an entity to achieve 
emissions reductions and sustain BAU growth at home. A subsequent analysis of the 
United Nations’ Kyoto Protocol shows how carbon trading developed on the international 
stage, especially through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for carbon 
offsetting. This discussion provides essential background on the development of carbon 
forestry offsetting, including afforestation and reforestation (AR) projects (part of the 
CDM) and REDD+ (excluded from the CDM). Above all, this section concludes that the 
main goal of all offsetting strategies is to provide “flexible”, “least-cost” strategies for 
heavy emitters in the North to comply with the GHG reduction targets mandated under 
the Kyoto Protocol.  
 Section 2.4 problematizes carbon trading and carbon forestry as strategies that 
foster or accommodate fossil fuel-intensive capitalist growth, do not ensure substantial or 
credible emissions reductions, and yield negative social ramifications. An analysis of the 
logic behind carbon offsetting reveals that, in fact, offsetting merely cancels out fossil 
fuel emissions instead of reducing GHG emissions overall. Measuring and monitoring 
emissions reductions from forestry projects is also an incredibly difficult task, and 
undermines the environmental integrity of offset credits. Additionally, this section 
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provides examples from past and current carbon forestry projects, including REDD+ 
schemes, to show how carbon trading can further social injustices. This can lead to 
carbon colonialism and green grabs, which reinforce the economic and environmental 
dominance of the North over the South and worsen the socioeconomic situations and 
livelihoods of forest dwelling communities.  
2.2 Fossil Capitalism and the Climate Crisis 
 Skyrocketing CO2 levels and anthropogenic climate change have only arisen since 
the mid-1800s as fossil fuel-powered capitalist production has spread globally. A 
discussion of capitalism as a socioeconomic system is warranted, as such, to fully grasp 
why the climate crisis has come about. In a capitalist system, the owners of firms and 
industries engage in the production of commodities, which are objects produced for sale 
in markets (Polanyi, 1944, p. 72). The owner of capital must sell the finished 
commodities for a price that will cover the costs of both human labour and the means of 
production, like raw materials and machinery, used to make that commodity. The money 
left over, or profit, is a central driving force behind this capitalist form of commodity 
production in the first place. Without the reasonable expectation of profit, an owner of 
capital will not want to risk losing a return on her investment in labour and the means of 
production (Luxemburg, 1951; Harman, 1979). To ensure profit in a competitive 
marketplace, then, a capitalist must sell an increasingly greater number of commodities 
for as cheaply as possible, reinvesting the profits to expand production (Luxemburg, 
1951).  
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 In contrast to other economic systems like feudalism or Soviet-style communism, 
production in a capitalist system is determined purely by the number of people willing to 
pay for a commodity (effective demand), not a consideration of which commodities 
fulfill societal needs. Without enough effective demand, the capitalist will fail to both 
yield a profit and pay off her production costs, thereafter going out of business. 
Meanwhile, competing industries will expand their own operations by increasing market 
share for their finished commodities (Luxemburg, 1951). The Marxist theorist Rosa 
Luxemburg (1951) concisely summarizes this growth imperative of capitalism, in that 
“expansion becomes in truth a coercive law, an economic condition of existence for the 
individual capitalist.” 
 Additionally, an important quality of the capitalist mode of production is that it 
effectively divides society into two groups. The first are capitalists, who own the means 
of production and employ the labour force required to generate a profit from commodity 
production. The second are workers, who lack this ownership and are compelled to sell 
their labour to capitalists in exchange for a wage to sustain themselves. This arrangement 
creates a division between the capitalist class and the working class, with the former 
seeking to lower their production costs and increase profits, and the latter fighting for 
higher pay and better working conditions (Harman, 1979).  
 Capitalists have found they can both expedite growth and control their labour 
force by using fossil fuels as the primary energy source in production. To start, fossil 
fuels present an easily transportable and storable input for industries to expand with 
(Altvater, 2006, p. 41). Andreas Malm (2013) illustrates this point through his account of 
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the British cotton industry’s shift from water-powered mills to coal-powered steam 
engines in the mid-19th century. Before the advent of coal power, cotton mills were 
located directly next to their power source, waterfalls in the countryside. This was 
disadvantageous for the cotton industry since the location was far from markets to sell the 
finished product in and from an abundant labour supply to staff the mills with. The 
introduction of coal allowed for the construction of factories in burgeoning urban centres 
where this workforce resided (Malm, 2013, pp. 32-33). Cotton factory owners were no 
longer dependent on rural waterfalls to power production, as coal could be easily shipped 
and stored in multiple locations where access to labour that was “substitutable, 
expendable, and adapted to machinery” was greatest (pp. 33, 39). The consolidation of 
cotton mills in cities also allowed owners to exert greater control over their workforces. 
In the sparsely-populated countryside, workers possessed stronger bargaining power, 
since there were not many options to replace them. However, workers in urban factories 
were forced to compete with a growing number of other labourers, giving employers 
greater power in structuring production and disciplining their staff (pp. 53-54).   
 Fossil energy could also function with the same intensity year-round, removed 
from the variations and natural cycles of non-fossil energy types (Altvater, 2006, p. 41). 
Again, Malm (2013) cites the drawbacks of water-powered versus steam-powered cotton 
plants to document this point. When the water flow at a cotton mill was low, the owner of 
the plant had no choice but to send workers home and make up for the lost time on 
another date (Malm, 2013, p. 41). In contrast, the energy potential of coal is separate 
from that of its underground origin, which eliminated the contingent nature of water 
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power. Steam power supplied consistent energy intensity that greatly accelerated worker 
productivity, enabling a labourer to produce more in a shorter period (p. 41). Together, 
the two distinct advantages of fossil fuel-based energy – lack of geographical fixity and 
independent energy flows – provided a boon for capitalist industries to produce more 
commodities, attain higher profit margins, and control their labour forces.  
 In addition to coal, oil became another fossil fuel used to accelerate capitalist 
production. In fact, oil is a more efficient form of fossil energy than coal. Oil is forced 
toward the surface from underground pressure, and as a liquid, it can be transported 
through pumping stations and pipelines rather than by railroad or carts, both of which 
minimize the labour costs needed to extract and distribute it (Mitchell, 2011, p. 36). 
Overall, the extraction and transportation process for oil does not require as much labour 
and capital as other forms of energy, which gives it a very high “Energy Returned on 
Energy Invested” (EROEI) (Altvater, 2006, p. 39; Mitchell, 2011, p. 36). Oil thus 
presents capitalist industries with a marked efficiency and profit-making advantage over 
coal. Together, though, all fossil fuels – coal, oil, natural gas – have helped lower the 
costs of capitalist production at a greater rate than non-fossil energy forms, facilitating 
the growth imperative of capitalism and stimulating industry profits.  
 To demonstrate how ubiquitous fossil energy has become in the world economy, 
one only needs to observe the historic rise in global fossil fuel use rates. The world’s 
“total primary energy supply”, defined by the International Energy Agency (IEA) as the 
total amount of energy production by fuel type, increased for all fossil fuels from 1973 to 
2014. Coal consumption rose from 3,074 million tonnes (Mt) in 1973 to 7,709 Mt in 2015 
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(IEA, 2016, p. 14). Oil consumption followed suit, increasing from 2,869 Mt to 4,331 Mt 
over the same period (p. 10). When adding in natural gas consumption, in 2014 fossil 
fuels were responsible for 81.1% of all energy production globally (p. 6). Reflecting on 
the dominant role of fossil fuels in global production, Malm (2013) has developed a 
model of fossil capitalism:  
 
Money – Commodities (Labour Power + Means of Production (Fossil Fuels)) … 
Production ^ (CO2) … Commodity Increment – Money Increment (Malm, 2013, 
p. 52). 
 
This model illustrates the circuit of fossil capitalist production, a process that 
leads to a continuously increasing usage of fossil fuels and production of CO2. The 
capitalist invests money into paying workers’ wages, purchasing machinery and tools, 
and acquiring fossil fuels for use in production. When fossil fuels burn and combust, they 
release CO2 (and other GHGs) into the atmosphere. A greater number (i.e. increment) of 
finished commodities will ideally yield a greater profit for the owner of capital to expand 
production with in the future, a symptom of the growth imperative. In so doing, fossil 
fuel extraction and CO2 emissions become intertwined with commodity production when 
the circuit starts anew (Malm, 2013, pp. 52-53).  
One can ascertain the serious climatic impact of CO2 by understanding its 
scientific properties. CO2 does not immediately break down after being emitted, but 
rather circulates between the different “reservoirs” that take it in from the atmosphere, 
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including vegetation, soils, and the ocean (Ciais et al., 2013, p. 544). Each reservoir takes 
a long time to sequester atmospheric CO2: vegetation sequestration takes up to 100 years; 
soils up to 500 years; the deep ocean up to 2000 years (p. 544). As fossil fuel emissions 
continue and intensify, each reservoir experiences a diminished capacity to absorb CO2, 
and more of it remains in the atmosphere (p. 544). Although these reservoirs have stored 
roughly half of the CO2 emitted since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution in the mid-
18th century, this sequestration is not permanent because these reservoirs will also release 
CO2 in addition to taking it in – for example, when trees and other forms of vegetation are 
lost to fires or impacted by disease (p. 546).3 
 Once emitted, CO2 and other GHGs like methane (CO4), halocarbons (including 
HFC-23), and nitrous oxide (N2O) directly influence climate change through the 
greenhouse effect. Here, incoming ultraviolet solar waves pass through GHGs in the 
atmosphere and are absorbed by various surfaces on Earth. About 30% of these waves are 
reflected into space in the form of infrared energy. GHGs get their name because 
although they originally let the ultraviolet waves in, they trap many of the outgoing 
infrared waves, like a greenhouse. The infrared radiation remaining in the atmosphere is 
then released in the form of heat energy and warms the planet (Lallanila, 2016). Of these 
GHGs, CO2 is the most prevalent and will linger in the atmosphere for the longest 
amount of time, making it the focal point of climate change mitigation efforts (Ciais, 
2013 pp. 470, 473). Indeed, Ciais et al. (2013) predict that between 15 to 40% of the CO2 
emitted until 2100 will stay in the atmosphere for over 1000 years (p. 472).  
                                                 
3 Ciais et al. (2013) define permanence as a period of time longer than ten of thousands of 
years (p. 546).  
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 Recent data shows the connection between the CO2 content in the atmosphere, 
fossil fuel-based CO2 emissions, and global temperature rise quite clearly. From 1750 to 
2016, the atmospheric CO2 concentration rose from 278 parts per million (ppm) to 
400ppm, an unprecedented statistic when considering that in the previous 7,000 years 
leading up to 1750, the atmospheric CO2 concentration only increased by about 20 ppm 
(Ciais et al., 2013, pp. 467-468; NOAA, 2016). Tellingly, the last time the atmospheric 
CO2 content reached 400ppm was between 3 and 4 million years ago (NOAA, 2016). 
During this era, sea levels were 65 feet (20 metres) higher than today and the planet was 
so warm that trees grew near the North Pole (Milman, 2016). In 2014, 32,381 MtCO2 
were emitted from fossil fuel combustion, up from 15,458 MtCO2 in 1973 (IEA, 2016, p. 
44). Simultaneously, the global average temperature has risen 1.1°C above pre-industrial 
levels, the hottest the planet has been in 115,000 years, and continuing the alarming trend 
of global temperatures warming by 0.18°C each decade over the past 45 years (Milman, 
2016; NASA, 2017).  
This evidence has led the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to 
state that it is extremely likely that anthropogenic CO2 and GHG emissions from 
economic growth are the cause of unprecedented global warming since the mid-20th 
century (IPCC, 2014, p. 4, emphasis original). Importantly, the IPCC (2014) states that 
the phrase “extremely likely” means there is a 95-100% assessed likelihood of a certain 
outcome or result, based on the IPCC contributors’ confidence in their statistical analyses 
of observations, model results, or expert judgment (p. 2). Based on this explanation, 
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“extremely likely” is as close as the IPCC can come to saying that human activity is 
indisputably responsible for rising temperatures.  
Critically, though, not all regions of the globe are responsible for the current state 
of the climate crisis. The wealthy, advanced capitalist countries in the North were the first 
to industrialize, and consequently, the first to release vast quantities of CO2 into the 
atmosphere. In 1850, the UK was the world’s largest emitter, generating over 60% of the 
planet’s fossil fuel-based CO2 emissions, (Friedrich & Damassa, 2014). The United 
States, France, Germany, and Belgium rounded out the remainder of the top five emitters 
in 1850, together making up 94% of all fossil fuel-based CO2 released worldwide that 
year (World Resources Institute, 2016). Over the next century and a half, GHG emissions 
continued to rise in these countries and others – mostly in North America and Europe – 
that had extensively incorporated fossil fuel use into daily production processes and 
consumption patterns. CO2 emissions really escalated in the United States, which 
overtook the UK as the world’s largest fossil fuel-based CO2 emitter in 1888, and held 
onto this title for over a century (Friedrich & Damassa, 2014). From 1900 to 2010, fossil-
based CO2 emissions from the seven wealthy countries making up the informal “G7” bloc 
vastly exceeded those from the entire regions of Africa, Latin America, and the 
Caribbean combined by 1,567 MtCO2 in 1900 and 6,443 MtCO2 in 2010 (World 
Resources Institute, 2016).4 
In recent years, a few countries outside of the European-settled, early 
industrialized states have closed the CO2 emissions gap between North and South. The 
                                                 
4 The G7 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US 
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overwhelming contributor is China, whose emissions surged in the late 20th century as it 
rapidly industrialized, culminating when it passed the US as the world’s largest CO2 
emitter in 2005 (Friedrich & Damassa, 2014). China alone was responsible for 9,087 
MtCO2 emissions from fossil fuel-based sources in 2014, 28% of the world’s total (IEA, 
2016, pp. 45, 50). India is another country that is quickly industrializing, with a 
corresponding boom in GHG emissions to prove it. In 2014, India generated 2,020 
MtCO2 emissions from fossil fuels, over 6% of the world’s total (p. 52).  
Tropical forested countries have also experienced a surge in CO2 emissions over 
the past several decades, but mainly from non-fossil fuel sources. Instead, deforestation-
related activities are largely to blame for these emissions, which stem from large-scale 
agriculture, livestock, mining, and timber operations that clear forests and release 
sequestered CO2 (De Shazo, Pandey, & Smith, 2016, pp. 53-54). Climate change-related 
effects, such as more frequent droughts and fires, also lead to trees dying and releasing 
CO2 (Lang, 2016b). Brazil is the largest emitter of CO2 from tropical deforestation, 
averaging 722 MtCO2 worth of deforestation emissions per year from 2001 to 2014 
(Global Forest Watch, 2016a). Indonesia follows in second place, having released an 
average of 447 MtCO2 from activities related to deforestation over the same period 
(Global Forest Watch, 2016b).  
Despite the increase in CO2 emissions from rapidly industrializing countries and 
from activities related to deforestation, countries in the North still bear the greatest 
responsibility for contributing to climate change from their historic and present CO2 
emissions. Between 2006 and 2015, fossil fuel combustion and industrial production are 
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estimated to have generated 91% of all anthropogenic CO2 emissions, while activities 
related to land use change caused the other 9% (Le Quéré et al., 2016, p. 625). CO2 
emissions from land use change have also remained constant from 1960 to 2015, while 
fossil fuel and industrial-based emissions have risen over this same stretch (pp. 625-626).  
Furthermore, countries in the mid-Northern latitudes (largely corresponding to states in 
the Global North) were responsible for most emissions from large-scale deforestation and 
land use change prior to the 1980s. Only from the 1980s onward did tropical 
deforestation in the South, including Latin America, Africa, and Asia, take over as a 
bigger contributor to emissions from land use change (Ciais et al., 2013, p. 491).  
Even so, export-oriented, commercial agriculture is the largest factor in 
deforestation across the South. Large-scale agriculture contributes to 40% of 
deforestation in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, while subsistence-based agriculture 
only makes up 33% (FAO, 2016, p. 88).5 In Latin America specifically, commercial 
agriculture for soybean, beef, and oil palm (biofuels) drives an even larger 70% of 
deforestation (p. 88). As such, deforestation has not occurred in the South in isolation, but 
rather as part and parcel of the growth of global commodity markets. Brazil, for example, 
was the world’s third largest exporter of agricultural products in 2014, worth USD 88 
billion and falling only behind the European Union (EU) bloc and US (WTO, 2015, p. 
77). These numbers are consistent across South America as well. Member states of the 
Andean Community customs union exported USD 67 billion more in fuels, agricultural 
products, and mining products than they imported in 2014, while countries in the 
                                                 
5 Mining, urban expansion, and infrastructure rounds out the other 27% of deforestation 
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Mercosur trading bloc exported USD 180 billion more than they imported of these same 
products (pp. 55-56).6    
A comparison of different regions’ per-capita emissions rates also puts the 
North’s overwhelming contribution to climate change into perspective. Member states of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a collection of 
35 high to middle income countries mostly located in the North, averaged a per-capita 
emissions rate of 9.36 tonnes of CO2 per person (tCO2/capita) in 2014. OECD countries 
with even higher rates were the US (16.22 tCO2/capita), Australia (15.81 tCO2/capita), 
and Canada (15.61 tCO2/capita) (IEA, 2016, pp. 49, 51, 57). China, the world’s largest 
emitter, had a smaller per-capita emissions rate of 6.66 tCO2/capita (p. 49). Even more 
revealing, non-OECD countries in Asia and Africa had minuscule per-capita emissions 
rates of 1.58 and 0.96 tCO2/capita respectively (p. 49). Although CO2 emissions may be 
increasing across many regions, clearly the wealthy, industrialized countries in the North 
have disproportionately contributed more to climate change than those in the South, and 
continue to do so today. 
To summarize, fossil fuel combustion by itself emits CO2, causing climate change 
by trapping solar radiation and inducing global warming. Combined with the efficiency 
advantages fossil fuels present to growth-driven capitalist industries, fossil fuel usage has 
exploded, accompanied by a dramatic rise in the global concentration of atmospheric 
CO2. Armed with an understanding of the fact that the North has brought on the climate 
crisis by its overwhelming historic and present use of fossil fuels (even as emissions in 
                                                 
6 The Andean Community comprises Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, while 
Mercosur includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay  
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the South increase through industrialization and deforestation), the next section turns to 
showing how representatives from businesses, governments, and international 
institutions, influenced by a neoliberal, market-led approach to environmental policy, 
have formulated carbon trading as the least disruptive response to BAU, fossil fuel-led 
capitalist growth.    
2.3 The Origins of and Arguments for Carbon Trading 
 In the years immediately following World War II, and decades before 
policymakers had started debating how to lower GHG emissions, governments in heavy-
emitting, advanced capitalist states were taking on a more active role in regulating their 
economies for a different reason. Drawn from the work of the British economist John 
Maynard Keynes, the ideology of “embedded liberalism”, or “Keynesianism”, 
emphasized that governments should regulate different business sectors with the goal of 
promoting full employment and limiting inflation (Harvey, 2005, pp. 10-11). Keynesian 
policies were designed to prevent shocks like the Great Depression – in which a decade 
of free market policy triggered a widespread economic crisis in these same advanced 
capitalist states – from occurring in the future (p. 21). Additionally, a so-called “class 
compromise” would provide workers with social welfare benefits, like healthcare and 
education support, from the state’s increased economic output (Harvey, 2005, p. 10; 
Moore, 2011, p. 135). Under Keynesianism, an active regulatory state was viewed as an 
integral part of ensuring stable, economic growth, while also extending welfare support to 
its citizens.  
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The regulatory apparatus of the Keynesian state also extended to the environment, 
seeking to curtail environmentally-harmful forms of economic growth (McCarthy & 
Prudham, 2004, p. 278). For example, the US government passed the Clean Air Act, 
Endangered Species Act, Marine Mammal Protection Act, and created the Environmental 
Protection Agency throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, an era when US Republican 
President Richard Nixon even declared “we are all Keynesians now” (qtd. in Harvey, 
2005, p. 13). Furthermore, international organizations and environmental movements 
were beginning to sound the alarm on the environmental consequences of unchecked 
economic growth. The Club of Rome’s 1972 publication, The Limits to Growth, projected 
that excessive industrial production and resource usage would, over several centuries, 
surpass Earth’s ecological limits to sustain this growth (Foster, 2012, p. 215; Turner, 
2008, p. 397). “Sustainability” discourses in the 1970s also built upon the findings of The 
Limits to Growth by recognizing that the planet could accommodate only so much 
economic growth without environmental collapse (Agyeman, Bullard, & Evans, 2002, p. 
80; McManus, 1996, p. 50). 
 The antagonism between capitalist economic growth and environmental 
sustainability is given a thorough analysis by the ecological Marxist theorist James 
O’Connor (1988, 1991) through his work on the second contradiction of capitalism. 
Essentially, the second contradiction describes how capitalism’s growth imperative 
destroys the very means of production it depends on for further growth. Inputs in 
production, like natural resources, are treated as “free gifts to capital” to lower costs, and 
the capitalist neglects to account for the deterioration of these inputs over time (Marx qtd. 
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in Foster, 2002; O’Connor, 1988, 1991). This not only raises the costs of acquiring these 
increasingly-scarce inputs in the future, but also “externalizes” them, leaving the rest of 
society to bear the economic and environmental costs and consequences of using them up 
(O’Connor, 1988, p. 26).  
For instance, fossil fuel-based industries have historically not incorporated the 
costs of releasing CO2 into their daily operations. Society then faces the ramifications of 
these industries’ unvalued and uncontrolled CO2 emissions, like lower agricultural yields 
from more frequent heat waves and droughts, or relocation due to sea level rise (Foster, 
2002; O’Connor, 1988, p. 25). Large-scale deforestation also has a similar effect. Not 
only do trees play a vital role in sequestering CO2 and regulating the climate, but as forest 
cover shrinks, it becomes more difficult to replenish timber stocks and their capacity to 
sequester CO2 in the future, since replanting trees takes years until they will reach 
maturity (Hall, 2012, p. 3; Prudham, 2003, p. 641). Therefore, the environmental costs of 
deforestation may be revealed through increased temperatures from newly-released CO2 
in the atmosphere. In his environmentally-based critique of capitalism, O’Connor 
believed that the state must lead efforts to curtail capitalist growth, from the subnational 
to the supranational level (Castree, 2008, pp. 144-145).  
However, the state-led regulations that the Keynesian Welfare State had applied 
towards the environment would fall out of favour beginning in the 1970s. Amidst a slow-
down in growth rates in the advanced capitalist countries and a rise in unemployment and 
inflation, critics of Keynesianism claimed that active, interventionist states had interfered 
with the free functioning of global markets and stifled capitalist growth (Harvey, 2005, 
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pp. 20-21). In response, the political-economic theory known as “neoliberalism” swept 
across both the North and South to replace Keynesianism. Under neoliberalism, 
proponents argue, unhindered private property rights, free trade, and free markets are 
supposed to best guarantee human welfare (p. 2). Neoliberal theory borrows heavily from 
neoclassical economics, which states that a rational individual acting in her own self-
interest guides economic behaviour (Arnsperger & Varoufakis, 2006, p. 8). Free markets 
are viewed as best equipped to distribute an individual’s unlimited wants and desires in 
accordance with the finite amount of goods and services available to the rest of society 
(McAfee, 2015, p. 342).  
To ensure that markets will properly distribute these goods and services, the 
neoliberal state must guarantee individual, private property rights. Proponents argue that 
doing so not is only necessary to ensure social order, but also to generate profit from 
economic activities taking place within these well-defined, enclosed spaces (McCarthy & 
Prudham, 2004, p. 277; Wood, 2002, p. 111). Individuals will then govern their property 
in the same way that they seek to maximize their self-interest elsewhere. Additionally, 
the neoliberal state is only to intervene in the economy insofar as it creates or protects the 
proper functioning of markets. Advocates of neoliberalism believe that state intervention 
will distort price signals that are determined through voluntary forms of market 
exchange, and should thereby remain at a minimum to stimulate economic growth 
(Harvey, 2005, p. 2).  
Around the same time that neoliberalism was spreading globally, scientists were 
starting to connect elevated CO2 levels with climate change. Organizations like the 
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United Nations World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP) began developing what are known as “general 
circulation models” to demonstrate how elevated GHG emissions would affect the 
climate (Newell & Paterson, 2010, p. 16). These efforts culminated in the creation of the 
IPCC by both the WMO and UNEP in 1988 (p. 18). Since then, successive IPCC reports 
have publicized the link between human activity and climate change, most recently in the 
IPCC’s (2013) Fifth Assessment Report. Bolstered by additional scientific studies and 
increased media coverage of extreme weather phenomena linked to climate change, 
heavy emitters in the public and private sectors have faced added pressure to address their 
environmental impact.   
In contrast to the more state-led, “command and control” approach to 
environmental regulation under Keynesianism, environmental policies under the 
neoliberal state would take on a very different shape. Instead of government laws and 
policies, neoliberal environmentalism would consist of market-led policies aimed at 
making capitalist growth environmentally sustainable. Key to this strategy of “free 
market environmentalism” would be to “internalize externalities”, or bring the 
environmental cost of depleting natural resources and ecosystem functions more fully 
into capitalist markets (Castree, 2008, pp. 146-147).  
This model builds off the work of environmental economists, perhaps most 
notably Robert Costanza and his colleagues. Costanza et al. (1997) argued that the planet 
faces an environmental crisis because society has not accounted for the environmental 
cost of using up ecosystem services, the natural resources and ecosystem functions that 
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humans benefit from (p. 253). These ecosystem services range from animal habitat 
protection to water filtration to climate regulation, including carbon sequestration in 
vegetation-based reservoirs (McAfee, 2012, p. 105). If natural resources and ecosystem 
services were properly valued, so Costanza et al.’s (1997) argument goes, the real 
environmental cost of depleting them could be incorporated into business practices and 
government policies (Costanza et al., 1997, pp. 254-257). Effectively, assigning a price to 
natural resources and ecosystem services would make exploiting them more expensive, 
prompting those who rely on these goods and services to become more sustainable. 
The arguments presented by Costanza et al. (1997) aligned perfectly with the 
growth-centric, market-led approach to economic policy in the neoliberal era. Command-
and-control regulations enacted by the state were viewed by proponents of neoliberalism 
as costly and obstructive to the free functioning of markets (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). 
However, if ecosystem services – like CO2 sequestration – were given a price, these 
proponents believed that the newly-valued services could be treated as commodities and 
traded in markets. For example, a forest-based landowner could sell her ability to 
efficiently sequester CO2 through planting trees. In return, she could earn payments from 
other market actors that also want to mitigate climate change, but did not have the 
competitive advantage of doing so themselves. And since advocates of neoliberalism 
viewed free markets as the preferred means of distributing goods and services, trade in 
environmental commodities became the common-sense response to climate policy under 
neoliberalism as well (Kallis, Gómez-Baggethun, & Zografos, 2013, p. 99). 
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By the end of the 20th century, as the ideals of neoliberalism had spread 
worldwide, a growing number of policymakers and economists began promoting market 
trade as a solution to lower GHG levels. Hereafter, the design of cap-and-trade began to 
take shape. In a cap-and-trade scheme, a government sets an economy-wide limit (the 
“cap”) on the quantity of emissions allowed in each trading period. The total quantity of 
allowable emissions under the cap are treated as property rights to emit and divided 
between individual firms participating in the market. Firms must then ensure they have 
enough property rights, commonly known as permits or allowances (and measured as a 
tCO2e), to cover their emissions within the scheme’s designated trading period (Reyes & 
Gilbertson, 2010, p. 90). In other words, a cement factory must have allowances 
equivalent to its emissions for one trading period to surrender to the scheme 
administrator, typically the state in the jurisdiction where it exists.  
Depending on the economic sector or cap-and-trade scheme itself, allowances 
may be allocated to firms free of charge or sold to them in a method known as auctioning. 
If an industry’s emissions exceed its share of allowances, it must cover them through 
auction purchases or various forms of market exchange. The latter forms include several 
different strategies, the exact rules of which depend on the cap-and-trade scheme itself. 
First, firms may buy surplus allowances from other firms in the market who are more 
successful at reducing their emissions (Sandor et al., 2002, p. 1609). Second, firms can 
purchase allowances from speculators, entities without any emissions reduction 
commitments, that seek to buy and sell allowances at a profit (Ervine, 2016, p. 32; 
McAfee, 2015, p. 337). Third, firms might offset their emissions, purchasing credits from 
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projects that reduce GHGs outside the jurisdiction of the scheme administrator (Lovell et 
al., 2009, p. 2361).  
Carbon offsetting, as an important subset of cap-and-trade, warrants its own 
explanation as well. An oil refinery, for example, might find it physically difficult or 
expensive to reduce its emissions below a certain level in a cap-and-trade scheme. 
Instead, the company could purchase cheaper emissions reduction credits (i.e. offsets) 
from projects that reduce GHG emissions outside the scheme (Reyes & Gilbertson, 2010, 
pp. 93-94). One example of offsetting is a project that installs technology to destroy 
HFC-23, a GHG calculated to be 11,700 times more potent than CO2. The oil company 
might find it is cheaper to pay this project developer to destroy 11,700 tonnes of HFC-23 
than it is to reduce only one tonne of CO2 at the source, which makes the project a more 
financially viable alternative to comply with the cap-and-trade scheme (MacKenzie, 
2009, pp. 444-445). Another offset type is methane capture from livestock, particularly 
swine and cattle. In this model, technology is deployed to capture and burn methane – a 
GHG that is 21 to 25 times more potent than CO2 – by actually turning it into CO2 
(Alarcón, 2009, pp. 74-76). Like destroying HFC-23, an emitter could more cost-
effectively mitigate climate change by destroying 21 to 25 tonnes of methane instead of 
reducing one tonne of CO2.  
Critically, in both projects, the offset credits are considered equal to allowances 
traded in the cap-and-trade scheme, and may be used to meet a firm’s emissions 
reduction target. Therefore, an actual tCO2e reduction that the firm foregoes under the 
cap equals a payment for an “avoided” tCO2e outside the scheme; which in other words, 
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is a tCO2e that does not exist because of the firm’s offset payment (Lohmann, 2012, p. 
96). Overall, the idea behind all market transactions in a cap-and-trade scheme is that as 
the emissions cap shrinks over time, firms will seek to reduce their emissions by 
whatever method is cheapest. 
 This neoliberal logic behind carbon trading is perhaps best summed up by Richard 
Sandor, Eric Bettelheim, and Ian Swingland (2002) in their piece, “An overview of a 
free-market approach to climate change and conservation”. According to Sandor et al. 
(2002), saving the environment and mitigating climate change involves pricing CO2 
emissions (and other GHGs), which previously contained “zero” value (p. 1608). By 
assigning this price and treating these emissions like tradable property rights, carbon 
pricing could make one’s ability to freely release CO2 increasingly difficult. In this 
context, industries responsible for large quantities of CO2 emissions would now find it 
expensive to continue emitting at a BAU rate (pp. 1608-1609).  
According to Sandor et al. (2002), a market-led system would be the most 
efficient strategy to mitigate climate change. State-led regulatory policies, in their view, 
were not only a prohibitive restriction on economic growth, but also prevented various 
industries and firms from exercising their competitive advantage at cutting CO2 
emissions (p. 1609). Instead, if all entities were given property rights over their CO2 
emissions, and public policies did not interfere with market price signals, market 
transactions would efficiently reduce emissions where the cost of doing so was cheapest 
(Sandor et al., 2002, pp. 1608-1609; Stern, 2009, p. 99). This new trade in CO2 
commodities would present growth opportunities for efficient industries, who could sell 
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their unused emissions allowances on the market (Lohmann, 2005, p. 205). Additionally, 
carbon markets would create an opportunity for offset project developers, consultants, 
brokers, traders, and others who hoped to profit off the trade in carbon commodities 
(Ervine, 2013, p. 656).  
Driven in part by this logic, the idea of carbon trading entered centre stage on the 
international environmental policy realm by the end of the 20th century. The UNFCCC 
held its 3rd annual Conference of the Parties (COP 3) meeting in 1997 to construct a 
global agreement in combatting the threat of worsening climate change. The treaty 
reached at the meeting, known as the Kyoto Protocol (hereafter referred to simply as “the 
Protocol”), contained binding legislation that wealthy, industrialized, “Annex I” countries 
were to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2% below 1990 levels between 2008 
and 2012, while non-industrialized, lower-income “non-Annex I” countries were not 
assigned emissions targets (Cabello, 2009, p. 192).  
At COP 3, the US delegation was steadfast in its assertion that any strategy to 
reduce emissions must include a market mechanism. Prior to the conference, US 
Democratic President Bill Clinton stated that to “harness the power of the free market” 
would be to protect the environment and “yield not costs, but profits” (qtd. in Meckling, 
2011, p. 34). Financial traders and heavy-emitting corporations like BP and DuPont also 
supported a market-based policy, hoping to either profit off the new trade in GHGs or 
prevent more regulation-intensive policies from arising that interfered with their fossil 
fuel-led business models (Lohmann, 2005, p. 205; Meckling, 2011, p. 33). Acquiescing 
to US pressure, the Protocol included three “flexible mechanisms” for market-based 
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emissions reductions; cap-and-trade, and two carbon offsetting platforms, Joint 
Implementation (JI), and the CDM.  
The first cap-and-trade scheme to regulate GHG emissions after the Protocol was 
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Originating in 2005, the EU 
began the scheme as a way for its (now) 28 member states to meet their emissions 
reduction targets under the Protocol. Today, it is the world’s longest-running and largest 
cap-and-tap trade scheme. At the end of 2016, 17 cap-and-trade schemes operated across 
supranational (the EU), national (New Zealand, Switzerland) and subnational (California, 
Québec) levels worldwide, putting a price on 9% of the planet’s GHG emissions (ICAP, 
2016, p. 26). The province of Ontario also started its own Cap-and-Trade Program in 
2017, and China’s network of eight regional and municipal programs may be scaled up 
into a nationwide cap-and-trade scheme sometime during 2017 as well (ICAP, 2017, p. 
22).  
For the offset programs under the Protocol, JI allows Annex I countries to offset 
their emissions by investing in emissions reduction projects located in other Annex I 
countries – usually those in the former Soviet Union – while the CDM permits Annex I 
countries to invest in offset projects in non-Annex I countries in the South. The investor 
then receives emissions reduction credits, called Emissions Reduction Units (ERUs) in JI 
and Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) in the CDM (and standardized as one 
tCO2e), that correspond with the size of the payment (Newell & Paterson, 2010, pp. 79-
80, 86). Among the dozens of approved offset project types that are eligible to issue 
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offsets under the Protocol are HFC-23 destruction, methane capture, renewable energy 
(wind, solar, hydroelectricity), and tree planting.  
Particularly, the CDM has received the bulk of offset investment to date. Cheaper 
land and labour costs and less stringent regulatory frameworks for offset projects in 
Southern countries were promoted as a more cost-effective way for Annex I countries to 
comply with the Protocol, instead of altering their dependence on fossil fuels (Böhm & 
Dabhi, 2009, p. 12). In fact, Article 12 of the Protocol states outright that the CDM is 
designed to make it less costly for Annex I countries to meet their emissions targets 
(McAfee, 2012, p. 111). Additionally, non-Annex I countries that hosted CDM projects 
were also supposed to benefit through income from project development and offset credit 
generation, knowledge transfers of low-carbon technologies, and community involvement 
in CDM projects (Böhm & Dabhi, 2009, pp. 13, 16). Subsequently, a vast network of 
carbon offset projects has developed across the Global South. Between the Protocol’s 
ratification in 2005 and January 2017, 7,749 offset projects were registered with the 
CDM (UNFCCC, 2017). 3,027 of these projects have generated over 1.75 billion CERs, 
or two-thirds of all offsets issued under the Protocol (UNEP-DTU Centre, 2017b; 
UNFCCC, 2017). On the other hand, JI projects have issued just over 871 million ERUs 
(UNFCCC, 2016).  
Importantly, creating a carbon offset is an incredibly complex undertaking. Adam 
Bumpus (2011) has coined the phrase “hemming in” to describe the process of 
transforming a tCO2e reduction into tradeable commodity (p. 619). At the outset, trade in 
offsets depends on a tCO2e reduced from one offset project equalling a tCO2e reduced 
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from a different project (commensuration), so it may then be bought and sold on the 
market (fungibility) (MacKenzie, 2009, p. 443; Newell & Paterson, 2010, p. 86). 
However, offset project types vary in their capacity to fully hem in a tCO2e reduction, 
and thereafter generate reliable emissions reduction credits. For example, HFC-23 
destruction projects contain a clear methodology for reducing GHG emissions, and do so 
at an easily accessible, central location, making for efficient credit issuance. On the other 
hand, offset initiatives to replace emissions-intensive, wood-burning stoves in rural 
households with stoves that burn less biomass are more difficult. Not only is emissions 
data from these stoves often sourced from estimates, but the process of issuing offset 
credits can mean conducting lengthy follow-up studies to verify that the new stoves are 
being used (Bumpus, 2011, pp. 616, 627; Ervine, 2015, p. 252). It should come as no 
surprise, then, that HFC-23 destruction projects have issued 30% of all CERs to date, 
while projects that improve household energy efficiency, including clean cookstoves, 
have generated less than 1% (UNEP-DTU Centre, 2017b). As this statistic shows, the 
capacity for a project to hem in a tCO2e is directly linked to its potential for future capital 
accumulation (Bumpus, 2011, p. 621).  
The concept of hemming in also relates to an essential quality of any offset 
project in JI or the CDM, proving “additionality”. That is, emissions reductions through 
an offset project must exceed what would otherwise occur in a BAU scenario (Ervine, 
2013, p. 657). If reductions were going to happen without the project – through a 
government regulation, for example – then the project should not issue ERUs or CERs, as 
the Annex I emitter would not have contributed to those reductions via its offset 
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payments. To achieve additionality, a reference level or baseline is calculated to forecast 
what BAU emissions would look like in the absence of a project (Lohmann, 2012, p. 99; 
Seyller et al., 2016, p. 232). If the project then reduces emissions below the baseline rate, 
ERUs and CERs may be generated. 
However, there are several problems related to additionality. As Bumpus (2011) 
notes, proving additionality is a key part of marketing an offset project, as initiatives that 
reduce many emissions are more financially attractive to investors (p. 621). This, in turn, 
creates a perverse incentive for project developers to inflate a reference level or actual 
emissions and generate more offsets (Lohmann, 2005, p. 218). For example, in JI, several 
Russian industries intentionally increased their production of HFC-23 and other industrial 
gases past BAU levels. Once the plant operators received JI investment, they scaled back 
this artificially high production and issued ERUs that were not caused by the original 
payments, which in other words, were non-additional (Schneider & Kollmuss, 2015, p. 
1062). Similarly, in 2010, firms in China, India, and Central America were found to have 
artificially increased their HFC-23 production to earn CERs as well (Ervine, 2013, p. 
662). Although such projects have come under scrutiny in the time since (the EU ETS 
phased out HFC-23 destruction projects in 2013), the goal of maximizing additionality to 
sell offsets remains a key driver across all project types, since offset project developers 
depend on carbon commodity revenue to make a profit.    
2.3.1 Carbon Forestry: The Beginnings of REDD+  
One important type of offset project that has arisen through the development of 
the CDM is carbon forestry, which builds off the numerous ecosystem functions and 
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services that trees provide. Trees cover 30% of Earth’s surface and play a critical role in 
sequestering CO2 for long periods of time (De Shazo et al., 2016, p. 9). 7 Tropical forests, 
mainly located in countries in the Global South, also hold up to 50% more carbon per 
hectare than those in other regions (Hall, 2012, p. 3). Adding to their importance, 15 
million hectares of forests are lost every year, which contributes to roughly 9% of global 
CO2 emissions (De Shazo et al., 2016, p. 9; Le Quéré, 2016, p. 625). Around 1.6 billion 
people worldwide are either fully or partially dependent on forests for their livelihoods or 
shelter as well, making forest preservation an immense environmental, economic, and 
social priority (Hall, 2012, p. 7). 
Initially, two distinct categories of forestry-based offset projects were proposed 
for use under the CDM. The first of these are the related methodologies of afforestation 
and reforestation (AR). Under the terms of the Kyoto Protocol, afforestation involves 
planting trees on land not forested for the past fifty years, while reforestation involves 
planting trees on areas deforested prior to 1990 (Neef, von Luepke, & Schoene, 2006, p. 
3). As new forest stocks grow and mature, they can, in theory, store CO2 emissions in 
addition to what would happen in a BAU scenario, allowing them to generate CERs for 
purchase by Annex I countries.  
The second category is comprised of “avoided deforestation” initiatives. Rather 
than a project developer planting new trees to sequester CO2, avoided deforestation 
projects would generate emissions reduction credits by merely slowing an area’s 
deforestation rate from its BAU, historical rate. A baseline deforestation rate, or reference 
                                                 
7 Although as Ciais et al. (2013) caution, this sequestration is not permanent, as trees will 
continue to release CO2 through seasonal cycles or after dying.  
 49 
level, would be calculated using a mix of historical deforestation data from the project 
area or country at hand, remote sensing satellite imagery, and on-the-ground 
measurements. These methods are designed to determine additionality, which in this case 
is the projected rate of deforestation expected to occur without project financing versus 
deforestation that takes place after the addition of the project (Estrada & Joseph, 2012, 
pp. 253-256; Lohmann, 2015, p. 4). Once a decline in deforestation below the baseline 
rate is monitored, reported, and verified (MRV) via remote sensing, field data 
measurements, and local knowledge of the project area, the project developer can issue 
and sell emissions reductions credits (Korhonen-Kurki, Brockhaus, Duchelle, Atmadja, & 
Thu Thuy, 2012, pp. 97-98).  
Carbon forestry projects have attracted a variety of critiques though, especially in 
relation to the problem of hemming in forest-based offsets. Unlike emissions from fossil 
fuel-based sources, which are mostly constant over time, forest-based GHG emissions 
range in intensity based on both weather conditions and shifts in economic activities that 
cause deforestation (Ervine, 2015, p. 252). Thereby, the process of setting a credible 
reference level to measure additional emissions reductions is incredibly difficult. Trees 
can also be lost to human-related or natural causes – like fires or shifts in climate patterns 
– once the project begins, which threaten to invalidate offset credits (Gutiérrez, 2011, p. 
650). Furthermore, if deforestation activity simply relocates from the project area to 
another location, an occurrence known as leakage, emissions are only displaced rather 
than reduced (p. 652).  
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Debates between scientists, policymakers, and others about the feasibility and 
integrity of carbon forestry projects ultimately ended in a compromise: only AR projects 
in the CDM were ruled to be credible enough to produce offsets under the legally-binding 
Protocol, while avoided deforestation projects were banned due to the technical 
difficulties in the measurement and MRV process for emissions reductions (Pistorius, 
2012, p. 639). Even then, though, apprehensions about carbon forestry remained. The EU 
ETS barred its member industries from utilizing AR credits to offset their emissions, and 
Annex I countries under the Protocol were only permitted to offset 1% of their 1990 
emissions totals through AR initiatives (Hall, 2012, p. 31; Haupt & Von Lüpke, 2007, p. 
5).  
 Subsequently, AR projects have failed to stimulate much development in the 
CDM. In addition to problem of hemming in forest-based emissions, another reason for 
this is that newly planted trees take years to mature and realize their full sequestration 
and credit generating capacity, which is a financial constraint on project developers 
(Thomas, Dargusch, Harrison & Herbohn, 2010, p. 881). Other kinds of offset 
methodologies, like methane capture and HFC-23 destruction, can generate emissions 
reductions and a subsequent return on investment much quicker (Bumpus, 2011, p. 621). 
A CDM project backer would, therefore, likely find these types of projects to be more 
reliable and profitable investments than AR projects. Combined with the problem of 
hemming in forest-based emissions, AR has barely made a dent in CDM offset projects. 
Only 0.8% of registered CDM projects were AR in January 2017, of which a mere 3 
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projects had issued 751,000 CERs, far less than 1% of all CERs issued to date (UNEP-
DTU Centre, 2017a; UNEP-DTU Centre, 2017b).  
Although omitted from the CDM, avoided deforestation projects would resurface 
in climate policy discussions in the mid-2000s. A group of countries called the Coalition 
of Rainforest Nations (CfRN) put avoided deforestation back on the table at COP 11 in 
Montreal in 2005. The CfRN believed that selling emissions reductions from forest 
preservation on international carbon markets could provide an important source of 
foreign investment for tropical forested countries (Coalition of Rainforest Nations, 2016; 
McAfee, 2012, p. 123). By the time that COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia took place in 2007, 
the CfRN’s initial blueprint for avoided deforestation offsetting had evolved into the 
modern framework for REDD. The Bali Action Plan, adopted at COP 13, also called for 
REDD to incorporate the goals of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks into this model, now denoted as “REDD+” (Lang, 
2009, pp. 214-215). 
Because REDD+ projects are not permitted under the Protocol, current efforts to 
scale up avoided deforestation initiatives are occurring outside the CDM. The UN REDD 
Programme and World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) are providing 
technical and financial support to countries in the South in getting nationally-
administered REDD+ schemes off the ground (McAfee, 2015, p. 2015, p. 338). So far, 
the UN REDD Programme has partnered with 64 countries and raised USD 269.7 million 
in funds, and the FCPF has partnered with 47 countries and received over USD 1.1 
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billion in funds for REDD+ program development and implementation (FCPF, 2016, pp. 
11, 59; UN-REDD Programme, 2016, pp. 1, 4). 
For now, REDD+ project financing in both the UN REDD Programme and FCPF 
is only taking place through grants. Ultimately, the goal is that recipient countries will 
transition to a model where payments are received only when forest-based emissions 
reductions are proven, in route to a market-based system (FCPF, 2016, p. 7). Donor 
nations have begun working with tropical forested countries as well to develop the 
frameworks for nationally-administered, market-based REDD+ programmes, including 
Germany’s REDD Early Movers Programme and Norway’s International Forest and 
Climate Initiative (De Shazo et al., 2016, p. 32). Article 5 of the Paris Agreement also 
identifies REDD+ as a mechanism for mitigating climate change in the UN’s post-2020 
climate policy, possibly through a global carbon market (UNFCCC, 2015, p 23).  
Alternatively, one option for market-based REDD+ schemes put forth by 
governments, private companies, and NGOs has materialized in the voluntary carbon 
market, or VCM (McAfee, 2015, p. 338). Instead of going through the CDM cycle of 
design, registration and MRV that AR projects must follow – which involves numerous 
private, governmental and UN bodies and can take up to three years before approval – 
VCM projects take place outside of existing environmental and climate change 
regulations and agreements (Newell & Paterson, 2010, pp. 84-85, 110). In most cases, 
they are initiated by companies looking to promote corporate social responsibility and 
brand themselves as both environmentally and socially progressive (Forest Trends, 2016, 
p. 37; Lovell et al., 2009, p. 2364). VCM projects typically use third party standards and 
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companies to develop, manage, and verify carbon offset projects and the emissions 
reduction credits they produce (Forest Trends, 2016, p. 37). In 2015, offset credits 
produced by REDD+ projects in the VCM retailed for an average price of USD 
3.30/tCO2e and were worth an estimated USD 37.5 million. This amounts to 11.1 
MtCO2e transacted, or 22% of the VCM’s overall quantity of offset credits from all 
project types (pp. 3, 15, 46). 
Above all, carbon forestry offset programs, like carbon trading in general, appeal 
to heavy emitters in a fossil fuel-dependent society. One estimate predicts that climate 
change mitigation efforts in the forest sector alone would save 3.5 billion tCO2 emissions 
by 2030, and could halve the cost of lowering these emissions to 1990 levels by 2030 
(Lederer, 2011, p. 1902). To proponents, carbon forestry projects like REDD+ represent a 
“win-win” solution to climate change, reducing deforestation rates through market-based 
payments, while also providing funding for conservation and development to populations 
in the South (Angelsen & McNeil, 2012, p. 35; Code REDD, 2013; Sandor et al., 2002, p. 
1614). As the next section will demonstrate, though, many important environmental and 
social concerns have plagued the design and implementation of carbon trading and 
carbon forestry mechanisms.  
2.4 Analyzing the Critiques of Carbon Trading and Carbon Forestry 
 Carbon trading programs have taken hold globally as a neoliberal approach to 
climate change mitigation, promising cost-effective emissions reductions facilitated by 
market trade. However, critics have challenged the ability of carbon trading strategies to 
contribute to rapid, significant, and equitable cuts in GHG emissions that are necessary to 
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avert catastrophic climate change. Apprehensions about the lasting environmental 
effectiveness and social impacts of cap-and-trade and offsetting, including REDD+, also 
relate to the distinctly capitalist design of carbon trading.  
As this thesis has already suggested, carbon trading is not an ideologically neutral 
climate policy. Instead, when viewed through an MPE framework, carbon trading has 
become the dominant climate change mitigation strategy over the past two decades 
because it best aligns with the growth imperative of fossil capitalism (Böhm et al., 2012 
p. 1624). By leaving market price signals to determine the cheapest sources of emissions 
reductions, heavy-emitting firms and governments can protect their dependence on fossil 
fuels so long as they purchase additional allowances within their cap-and-trade scheme, 
or offset their emissions elsewhere. Here, fossil-fuel intensive entities can use carbon 
trading’s dual promises of economic growth and market-based emissions reductions to 
dilute the “fatal connection” (Newell, 2008, p. 516) that links capitalist development with 
the climate crisis (see also Lohmann 2012, p. 91).  
 However, existing research has problematized the notion that carbon trading can 
rectify the environmental degradation caused by capitalist development. In particular, 
carbon forestry offsetting has been a focal point to hone in on the environmental concerns 
that surround all forms of carbon trading. A common theme among opponents is that 
carbon forestry offsetting lacks environmental integrity, a by-product of commodifying 
CO2 emissions for market trade regardless of how or where they were produced. In the 
case of REDD+ offsetting, for example, an actual reduction of a fossil fuel-based tCO2e 
(not taken by the entity purchasing the offset) is made equal to that of an avoided, 
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“biotic-based” tCO2e (made possible by the entity’s offset payment), found in trees, 
grasslands, soils, and other forms of organic matter in the planet’s biosphere (Lohmann, 
2012, p. 96; Lohmann, 2015, p. 4). 
 Indeed, those who question the environmental promise of carbon trading raise 
some critical points. Although fossil-based and biotic-based CO2 emissions are treated as 
chemically equal in carbon markets, from a climatic standpoint the two are very different. 
When fossil fuel combustion occurs, CO2 that has not interacted with the atmosphere for 
millions of years is suddenly released and adds to the above-ground “carbon pool” 
(Dooley, 2014, p. 6). In non-geologic time, these emissions are basically irreversible, 
since different carbon reservoirs, like oceans and forests, can sequester only so much CO2 
over the course of hundreds or thousands of years (Ciais et al., 2013, p. 544; Dooley, 
2014, p. 6). In fact, a recent study suggests the Northern Hemisphere biosphere reached 
peak carbon storage capacity in 2006, and has taken in less CO2 every year since (Curran 
& Curran, 2016). This is a troubling development, especially when considering another 
recent study that projects global temperatures to rise between 6.4° and 9.5°C if known 
fossil fuel resources are burned (Tokarska, Gillett, Weaver, Aurora, & Eby, 2016). In 
contrast, biotic CO2 emissions will fluctuate between the atmosphere and vegetation 
based on seasonal growth patterns, and trees will only store CO2 for centuries at most 
before dying and returning it to the atmosphere as part of a natural cycle (Dooley, 2014, 
p. 6). 
 The climatic difference between these two types of emissions is incredibly 
significant. For one, carbon forestry offsetting, like offsetting in general, does not 
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actually mitigate climate change. A tree-planting or avoided deforestation offset project 
merely compensates for continued fossil fuel-based CO2 emissions, and does not reduce 
global CO2 emissions overall (Cabello, 2009, p. 196). Additionally, commensurating 
fossil and biotic CO2 reductions as equal for market trade neglects whether or not these 
emissions reductions come from strategies that phase out fossil fuel combustion, the 
biggest and longest-running contributor to anthropogenic climate change (Lohmann, 
2012, p. 91).  
 Putting aside this fundamental distinction between fossil and biotic-based CO2 
emissions for the time being, the process of accurately hemming in emissions reductions 
through carbon forestry offset schemes is an arduous task. Several uncertainties and 
challenges abound in estimating carbon stock transfers between trees and the atmosphere, 
accessing sufficient historical data to calculate a project’s baseline deforestation rate, and 
protecting tree stocks from loss due to fire, droughts, and other weather or climate-related 
events (Bumpus, 2011, p. 616; Dooley, 2014, pp. 11-12, 17-18). Companies, 
governments, and organizations involved in developing forest-based offset projects have 
formulated various technologies and calculations to aid the process of hemming in biotic 
CO2, but these methods have also run into their own set of issues. 
Remote sensing, a computer-based system that uses satellite imagery to measure 
changes in forest cover and subsequent carbon fluctuations in AR and REDD+ projects, 
is one technology that shows the difficulty of hemming in biotic CO2 emissions. A 2012 
study produced for the Center for International Forestry Research assessed the quality of 
remote sensing technology used by 17 pilot REDD+ projects implemented in 6 countries. 
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Of these projects, only 7 were using high resolution (<10 metre) remote sensing imagery 
to model the deforestation rate, a requirement established by the largest VCM project 
developer and verifier, the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) (Estrada & Joseph, 2012, p. 
258).  
Although only 10 of these 17 projects were seeking verification through the VCS, 
the quality of remote sensing imagery can be critical in determining the environmental 
integrity of a carbon forestry project, as reported by Betsy Beymer-Farris and Thomas 
Bassett (2012). The two analyzed a pilot REDD+ project in coastal Tanzania that was 
developed to combat an alleged decline in mangrove forest cover. However, the authors 
found that the project’s medium resolution remote sensing imagery was not detailed 
enough to account for the naturally patchy and geographically varied distribution of 
mangrove forests. Without confirmation that deforestation is occurring and is capable of 
being measured, the rational for the entire project could be debunked (Beymer-Farris & 
Basset, 2012, p. 339).   
Yet, even if a project developer were to obtain high-resolution imagery, it would 
not overcome a fundamental problem with remote sensing itself. In their discussion on 
the use of geospatial data to stimulate biofuel production, Rachel Nalepa and Dana Marie 
Bauer (2012) identify several important drawbacks of remote sensing technology. 
Namely, remote sensing categorizes forested spaces in line with the perspective of who is 
deploying the technology. In this case, the technology suits developers that are focused 
strictly on increasing biofuel production, and classifies forests based on their potential 
contribution to the growth of international commodities markets for bioenergy (Nalepa & 
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Bauer, 2012, pp. 405, 418). Through this narrow view, remote sensing technology does 
not account for the complex socio-economic factors that lead to an area’s classification, 
or may stimulate a need for re-classification in the future (pp. 415, 418). Applied to 
REDD+, remote sensing is undertaken first and foremost to serve the interests of 
developers engaged in carbon commodity exchange, identifying which locations can 
yield the most offset credits.   
 Next, establishing credible baseline emissions rates to judge the additionality of a 
REDD+ project is a monumental task. In fact, a lack of consensus on how to prove that 
offset payments would directly lead to a decline in deforestation was one reason why UN 
policymakers did not include avoided deforestation projects in the CDM in the first place 
(Pistorius, 2012, p. 639). Nevertheless, the issue has persisted among REDD+ projects in 
the VCM, which Seyller et al. (2016) document in a recent study. The authors look at two 
REDD+ projects developed by private companies and conservation NGOs in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Madagascar. Both initiatives used 
reference areas – an outside land unit believed to reflect the biophysical makeup of the 
project area, as well as land use activity in it – to determine the baseline deforestation 
rate. Consequently, the baseline is used to assess how much deforestation the REDD+ 
project will prevent, and how many offset credits it can generate (pp. 234-235).  
 The reference areas used, though, drastically varied in size, forest density, and 
deforestation trends from the actual project sites. Both reference areas contained a 
deforestation rate that was twice that of the project area, which in the Madagascan project 
was mistakenly attributed to be the actual rate of the project area (Seyller et al., 2016, p. 
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240). In what is known as the “hot air phenomena”, the deforestation rate could stay the 
same, or even increase, yet earn bogus, non-additional offset credits because the rate 
would still be lower than that of the reference area. (pp. 235, 240). In other words, a 
company could say that it had reduced emissions by purchasing offset credits from the 
REDD+ project, even though the deforestation rate in the project area did not improve. 
Additionally, the reference area in the DRC project featured a patchy, mosaic forest 
instead of the project area’s dense, tropical forest (p. 237). Forest cover in the project area 
could decline but still not count as deforestation, because the forest type assumed from 
the reference area was naturally sparser. Seyller et al. (2016) conclude from their analysis 
that REDD+ project developers prioritize maximizing offset credit generation and 
revenue over environmental integrity in designing reference areas for the projects (pp. 
243-244). This is also reminiscent of the perverse incentive exercised by HFC-23 project 
developers, who overestimated or intentionally increased their emissions to produce more 
offset credits and gain higher profits (Ervine, 2013, p. 662; Lohmann, 2005, p. 218).  
 Any emissions reductions from a carbon forestry project that were deemed 
additional would not be immune from environmental integrity concerns at a later point. 
One problem relates to non-permanence, where trees that are either planted or protected 
from deforestation are later destroyed or degraded from human or natural causes 
(Gutiérrez, 2011, 650). If the trees responsible for the offset credit are lost due to fires, 
droughts, or the resumption of land-clearing activity, that credit no longer represents a 
tCO2e reduction for the entity offsetting its emissions. A Dutch NGO called Face the 
Future learned this lesson firsthand while developing an offset-based reforestation project 
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in Uganda’s Mount Elgon National Park. Initially, the project was forecasted to produce 
3.73 MtCO2e worth of offset credits, with 44% of these put in a risk buffer to issue in the 
case of forest loss in the future (Cavanagh & Benjaminsen, 2014, p. 61). To make room 
for the project, the Ugandan state forcibly evicted as many as 150,000 forest dwellers 
living throughout the parts of the national park destined for reforestation and additional 
conservation measures to be carried out by the state and NGOs (p. 59).  
Many of these people, however, were poor and subsistence-based farmers who 
depended on the land and resources in the park to survive. Firewood and medicinal plant 
collection, small-scale agriculture, and animal grazing were just some of the integral 
livelihood functions performed by local people in this area (Nakakaawa, Moll, Vedeld, 
Sjaastad, & Cavanagh, 2015, p. 2). In fact, restrictions on economic activity and forest 
access in the wake of these measures contributed to a USD 108.00 drop in average 
household income (Vedeld, Cavanagh, Petursson, Nakakaawa, Moll, & Sjaastad, 2016, p. 
190). With few other options for income generation, these groups continued to engage in 
small-scale deforestation and resource collection from the areas they had been evicted or 
banned from. After several years of project activity, Face the Future found that up to 44% 
of the reforestation area was affected by villagers’ prolonged use of the forest, which was 
the upper limit of the risk buffer (Cavanagh & Benjaminsen, 2014, p. 62). This threatened 
the environmental integrity of the offset credits so much that Face the Future eventually 
halted its reforestation activities altogether. 
 Another problem that undermines the environmental integrity of carbon forestry is 
leakage, where deforestation-related activities move outside of the project area (McAfee, 
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2015, p. 340). Any instance where deforestation emissions are simply displaced from 
inside the project area to outside of it means that no net emissions reductions occur, 
invalidating the tCO2e reduction credit issued. Many companies and organizations that 
advocate for carbon forestry projects also possess a short-sighted view of leakage, and 
believe that deforestation pressure can be contained just outside of a project’s boundaries 
(Seyller et al. 2016, p. 241). However, this view neglects the fact that governments that 
host REDD+ projects can encourage avoided deforestation initiatives in remote areas, 
while still channelling investments in agriculture, logging, or other forest-clearing 
activities to more accessible locations (pp. 241, 243).  
 Connor Cavanagh, Pål Vedeld, and Leif Trædal (2015) take this possibility even 
further, exposing how leakage may go beyond the national borders of the host country. 
Looking at the development of national REDD+ schemes in Tanzania, Kenya, and 
Uganda, the authors theorize that increased environmental monitoring in preparation for 
REDD+, including heightened military patrols to clamp down on encroachment, might 
lead to an accompanying rise in deforestation in the region’s less-regulated neighbouring 
countries (pp. 76-77). A nearby country like the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), for example, contains a much larger forested area (68% of total area) than Kenya 
(6%) or even Tanzania (38%), and could very well fill the demand for timber and 
charcoal in the region that is restricted by certain countries’ national REDD+ schemes (p. 
77). 
 The above examples demonstrate the immense contradiction between 
commodifying CO2 emissions for market trade and achieving verifiable and lasting 
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emissions reductions. As Polanyi (1944) described through the concept of a “fictitious 
commodity”, nature (in the case of carbon trading, CO2) can never be fully captured in 
capitalist markets, because it was never produced for sale as a commodity in the first 
place (McCarthy & Prudham, 2004, p. 281; Robertson, 2012, pp. 389-390). By assigning 
property rights to nature, market actors unsuccessfully attempt to overcome its 
biophysical properties and socio-cultural values that exist independent of the demands of 
capital accumulation (Castree, 2008, p. 281; Wanner, 2015, p. 25).  
 Thus, the complications and uncertainties that characterize carbon forestry 
projects – equating fossil and biotic-based CO2, hemming in emissions, proving 
additionality, preventing against non-permanence and leakage – should foreclose any 
reason to promote carbon forestry in mitigating the worsening effects of climate change. 
However, the possible use of REDD+ for a post-2020 global carbon market in the UN 
Paris Agreement, the development of national REDD+ schemes, and the operation of 
many REDD+ projects on the VCM suggest that policymakers will not exercise this 
caution. Simply put, carbon forestry programs offer the least path of resistance for heavy 
emitters to sustain BAU growth under fossil capitalism. The economic arguments in 
favour of carbon forestry – low-cost emissions reductions for heavy emitters, profit 
opportunities for project developers, consultants, and others – have neatly aligned with 
the preference for market-led, growth-accommodating solutions to environmental 
management in the era of neoliberalism. Capitalist entities require new sources of 
commodities to satiate their growth imperative, so the potential for forest-based offsets to 
satisfy this demand has undermined the valid environmental critiques of AR and REDD+.  
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 The implications of relying on questionable, market-led climate change strategies 
go beyond that of environmental integrity as well. Carbon forestry, and offsetting more 
broadly, has become a method to protect the North’s capacity to emit GHGs. Bachram 
(2004) has formulated the term carbon colonialism to describe how the North has 
displaced the responsibility to mitigate climate change to cheaper project sites in the 
South. The same set of measurement technologies that equates GHG emissions anywhere 
and from any source also allows Northern countries to offset their emissions in far off 
locations, rather than reduce emissions at home (Böhm & Dabhi, 2009, p. 13). In this 
view, carbon trading may be seen as a historical development of capitalism, where 
powerful countries exert their superior economic and political status for financial gain 
and heighten global inequalities in the process (Böhm et al., 2012, p. 1624). Now, these 
same powerful countries in the North are similarly attempting to maintain their 
dominance by convincing nations in the South to reduce emissions on their behalf 
(Bumpus & Liverman, 2008, p. 142; Lohmann, 2005, p. 209).  
 Several interrelated criticisms highlight the multiple ways in which the spread of 
carbon trading and REDD+ negatively impacts marginalized groups. The first of these 
criticisms comes from environmental justice and climate justice advocates, who condemn 
carbon trading for permitting GHG emissions to continue at Northern industries so long 
as offsets are purchased elsewhere. Environmental justice groups note that fossil-fuel 
industries in the North are typically located next to low-income, communities of colour, 
rather than more upwardly mobile, wealthy, typically white communities (Agyeman et 
al., 2002, p. 82). This is particularly problematic because fossil fuel combustion also 
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releases other airborne pollutants, which can cause serious cardiovascular and respiratory 
problems, and even death (EPA, 2014). A study by the American Cancer Society 
revealed that among 500,000 adults in 151 US cities, the mortality rate of residents in the 
most polluted cities exceeded residents of the least polluted cities by 17% (Bell & Samet, 
2016, p. 327). Furthermore, these damaging “co-pollutants” will continue if an industry 
can simply trade for emissions reductions credits elsewhere instead of reducing its 
pollution locally (Bachram, 2004, p. 17). In response, environmental justice advocates 
demand greater political representation to have a say in where polluting industries are 
located, and furthermore, to phase out harmful pollutants at the source (Agyeman et al., 
2002, p. 82).   
 Similarly, climate justice proponents follow the model of environmental justice 
groups, noting that the responsibility to drastically cut fossil fuel consumption should fall 
on the industrialized countries in the North, who have already contributed to 80% of 
historic global CO2 emissions (Okereke, 2011, pp. 121-122). Indeed, fossil fuel-based 
CO2 emissions outnumber CO2 emissions from land use change by over 9 to 1, and per-
capita emissions rates are substantially larger for countries in the Global North (IEA, 
2016; Le Quéré, 2016, p. 625). With these statistics in mind, the fact that Northern 
industries and countries are using carbon forestry projects to avoid tackling their own, 
larger contribution to climate change makes Bachram’s (2004) term carbon colonialism 
even more appropriate.  
 Several groups have embraced the arguments against carbon trading and REDD+ 
put forth by the environmental and climate justice movements over the years. The 2010 
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‘First Peoples’ World Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth in 
Cochabamba, Bolivia was organized by climate justice advocates, who hoped to include 
environmentally just principles in United Nations treaties and legislation on climate 
change. Among these principles was a recognition of the North’s historic contribution to 
climate change through fossil fuel consumption, and a rejection of the commodification 
of nature through carbon markets, including REDD+ (Bond, 2011, p. 8). The Durban 
Group for Climate Justice issued a statement at COP 16 in Cancún, Mexico that rejected 
REDD+ on the same basis as carbon offsetting more broadly. The statement argued that 
REDD+ offsetting delays urgent action on large-scale emissions cuts by giving industries 
and countries flexible investment opportunities in forest conservation (Bond, 2012, p. 
696). 
 The environmental and climate justice perspectives offer an important critique of 
carbon trading and carbon forestry that problematizes market-based environmental 
policies in general. The growth imperative of capitalism has historically produced 
negative climatic effects, while policymakers have responded with schemes like carbon 
trading and carbon forestry that protect the North’s capacity to emit. In the process, 
Southern nations are tasked with fixing a problem to which they have contributed very 
little, if at anything at all.  
Moreover, it is not just the discrepancy between the North and South’s 
contribution to GHG emissions that is worthy of being termed an environmental injustice. 
Past and existing AR and REDD+ projects have threatened the economic opportunities 
and livelihoods for forest dwelling communities. Indeed, as the case of the Mount Elgon 
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reforestation project shows, many rural and indigenous communities in tropical forested 
countries depend on forest-based resources for their survival (Cavanagh & Benjaminsen, 
2014; Nakakaawa et al., 2015; Vedeld et al., 2016). Furthermore, the process of enclosing 
and privatizing a tCO2e reduction for market trade can affect existing land tenure 
arrangements, which are defined as the right to hold and use land and other resources for 
a given period and under specific conditions (Corbera, Estrada, May, Navarro, & 
Pacheco, 2011, p. 304). As Corbera et al. (2011) explain, land tenure includes both 
formal rights to property that are upheld by legal institutions and informal rights relating 
to access and use. Informal rights can not only exist alongside formal rights, but may also 
be governed by relations and forms of authority that are entirely separate from those that 
guarantee the formal rights to property (p. 303).   
 One concept that is especially useful to pinpoint some of the ways that carbon 
forestry can negatively impact livelihoods and land tenure is James Fairhead, Melissa 
Leach, & Ian Scoones’ (2012) term green grabbing. These authors define green grabbing 
as “the appropriation of land and resources for environmental ends”, a phenomenon that 
evolves out of market-based environmental policies (Fairhead et al., 2012, p. 238). As 
these policies spread, previously uncommodified goods and services, like the ability of 
forests to store CO2, are commodified and privatized for incorporation into capitalist 
markets. However, when this occurs, CO2 and other objects are effectively “enclosed” or 
privatized, controlled by capitalist entities for the purpose of growth and profit, often 
regardless of how and by whom these goods and services were governed previously (De 
Angelis, 2004, p. 64). In this arrangement, a tCO2 reduction can be bought and sold by a 
 67 
singular, private entity, and no longer exists as a part of the global commons (Bachram, 
2004, p. 13) Fairhead et al. (2012) also note that green grabbing can lead to outright 
enclosures of land and resources for control by private or state capital, or alternatively 
foster the reorientation of laws and customs regarding access and resource use that still 
produces the same alienating effects (p. 239). Either way, green grabs can promote new 
inequalities between communities and outsiders, or exacerbate existing inequalities.  
 MacDonald’s (2005) account of a market-based wildlife conservation strategy in 
northern Pakistan serves as an example of the implications of commodifying nature, and 
thus helps to shed light on how we must theorize the consequences of carbon forestry as 
green grabbing. In 1996, the World Conservation Union signed an agreement with village 
leaders in the town of Hushe; villagers would stop hunting ibex, and in return, would 
receive revenue from the sale of permits to international hunters (MacDonald, 2005, pp. 
262-263). In effect, ibex became a commodity, whose preservation depended on 
enclosing them for exclusive hunting privileges by wealthy Westerners. The project 
moved forward despite no evidence to suggest that Hushe villagers had unsustainably 
hunted ibex in the past, or should be banned from hunting them in the future (pp. 273, 
282).  
Furthermore, the process of enclosing the ibex negatively impacted Hushe 
villagers by individualizing their role in the community. Formerly, village members had 
been able to freely hunt ibex in the region, a right that held significant cultural value in 
addition to its dietary necessity (MacDonald, 2005, p. 280). However, after the 
implementation of the World Conservation Union’s plan, any Hushe villager that killed 
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an ibex was not only reinforcing the organization’s false narrative of subsistence hunters 
as environmentally destructive, but was also committing a crime against the community 
by threatening village income from sale of the hunting permits (p. 281). The international 
hunter, on the other hand, was deemed to be protecting the ibex as a global commodity 
when she purchased a hunting permit (p. 282). An important implication of this for 
carbon forestry is that in a market-based environmental scheme, local modes of 
regulation and custom are usurped by the demands of the new regime doing the 
governing. Thereby, communities that hope to receive financial compensation as part of a 
conservation or carbon forestry project must abide by these enclosures.  
 Already, existing carbon forestry projects have advanced green grabs through the 
commodification of forest-based CO2. As discussed earlier, Cavanagh & Benjaminsen’s 
(2014) analysis of the Mount Elgon reforestation project in Uganda revealed that the 
initiative eventually halted reforestation activity after local people continued to use the 
project land they were evicted from. However, the evicted residents did not view 
themselves as illegal invaders, as they held customary tenure rights to their land based on 
their local traditions. Still, they were evicted for the creation of the reforestation project 
in 1993, a period when the Ugandan government claimed state ownership of all land. The 
state reversed this position in 1995 and recognized customary tenure rights again, but by 
this time the evictions had already started (Carmody & Taylor, 2016, p. 108; Cavanagh & 
Benjaminsen, 2014, p. 59). Despite the evicted peoples’ numerous claims to customary 
land ownership following the constitutional change, the project developer Face the Future 
made no mention of this contested history and forced removal when they published 
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brochures and annual reports about the trajectory of the project (Cavanagh & 
Benjaminsen, 2014, pp. 59-60). Together, the Ugandan state’s willingness to enforce 
Face the Future’s request for carbon offset commodities – free from human influence – 
advanced a green grab by adversely impacting the people who depended on the project 
area for their livelihoods.  
 The pilot REDD+ project in coastal Tanzania described by Beymer-Farris and 
Bassett (2012) also shows a preference for excludable spaces free from perceived human 
interference. The Tanzanian state planned to evict 18,000 residents from the Rufiji Delta 
to make way for the initiative, even though the residents had sustainably harvested 
mangrove forests for centuries (pp. 336-37). Again, a confusing land history complicates 
the situation. All Tanzanian mangrove forests are under state protection, and subsequent 
laws in the 1990s consolidated their control under the state and limited their use to 
scientific and protective purposes only (p. 335). Yet, the 2002 Forest Act permitted two 
different types of participatory forest management, giving local community associations 
some autonomy over their mangrove-covered jurisdictions (p. 335). In fact, some data 
even showed an increase in the area’s mangrove forest cover between 1993 and 2010 (pp. 
338-339). Nevertheless, forestry officials – backed by armed police – still attempted to 
evict villagers over their alleged forest destruction in the delta in 2011, reportedly 
burning down villagers’ huts and cutting down trees in the process (Lang, 2012; Beymer-
Farris & Bassett, 2013 p. 1355). Since then, the project has been halted due to reports of 
embezzlement, but the case still serves as a sobering example of the detrimental effects of 
green grabs (Hance, 2012).   
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 The case of the Kasigou Corridor REDD+ project in Kenya also exemplifies how 
offset projects can produce new inequalities or widen existing ones between local groups. 
The US corporation Wildlife Works started planning the project in 2008, and laid out a 
plan to compensate land owners and landless community members alike for refraining 
from cutting trees in the project area. Landowners in the area would receive 33% of the 
revenue from the sale of offsets, and after project costs were deducted, non-landowning 
community members would receive the remainder of the funds. However, the market 
price of carbon offsets on the VCM dropped significantly when credits were issued in 
2010, and non-landowning community members only received 14% of total revenue 
distribution. This was far less than the one-third ratio split expected between project 
costs, landowners, and communities at the outset of the project (Chomba et al., 2016, pp. 
206-207). These communities already faced restrictions on hunting, charcoal gathering, 
cultivation, and other extractive activities in the REDD+ project area to ensure that 
offsets were credible (p. 210). Consequently, a further decrease in revenue from the sale 
of carbon credits damaged their possible income opportunities even more.  
Additionally, private and public entities alike could take advantage of small land 
owners (smallholders) with marginal or unclear tenure rights, worsening income disparity 
through REDD+ payments. In Vietnam, for example, the state owns the highest quality 
forests, whereas local people typically receive access to poorer-quality, degraded forests. 
The possibility of a national REDD+ scheme in Vietnam means that most payments 
could be held at the government level, with very little trickling down to those who 
manage the forests on the ground (Larson et al., 2013, p. 683). Thus, even if communities 
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are not relocated or restricted from their homes, they could still be subjected to a different 
kind of green grab, where REDD+ payments remain in private or state hands, rather than 
flowing down to forest dwelling populations. Moreover, as the above examples have 
demonstrated, REDD+ entails a marked shift in how communities may use and interact 
with forests. As the carbon stored in trees becomes the property of the offset user, local 
groups are barred from subsistence-based, small-scale activities that may undercut the 
value of the offset credit. In turn, community livelihoods may be negatively impacted not 
only at the outset of a REDD+ scheme, but at a later point as well if these groups are not 
adequately compensated for their involvement in the project. 
2.5 Conclusion 
 Carbon trading has become the dominant policy response to climate change, albeit 
one that accommodates the main cause of the climate crisis itself, fossil capitalism. In the 
neoliberal era – where the power of free markets triumphs over state-led regulation of the 
economy – carbon trading, according to its proponents, promises flexible, low-cost 
emissions reductions designed to protect economic growth for fossil fuel-dependent 
entities. Carbon forestry offsetting is also an embodiment of market-based 
environmentalism. Firms receive emissions reduction credits for planting or protecting 
trees in the Global South, which is a more cost-effective method than reducing their 
emissions at the source. Moreover, it is a strategy that does not require the firm to shut 
down or drastically scale back production and CO2 emissions.   
 In all, this chapter argues that carbon trading is a problematic solution to climate 
change both environmentally and socially, and carbon forestry as a subset raises several 
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important questions. Why should the global community put its faith in a climate change 
strategy that not only has difficulty measuring and monitoring CO2 reductions, but in its 
design, allows for fossil-based CO2 emissions to continue? Why should populations in the 
Global South and marginalized groups in the Global North favour offset provisions that 
allow high-emitting countries and industries to ignore their disproportionate historic and 
present contribution to fossil-based CO2 emissions by offsetting their emissions instead? 
Why should carbon forestry policies that have the potential to undermine and harm 
peoples’ livelihoods by restricting access to land and resources be a central component to 
climate change policy?   
 The above concerns are becoming increasingly pronounced as more governments 
implement cap-and-trade schemes with offset provisions, and as the possibility of a post-
2020 international carbon market with REDD+ grows. The next two chapters show that 
in the immediate future, all eyes will be focused on California to establish an important 
precedent for the future of carbon trading worldwide. If the government of California 
allows capped industries to use REDD+ offsets in its Cap-and-Trade Program, the 
aspiration to achieve environmentally effective and socially just climate change 
mitigation in the future could take a serious hit.  
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Chapter 3: Market Environmentalism or Environmental Justice? 
Debates on Carbon Trading and Offsetting in California 
3.1 Introduction 
As the world’s 15th largest emitter—if taken as a country on its own – California 
has a significant impact on the state of climate change globally (Union of Concerned 
Scientists, 2014). In recent years, governments in the state have passed measures to limit 
California’s contribution to fossil fuel-based GHG emissions, one of which is the 
California Cap-and-Trade Program. Industries participating in the scheme may take 
several steps to cover their emissions under the cap, including trading allowances and 
offsetting from domestic sources. At present, international offsets are not permitted, but 
this may change if offsets from a REDD+ program in Acre, Brazil are allowed as early as 
2018. If completed, the “California-REDD linkage” would be the first time REDD+ 
offsets are used in a compliance-based emissions trading scheme anywhere in the world. 
Yet, many of the same environmental and social concerns about REDD+ offsetting 
discussed in Chapter 2 have surfaced in the debates over this proposed REDD+ linkage 
too. 
This chapter provides the background information on how proposals and plans for 
the California-REDD+ linkage have come about, with a specific focus on California. 
Section 3.2 presents a history of the California Cap-and-Trade Program, including how it 
was developed, the arguments for its implementation, and information on its design and 
current statistics. It also highlights the environmental justice community’s original 
opposition to the scheme. This is rooted in the connection between heavy-emitting 
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facilities and local pollution, which makes people sick while also worsening their 
resiliency to the effects of climate change. The environmental justice community argued 
that cap-and-trade would lead to or perpetuate pollution “hot spots”, where industries 
trade or offset their emissions rather than reduce them at the source. Subsequent 
movements have attempted to either block trading and offsetting altogether, so that 
industries would be forced to reduce their emissions and pollution at the source, or direct 
cap-and-trade funds to disadvantaged communities in the state, so that marginalized 
communities would receive tangible economic and environmental benefits from the trade 
in GHGs.   
Section 3.3 details how the state of California’s early efforts to protect tropical 
forests with other subnational jurisdictions worldwide has led to the proposed California-
REDD+ linkage, bolstered by California’s 2010 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
with Acre. Advocates of the linkage claim that REDD+ offsets, which they assert are 
“proven” and “significant” sources of emissions reductions, would help Californian 
industries achieve “flexible” and “cost-effective” climate change mitigation. On the other 
hand, critics have raised concerns that allowing REDD+ offsets in the scheme would 
constitute an environmental injustice, where industries pay for international offsets of 
questionable environmental integrity, all while protecting their fossil fuel-dependent 
business models at home.   
3.2 A History of Carbon Trading in California 
California has been somewhat of a unique case in the US, as it has consistently 
pioneered more stringent pollution regulations, emissions standards, and environmental 
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policies than most other states or the federal government. California’s environmental 
ambition can be traced back to the 1940s, when the city of Los Angeles was experiencing 
a massive problem with smog and haze brought on by rapid industrialization and 
automobile emissions in the region (Hanemann, 2007, p. 3). In 1945, the city passed an 
ordinance that placed limits on industrial smoke emissions and established an air 
pollution control unit in the city’s industrial health department. Two years later, the Los 
Angeles County Air Pollution Control District was created, the first of its kind in the 
country (p. 4). The city’s regulatory work to improve its environment spread state-wide 
throughout the 20th century, and even the federal government looked to California as “a 
kind of laboratory for innovation” in regulating pollution and developing clean 
technology (qtd. in Hanemann, 2007, p 5).  
California’s attention to environmental protection extended to tackling climate 
change in 1988, when the state’s energy policy and planning agency, the California 
Energy Commission, was tasked with taking inventory of California’s GHG sources 
(Hanemann, 2007, p. 8). Subsequent automobile fuel standards and renewable electricity 
mandates in the late 20th and early 21st centuries were passed by the state Legislature to 
both tackle the environmental cost of GHG emissions in the state and stave off potential 
fuel and energy shortages (p. 10). Given the state’s reliance on oil imports (70% of 
California’s petroleum consumption is sourced from out of state) and shale gas (the 
production of which only constitutes 1% of GDP), fossil fuel industries possessed a 
relatively marginal economic standing in the state, and thereby, less influence in 
obstructing these environmental policies (Harrison, 2013, p. S105; Houle, Lachapelle, & 
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Purdon, 2015, pp. 61-62). Coupled with high public belief in anthropogenic climate 
change and support for environmental policies in the mid-2000s, the stage was set for 
California to undertake its most robust environmental plan yet.  
In 2006, the California state Legislature passed Assembly Bill (AB) 32, also 
known as the Global Warming Solutions Act. Hailed at the time as a ground-breaking 
climate change policy, the act required California to cut its GHG emissions to 1990 levels 
by the year 2020, 40% below 1990 levels by 2040, and 80% below 1990 levels by 2050 
(Cullenward, 2014, p. 41; ICAP, 2016, p. 41). The state’s clean air agency, the California 
Air Resources Board (CARB), was tasked with developing programs to achieve this 
target under an initiative known as the Scoping Plan (London, Karner, Sze, Rowan, 
Gambirazzio, & Niemeier, 2013, p. 791). Twelve of the fourteen members of CARB are 
appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate, while the other two are appointed 
by the state Legislature. Six of these members are selected from the boards of the state’s 
local Air Quality Management Districts, and the other eight come from a pool of experts 
on engineering, science and law, health, and social work with communities that are 
vulnerable to high levels of pollution (CARB, 2016a). Some of the programs CARB 
included under the Scoping Plan were the Renewables Portfolio Standard, which 
mandates that electricity retailers source 33% of their product from renewable energy by 
2020, and the Low Carbon Fuel Standard, which requires a 10% drop in the carbon 
intensity of transportation fuels by 2020 (CARB, 2016b; Ramo, 2014, p. 113). 
Additionally, CARB developed an emissions trading scheme, known as the 
California Cap-and-Trade Program. Cap-and-trade was not originally mandated when AB 
 77 
32 was passed, but an Executive Order from California Republican Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger soon followed and prioritized it as a method to achieve the state’s GHG 
reductions (London et al., 2013, p. 795). The Schwarzenegger Administration argued that 
cap-and-trade would allow the state of California to achieve the greatest amount of 
emissions reductions at the lowest cost, and thereafter, CARB submitted its first cap-and-
trade plan in 2008 (Truong, 2014, pp. 502, 504). 
The California Cap-and-Trade Program began operation in January 2012, and 
Californian industries were forced to comply with the program’s restrictions on GHG 
emissions in January 2013. Californian businesses emitting over 25,000 tCO2e per year in 
the electricity and industrial sectors were required to participate in the scheme when it 
began. Since 2015, when transportation fuels were added to the coverage, the scheme has 
capped roughly 85% of the state’s emissions (Truong, 2014, p. 504).  Emissions 
regulated by the cap are to decline by nearly 80 million tCO2e from a BAU emissions 
scenario by the end of the third trading period in 2020, at a rate of 2-3% a year (Burtraw; 
McLaughlin, & Szambelan, 2012, p. 4; Purdon, Houle, & Lachapelle, 2014, p. 16). Of 
this number, 18 MtCO2e of reductions are expected to come exclusively through cap-and-
trade activity, meaning regulated industries must cut their emissions by 15% below 2012 
levels to meet this target (Ramo, 2014, p. 128).  
Allowances to emit, measured as one tCO2e, are distributed to participating 
Californian firms through a mixture of free allocation and auctioning. For free allocation, 
firms are ranked by their perceived carbon “leakage” risk, where a competitively 
disadvantaged or trade-exposed industry could relocate to a jurisdiction not subject to 
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carbon pricing rather than reducing its emissions (Ervine, 2016, p. 22). In the California 
Cap-and-Trade Program, oil and gas extraction companies, paper mills, chemical and 
cement manufacturers, and electricity retailers are given 100% of their allowances for 
free throughout the scheme’s three trading periods (Purdon et al., 2014, pp. 21-22). 
 For the permits that are not freely allocated, quarterly joint permit auctions take 
place between California and the Canadian province of Québec. Québec linked its own 
“Cap-and-Trade System for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowances” to California’s in 
2014 as part of the environmental non-profit corporation Western Climate Initiative 
(WCI). The WCI was designed to provide technical and administrative support to North 
American state and provincial governments in developing carbon trading programs 
(WCI, 2014). The linkage and joint auctions between California and Québec are meant to 
allow industries in each jurisdiction to achieve their GHG targets more easily by 
providing them with additional options (Haya, 2016, p. 5). Proponents contend that this 
allows for even greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness by expanding the number of 
low-cost emissions reductions possible in the scheme (WCI, 2010, pp. 5-6).  
For instance, a firm in Québec may have a difficult time reducing its emissions 
under the cap. Through the linkage to the California Cap-and-Trade Program, it may find 
it can purchase surplus allowances from an efficient Californian industry for cheaper than 
the cost of purchasing allowances at auction or from other Québécois industries. 
Similarly efficient industries in either jurisdiction, then, could also financially benefit 
from the sale of such allowances. Alternatively, critics of linking cap-and-trade markets 
argue that the arrangement allows market actors to send financial resources out of the 
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state or province, contributing to lost at-the-source emissions reductions and economic 
investment at home (Ranson & Stavins, 2016, pp. 5-6, 8).  
Capped industries in California may also offset up to 8% of their compliance 
emissions from domestic sources approved by CARB. US Forest, Urban Forest, 
Livestock (Methane Management), Ozone Depleting Substances, Mine Methane Capture, 
and Rice Cultivation are the six different project types industries may offset their 
emissions from (ICAP, 2016, p. 42). The US Forest offset type is an especially relevant 
precursor to the REDD+ linkage. Reforestation, improved forest management, and 
avoided forest conversion projects within the US are all eligible to receive funds for 
offset credits to use in the California Cap-and-Trade Program (Lueders, Horowitz, 
Carlson, Hecht, & Parson, 2014, p. 10). As of February 2017, CARB has issued just over 
30 million offset credits for compliance use from all the approved project types, except 
for Urban Forest and Rice Cultivation. About 70% of these credits have come from US 
Forestry projects as well (CARB, 2017b). 
Similar to the reasons presented in favour of the CDM, California politicians, 
fossil fuel industry representatives, and some environmental NGOs argued that offsets 
would substantially lower the costs of complying with emissions reductions under the 
Cap-and-Trade Program. The Western States Petroleum Association, a trade group 
representing 28 companies in the fossil fuel industry, argued that a more generous 
allowance for offsetting than CARB’s 8% limit would decrease program costs by 80% 
and keep 300,000 jobs in California that would otherwise be lost to leakage, as 
companies relocated to avoid the costs of the scheme (Reheis-Boyd, 2009). The non-
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profit environmental organization Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) claimed that the 
agriculture, forestry, and other sectors whose emissions were not capped under AB 32 
could benefit from technological innovation and emissions reductions made possible 
through offset payments (EDF, 2012). Additionally, proponents stated that climate 
change action could spur economic development in California, creating a centre for clean 
technology development in the state (Purdon et al., 2014, p. 40).  
However, not everyone has been keen to support the California Cap-and-Trade 
Program. Environmental justice groups were quick to oppose carbon trading, as it builds 
upon their struggle against California’s first experience with market-based environmental 
policy two decades ago. During the 1990s, the South Coast Air Quality Management 
District, covering metropolitan Los Angeles, implemented a pollution trading program to 
reduce the amount of particulate matter, a mix of solid and liquid pollutants, in the region 
(EPA, 2014). Particulate matter is emitted from power plants and some industrial and 
combustion processes, and can cause or seriously exacerbate respiratory or 
cardiovascular diseases like asthma, chronic bronchitis, coronary artery disease, and even 
cancer (Drury, Belliveau, Kuhn, & Bansal, 1999, p. 231; EPA, 2014). The pollution 
trading program, known as Rule 1610, allowed stationary facilities, like factories and 
refineries, to purchase credits from destroying old, high-polluting cars rather than 
installing more expensive technology to reduce pollution at the source (Drury et al., 1999, 
pp. 247-248).  
When Rule 1610 went into effect, industries predictably started to purchase 
cheaper pollution reduction credits from destroying automobiles instead of reducing at-
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the-source pollution. Four oil companies, Unocal, Chevron, Ultramar, and GATX, were 
the primary purchasers of these credits. Although air pollution declined slightly across 
the region, it became more concentrated near the facilities that chose to purchase the 
credits, creating “hot spots” of pollution (Drury et al., 1999, p. 253; Truong, 2014, p. 
506). Communities located next to these facilities did not receive the health benefits of 
lowered pollution, even though under Rule 1610, pollution across the region technically 
declined when automobiles were taken off the road and destroyed (Drury et al., 1999, p. 
253).  
Additionally, the communities located next to high-polluting facilities in 
California are disproportionately comprised of low-income persons of colour. According 
to a 2012 study, 46% of Californian residents live within 6 miles of petroleum refineries, 
cement plants, and power plants. However, 62% of this group are persons of colour, 
whereas non-Hispanic whites only make up 38% (Pastor, Morello-Frosch, Add, and 
Scroggins, 2012, p. 82). For some groups, the disproportionate exposure to pollutants is 
even worse. The number of African Americans that live within ½ mile of one of the 
above facilities is double the number that live more than 6 miles from one (p. 82). 
Additionally, 70% of African Americans that make less than USD 10,000 a year live 
within 6 miles of a facility, while only 41% of whites do (p. 87).  
Because of these inequalities, CARB’s own Environmental Justice Advisory 
Committee (EJAC) and their allied organizations across the state contended that carbon 
trading would bring no improvement in reductions of GHG emissions or co-pollutants for 
low-income groups and persons of colour (Truong, 2014, pp. 507-508). Environmental 
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justice advocates came together in releasing The California Environmental Justice 
Movement’s Declaration on Use of Carbon Trading Schemes to Address Climate Change 
in 2007, which was endorsed by dozens of organizations and individuals across the US. 
The declaration stated that carbon offsetting and trading schemes like the CDM and EU 
ETS do not contribute to substantial fossil fuel-based emissions reductions required to 
mitigate climate change, because the market-led design of carbon trading allows cost-
efficiency, rather than environmental impact, to determine where emissions cuts occur 
(EJ Matters, 2007).  
The EJAC acted on this argument in 2009 by filing a lawsuit against CARB. 
EJAC charged CARB with attempting to push through cap-and-trade in its Scoping Plan 
without thoroughly researching alternative, non-market-based emissions reduction 
policies (London et al., 2013, p. 796). The California Superior Court found that indeed, 
CARB had not carried out enough research into alternatives to cap-and-trade in the 
Scoping Plan, and furthermore did not wait to consider public feedback on cap-and-trade 
before approving the Plan (p. 797). Nevertheless, once CARB proved it had researched 
non-market alternatives and incorporated public feedback, it could proceed with its 
original cap-and-trade design as a part of AB 32.  
Once cap-and-trade was imminent, a conglomeration of civil rights organizations, 
mainstream environmental groups, communities of color, and environmental justice 
groups banded together over a common cause. These groups engaged in several 
legislative and legal proceedings to try and improve the Cap-and-Trade Program from an 
environmental and socio-economic standpoint. On the one hand, more environmentally-
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oriented groups were especially skeptical of the offsetting provision, and contended that 
it could not reliably reduce GHG emissions and mitigate climate change (Truong 2014, 
pp. 507-508). When firms offset their emissions, the state does not receive revenue from 
auctioning allowances that can go toward low-carbon and green energy projects (Ervine, 
2016, p. 6). One the other hand, and building off the experience of Rule 1610, civil rights 
groups argued that market-based environmental policies, including cap-and-trade, subject 
communities of colour and disadvantaged groups to new or continued “hot spots” in 
pollution. In the process, these groups do not experience the environmental and health 
benefits that could be achieved if pollution was cut at the source. (London et al., 2013, p. 
796).  
A main point among both groups was that AB 32 did not stipulate how exactly 
disadvantaged communities, like those located near heavy-emitting facilities, would 
benefit from California’s climate policy (Truong, 2014, p. 510). In addition to the health 
effects of co-pollutants, disadvantaged communities spend a large portion of their income 
on necessities like food and water, with costs likely to grow even more because of 
climate change (p. 498). One study also found that African Americans in Los Angeles 
were twice as likely than other Los Angeles residents to die in a heat wave, in part 
because they have less income to spend on water and electricity (p. 498). In response, the 
combination of environmental groups and civil rights organizations helped write and pass 
Senate Bill (SB) 535 in 2011 (p. 511).  
SB 535 mandates that 25% of allowance auction revenue from the California Cap-
and-Trade Program must benefit disadvantaged communities as defined by the California 
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Environmental Protection Agency’s “CalEnviroScreen” metric. 8 Additionally, 10% of 
the revenue must be invested within the geographic boundaries of the disadvantaged 
communities themselves (Truong, 2014 p. 514). So far, the state has implemented USD 
1.2 billion of auction revenue in low-carbon, green energy, and sustainable development 
programs that comprise the California Climate Investments (CCI) fund. SB 535 has 
contributed to 50% (USD 614 million) of this total benefiting disadvantaged 
communities, and 34% (USD 413 million) of the original amount has been invested 
within these communities’ geographic boundaries (CCI, 2017, pp. v, vii).  
For example, the Department of Community Services and Development has 
implemented its share of the state’s auction proceeds in the CCI fund towards various 
subprograms of the Low-Income Weatherization Program. These subprograms are 
designed to help low-income families save money on energy costs while also providing 
job training and employment opportunities. Employees might install solar panels in poor, 
single-family households, or repair or replace windows, refrigerators, and heating/cooling 
systems in low-income, single-family households and small multi-family homes (CCI, 
2017, pp. 72,75). Critically, 100% of the auction proceeds in these specific subprograms 
benefit and are located in disadvantaged communities (pp. 72, 75). Additionally, the 
California State Transportation Agency has designated 95% (USD 213.3 million) of its 
                                                 
8 In 2010, the California Environmental Protection Agency and Office of Environmental 
Health Hazard Assessment developed the California Communities Environmental Health 
Screening Tool, known as “CalEnviroScreen”. CalEnviroScreen quantitatively assesses 
pollution sources and stressors with a population’s vulnerability to pollution based on 
socio-economic indicators, and ranks the sum of these indicators across California’s 
8,000 census tracks. Based on this methodology, roughly 25% of the state’s population 
was categorized as “disadvantaged” (California Environmental Protection Agency, 2014).   
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allotted auction proceeds through its Transit and Intercity Rail Capital Program to benefit 
disadvantaged communities, with 81% (USD 182.4 million) located within these 
communities. The program is intended to make the state’s transit and rail system more 
efficient and sustainable, which includes improving access to transit and rail systems and 
increasing service for disadvantaged communities (p. 58).  
To bolster the effectiveness of legislation like SB 535, environmental justice 
advocates have also sought to either rein in or prevent outright the offsetting provision 
within the California Cap-and-Trade Program. In February 2013, SB 605, co-authored by 
Senate President Pro Tem Darrell Steinberg and Senator Ricardo Lara, was introduced to 
the California Legislature. This bill was designed to limit any offsets used within the 
California Cap-and-Trade Program to sources strictly originating in California (Lueders 
et al., 2014, p. 10). However, by the time the bill was passed a year and a half later, the 
California State Assembly had subjected it to major revisions, most importantly taking 
out the limitations on out-of-state offsetting (p. 11).   
In 2015, the Court of Appeal of the State of California upheld a prior Superior 
Court decision that had challenged CARB’s authority to include offsets in the Cap-and-
Trade Program. The original case, Citizens Climate Lobby and Our Children’s Earth 
Foundation vs. California Air Resources Board, was brought forth by two attorneys 
acting on behalf of the Citizens Climate Lobby (Monfreda, 2015, pp. 244-245). First, the 
attorneys argued against the use of “performance standards” to determine the validity of 
domestic offset projects. Performance standards were introduced as an alternative to the 
project-by-project standards used to register offset projects in the CDM, which critics 
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asserted made for a slow and expensive process of issuing offsets. In their view, 
performance standards would provide a universal measurement to quickly and cheaply 
determine additionality across an offset category if projects were simply beyond 
“common practice” (p. 245). However, the attorneys countered that the use of 
performance standards would allow for ongoing GHG reduction activities that were 
beyond common practice to generate non-additional offsets (p. 245).   
Furthermore, the attorneys claimed a “profitability test” – used to separate offset 
projects likely to go ahead without offset finance from those that were not – involved too 
much guesswork to account for the total costs of the project and how much offset credits 
would sell for (Monfreda, 2015, pp. 246-248). As a result, the petitioners cautioned that 
corrupt project developers could include activities that were not additional to earn more 
offset revenue (p. 248). However, both the Appeals Court and Superior Court concluded 
that if the petitioners’ critiques of determining additionality were accepted, these market-
based approaches to climate change mitigation would be ineligible from the program 
entirely (p. 250). 
The overall debate on carbon trading in California touches on many of the themes 
already raised in this thesis. Proponents have touted a cap-and-trade program as the 
means of providing cost-effective emissions reductions for Californian industries, with 
offsets adding an additional layer of flexibility for industries to reduce emissions outside 
of capped sectors. On the other hand, opponents have cited the major concerns with 
environmental effectiveness and equity in market-based emissions trading programs both 
in California and abroad to fight the roll-out of carbon trading. As the next section shows, 
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as REDD+ offsets may enter the Cap-and-Trade Program very soon, the debate between 
the two sides is far from over.  
3.3 Room for REDD+? International, Sector-Based Offsets in California 
  In its final draft of the Cap-and-Trade Program legislation, CARB sanctioned the 
possible use of international, sector-based offset credits in the California carbon market. 
Instead of coming from individual projects, a national, regional, or subnational 
government body outside the US could generate offsets by reducing its jurisdictions’ 
emissions across an entire economic sector, like in transportation, electricity, or land use, 
(Lueders et al., 2014, p. 5). If the governing body of this economic sector linked its 
climate policy or program providing the offsets to the California Cap-and-Trade Program, 
Californian industries could purchase these emissions reduction credits (CARB, 2015, pp. 
28-29). CARB stipulated that sector-based offsets could count for up to 2% of a firm’s 
emissions during the first two compliance trading periods, and up to 4% during the third, 
all within the existing 8% offsetting limit (Ramo, 2014, p. 128). 
As outlined in its final cap-and-trade plan in 2011, CARB has specifically 
targeted REDD+ projects as the source of sector-based offsets (Lueders et al., 2014, p. 9). 
According to CARB, continued deforestation, especially in the Amazon, would have a 
tremendous impact on California’s resistance to climate change. Forecast models predict 
that increased Amazonian deforestation could alter the path of the jet stream and lead 
storms away from California, which would reduce the shrinking snowpack in the state’s 
Sierra Nevada mountain range. (CARB, 2015, p. 10). Already, a 2014 report ruled that 
the state’s drought over most of the 2010s, caused by a persistent shift in the jet stream, 
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was three times as likely to occur under today’s atmospheric GHG levels than at pre-
industrial levels (Swain et al., 2014). Additionally, more studies predict that Amazonian 
deforestation could set off frequent El Niño-like events, where the eastern Pacific Ocean 
around the equator warms by several degrees, triggering intense climatic phenomena. In 
the past, El Niño has been linked to melting snowpacks in the Sierra Nevadas, and 
flooding and landslides at lower elevations in California (CARB, 2015, p. 10). 
With these worrying studies in mind, the Schwarzenegger Administration and 
outside consultants like US Forestry Service employee Tony Brunello and attorney 
William Boyd began working on international partnerships to stop deforestation, 
including through REDD+ (Lueders et al., 2014, pp. 7-8). First, the Californian 
government fomented interest among regional governments in tropical countries to tackle 
their forestry-related GHG emissions. At the 2008 Governors’ Climate Summit in Los 
Angeles, the government of California signed an MOU with many subnational 
governments at both domestic (Illinois, Wisconsin) and international (Brazil, Indonesia) 
levels to work on reducing deforestation and mitigating climate change (Lueders et al., 
2014, p. 8). The following year marked the founding of the Governors’ Climate and 
Forest Task Force (GCF), which built on the MOU signed at the Governors’ Climate 
Summit. The GCF also incorporated more regional governments, including jurisdictions 
in Brazil, Indonesia, Spain, Nigeria, Mexico, and Peru, encompassing over 1/5th of the 
world’s tropical forest cover in total (ROW, 2013, p. 8). 
Most importantly, in November 2010 California signed an additional MOU with 
fellow GCF states Acre, Brazil and Chiapas, Mexico. This MOU was distinct from the 
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previous version in its explicit desire to link jurisdictionally-administered REDD+ 
programs in both states to the California Cap-and-Trade Program. In contrast to project-
based REDD+ programs operating in the VCM, or UN and World Bank-sponsored 
schemes being developed nationally, the jurisdictional REDD+ program agreed upon in 
the MOU between California, Acre, and Chiapas would operate at the subnational level 
of the latter two states. 
Within a jurisdictional REDD+ scheme, a subnational government determines the 
baseline deforestation rate for its entire governing area. Proponents of this method – 
including researchers, government representatives, and others comprising the REDD 
Offset Working Group (ROW) commissioned by CARB in 2011 – argued that a 
jurisdictional program would allow a subnational government to coordinate 
deforestation-related policies, measurement and MRV techniques, social and 
environmental safeguards, and law enforcement approaches on a much larger scale than 
any project-based initiative (ROW, 2013, p. 24). In theory, the increased scope, 
coordination, monitoring, and planning in relation to avoided deforestation at the 
jurisdictional level would help prove the additionality of reduced forest-based emissions 
compared with a BAU scenario. Also, this increased scope might better account for and 
prevent non-permanence and leakage issues than a project-based REDD+ scheme (p. 24).  
The REDD Offset Working Group also raised the possibility of incorporating 
existing or future project-based REDD+ initiatives into a “nested” approach. In a nested 
REDD+ framework, emissions reductions are tracked at the project level, but projects 
issue offset credits based on gains or losses in forest-based emissions across the entire 
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jurisdiction (ROW, 2013, p. 28). Karsenty, Vogel, & Castell (2014) state that a nested 
REDD+ strategy might appeal to private sector groups who are skeptical of putting 
subnational governments in charge of distributing all REDD+ revenues (p. 21). However, 
a nested REDD+ strategy would require a great deal of work to harmonize deforestation 
reference levels and divide emissions reduction credits between projects and the 
subnational government, to ensure that false emissions reductions are not credited 
(Karsenty et al., 2014, p. 22; ROW, 2013, p. 28). 
Regardless of a purely jurisdictional or nested approach, REDD+ offsets remain 
attractive to Californian firms that desire cost-effective emissions reductions under the 
cap (CARB, 2015, p. 12; Dixon, Anger, Holden, & Livengood, 2008, p. 10). In a 2013 
letter to California Governor Jerry Brown and CARB Chairwoman Mary Nichols, dozens 
of private companies and market-based environmental organizations in the for-profit and 
non-profit sectors expressed their support for the California-REDD+ linkage. Their letter 
asserts that REDD+ “makes good business sense for California companies”, and is a 
“proven, cost-effective tool” in reducing deforestation-related GHG emissions (Code 
REDD, 2013, emphasis in original). One of these supporters, the natural gas and 
electricity utility Pacific Gas & Electric Company, stated that REDD+ offsets would help 
contain the costs of the Cap-and-Trade Program, while the EDF also wrote that a 
jurisdictional REDD+ program would lead to “significant emissions reductions” for 
Californian industries (Lueders et al., 2014, p. 19). 9   
                                                 
9 An extensive list of both supporters and critics of the California-REDD+ linkage may 
be found in the public comments for CARB’s workshops on sector-based offsets, on 
CARB’s website at  https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/meetings.htm. 
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On the other hand, opponents of the California-REDD+ linkage have contended 
that there are serious environmental and social pitfalls with REDD+ offsets. A main 
environmental concern is that it is one thing to assert that deforestation in a jurisdiction 
has declined, based on remote sensing satellite imagery and on-the-ground checks; 
however, it is much more difficult to prove that deforestation has not occurred precisely 
due to REDD+ payments, rather than from regulatory policies or changes in the activities 
that drive deforestation. This recalls the hot air phenomenon, where credits are issued for 
emissions reductions that offset payments did not cause, meaning the credits are “non-
additional” (Haya, 2016, p. 2; Seyller et al., 2016, p. 535). Other groups have raised 
questions about how the credibility of REDD+ offsets would be affected if trees were lost 
to natural or human causes in the future (non-permanence) or if deforestation activity 
relocated outside of each jurisdiction (leakage) (Lang, 2013a).  
There is also concern about the proposal from a social standpoint. A letter to 
CARB, signed by 21 representatives from groups like the California Environmental 
Justice Alliance, Friends of the Earth US, and the Asian Pacific Environmental Network, 
has argued that the agency has so far not identified how the California-REDD+ linkage 
would protect disadvantaged Californian communities from pollution hotspots 
(Vanderwarker, 2016). In this view, the linkage would be yet another barrier towards 
reducing co-pollutants and improving local health and the environment for disadvantaged 
groups. Organizations in both California and Acre have also labelled the California-
REDD+ linkage as an example of carbon colonialism. Here, wealthy industries in 
California would seek out cheaper, forest-based offset commodities in Acre to preserve 
 92 
their business models, rather than address their overwhelming historic and present 
contribution to fossil fuel-driven climate change (Lang, 2013b; Nussbaumer & Lupien, 
2016).  
Currently, CARB is still deliberating on whether or not it will pursue the linkage. 
Previously, the REDD Offset Working Group produced a set of final recommendations in 
July 2013 that advised CARB on how to best proceed with a jurisdictional REDD+ 
linkage (ROW, 2013). Two years later, CARB published a white paper that definitively 
advocated for the use of REDD+ offsets (CARB, 2015). In 2016, CARB also issued a 
draft plan on the future of the California Cap-and-Trade Program after 2020. In the paper, 
REDD+ credits were still floated as a potential offset source for industries at the start of 
the program’s third compliance period in 2018, but nothing certain was laid out (Garside 
& Szabo, 2016).  
3.4 Conclusion 
 Overall, the rationale for including REDD+ offsets in the California Cap-and-
Trade program matches the growth imperative of firms under fossil capitalism. Cheap 
REDD+ offsets from Acre would provide a boon for California’s heaviest emitters over 
costlier mitigation strategies, while also stimulating economic growth for California-
based or other firms involved in offset project development, consulting, and research. 
However, critics caution that an economic argument behind the California-REDD+ 
linkage overlooks serious problems regarding the questionable environmental integrity of 
REDD+ offsets, the effect of offsetting on disadvantaged communities in the state, and 
how the proposal could further carbon colonialism. Before analyzing these issues in 
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depth, it is important to consider not only how REDD+ has become a policy proposal in 
California, but also in Acre. The next chapter examines the history of Acre’s own foray 
into REDD+, while also demonstrating why its plan to supply Californian industries with 
offsets is problematic for a different set of reasons.   
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Chapter 4: Deforestation, Carbon Forestry, and Conflict in Brazil and 
Acre 
4.1 Introduction 
 Acre is a heavily forested state in the western part of the Brazilian Amazon, and 
was one of two states identified in the 2010 MOU as a possible supplier of REDD+ 
offsets for the California Cap-and-Trade Program. Recently, CARB (2015) has stated that 
REDD+ offsets from Acre would not only help Californian industries cost-effectively 
mitigate climate change, but also benefit populations in Acre (Acrianos) by providing 
funds to protect their culture, create jobs, and preserve biodiversity (p. 14). These actions 
build upon the government of Acre’s own efforts to reduce deforestation over the past 
two decades as well, most notably through its 2010 State Incentives for Environmental 
Services (SISA) program. In fact, because of the legal and institutional frameworks for 
statewide deforestation reductions contained in SISA, outside observers have called Acre 
the host of the world’s first jurisdictional REDD+ program (CARB, 2015, p. 43; 
Duchelle, Greenleaf, Mello, Gebara, & Melo, 2014b, p. 33).  
 This chapter presents an overview of how Acre came to develop its own 
deforestation reduction policy to link to the California Cap-and-Trade Program, and what 
it might gain or lose should the linkage go ahead. Section 4.2 begins by documenting the 
federal history of land tenure and ownership, drivers of deforestation, and environmental 
policy in Brazil. Decades of the federal government giving land titles to extractive 
industries has caused deforestation nationwide to skyrocket, especially in the Amazon. 
Policy responses have included outright bans on commodity production linked to 
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deforestation, as well as distributing land titles to smallholders in exchange for forest 
protection, to varying degrees of success or failure. Section 4.3 shows how Acre has, like 
California, forged ahead of the federal government’s environmental efforts in creating its 
own subnationally-administered environmental policies over the past two decades. 
Ultimately, this has culminated in SISA, the potential source of offset credits for the 
California-REDD+ linkage. This section discusses some of the key aspects of SISA, as 
well as highlighting some pros and cons of the initiative that could affect Acrianos if 
SISA takes on a market component and supplies offsets to California.   
Section 4.4 inserts the concept of green grabs back into the discussion of carbon 
forestry offsetting. This time, the discussion functions as a warning based on the 
experience of other carbon forestry projects that have worsened the socio-economic 
circumstances and livelihoods of local populations, created rifts within communities, or 
exacerbated land tenure conflicts of forest dwelling groups living in these project areas. 
Fairhead et al. (2012) note that green grabbing can occur in a multitude of ways, but 
essentially, all forms of green grabbing contribute to alienating poorer communities from 
their land and resources for the benefit of more powerful entities (p. 239). In any case, the 
three Brazilian case studies that will be examined – the Guaraqueçaba Climate Action 
Project, the Suruí Forest Carbon Project, and the Purus Project – as well as a 
jurisdictional REDD+ program in Cross River State, Nigeria, illustrate the various ways 
green grabs can take effect. As such, they provide a powerful lesson for those that should 
influence the future of the California-REDD+ linkage. 
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4.2 Land Tenure, Deforestation, and Environmental Policy in Brazil 
The state of Acre did not establish what CARB (2015) and the REDD Offset 
Working Group (2013) have called one of the most advanced REDD+ programs in the 
world in isolation. Rather, it has built off the Brazilian federal government’s efforts to 
undertake a series of land reform and deforestation-related policies over the past several 
decades. The history of these measures provides useful context in the lead up to the 
government of Acre’s own foray into subnational environmental policy and jurisdictional 
REDD+.  
Up until the 1960s, large swaths of land in Brazil were held by either the 
government or in private holdings, a remnant from the Portuguese colonial era. During 
the colonial period, the Portuguese Crown would transfer its ownership of large 
landholdings in the Amazon to elites, who worked the land in exchange for tax 
exemption and a portion of the land’s profits (Duchelle et al., 2014a, p. 55; Reydon, 
Fernandes, & Telles, 2015, pp. 510-511). Following independence, the Brazilian state 
passed several laws that attempted to consolidate unclaimed land in the hands of the 
federal government. These included the 1850 Land Law, which stated that only land 
acquisition through legal channels allowed for land access, and the 1916 Registration 
Law, which mandated that legal documentation was necessary to prove land ownership 
(Reydon et al., 2015, pp. 510-511). However, landless rural peasants vehemently 
challenged these measures, leading to numerous violent conflicts between these 
“camponeses” and large landholders in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Simmons, 
Walker, Armia, Aldrich, & Caldus, 2007, p. 568). These laws were largely unsuccessful 
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at verifying landholdings, though, so by the-mid 20th century, the occupation of 
unclaimed land by forest dwellers was a common feature throughout rural Brazil (Reydon 
et al., 2015, p. 511).  
Formally, the situation began to change in the 1970s for several reasons. On the 
one hand, several reform-minded peasant movements had grown frustrated with high 
levels of rural poverty and inequality among landless forest dwellers, which still exists 
today. For example, in 2006, 5% of the largest farms in Brazil encompassed almost 70% 
of the total farm area, while 50% of the smallest farms only covered 2.3% of this area 
(Reydon et al., 2015, p. 509). Furthermore, 47% of the country’s forests are owned by 
individuals and private firms, whereas only 26% is owned by communities and 
indigenous people (Larson et al., 2013, p. 681). As a result, peasants sought to 
redistribute the large estates held over from the colonial period so that the land could be 
put to productive use and generate income (Reydon et al., 2015, p. 511). On the other 
hand, the federal government also wanted to bolster its national borders through 
increased rural settlement. The Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) 
initiated a program called Direct Action Land Reform to distribute large state-owned or 
privately-held landholdings to smallholders. Peasants organized into associations, drafted 
development plans for their land plots, and invested in productive activities on the land in 
exchange for access to federal credit and services like education and healthcare, provided 
by INCRA (Duchelle et al., 2014a, p. 55). 
 Several problems arose with Direct Action Land Reform though. Large 
landholders and investors in major extractive industries like livestock and logging were 
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given priority for government subsidies over smallholders, the latter of whom often found 
themselves without financial support after settling in rural areas (Hall, 2008, p. 1926). 
Excessively large 2,000 to 3,000 hectare plots sold by INCRA were also intended for 
purchase by large mining and cattle ranching operations, in close coordination with the 
state. Thus, Direct Action Land Reform not only failed to provide much needed long-
term income to newly-settled peasants and forest dwellers, but also accelerated large-
scale deforestation (Thomas, 2011, p. 1119). Indeed, large landholders are estimated to 
account for 80% of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon (Osborne, Bellante, & 
VonHedemann, 2014, p. 31). 
 Additionally, some settlers chose not to obtain official titles for their new land 
under Direct Action Land Reform, because they would consequently lose the financial 
subsidies given to peasants while they applied for landholdings (Simmons, 2010, pp. 433, 
439). This meant that the land the settlers resided on was still technically owned by the 
state or a private entity (Duchelle et al., 2014a, p. 55). INCRA also stipulated that 
redistributed land must be put to “productive” use to warrant receiving subsidies, 
services, and eventually a formal title. Settling the land in the first place often led to 
forest clearing, but the productive use requirement led smallholders to engage in 
deforestation-related activities like slash-and-burn, a practice where forested areas are set 
ablaze to make room for agriculture (p. 55). Ironically, the Brazilian state began to frame 
smallholders as agents of deforestation, even though the government had helped finance 
extractive industries through policies like Direct Action Land Reform, and required 
smallholders to deforest in order to secure landholdings (Hall, 2008, p. 1926). 
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Smallholders often had to move to new land plots when soil quality declined after several 
years of farming, and those without title also were forced off their plots by land grabbers 
and forced to start their activities over in new areas (Thomas, 2011, p. 1109).  
Increasingly, forest dwelling communities started to resist not only how large, 
extractive industries disproportionately earned tax breaks and government subsidies 
compared to smallholders, but also how the state framed forest dwellers as agents of 
deforestation instead of the extractive industries it helped finance. In Acre, this conflict 
boiled over as poor rubber tappers, who usually worked for large company estates, began 
losing their jobs. The Brazilian government had subsidized credit and gave tax breaks to 
cattle ranchers to buy out the rubber companies and clear cut Amazonian forests (Centro 
de Memória das Lutas e Movimentos Sociais da Amazônia, 2013; Schwartzman, 2015, p. 
3). Chico Mendes, an Acriano rubber tapper, labour activist, and environmentalist, started 
to organize fellow rubber tappers and forest dwelling communities to protest the loss of 
their livelihoods and shelter. National and international environmental organizations 
picked up on the plight of Mendes and activists in the Amazon, and widely popularized 
the communities’ struggle against the proliferation of land-clearing, extractive industries 
in Brazil (Schwartzman, 2015, p. 3). After Mendes’ 1988 murder – carried out by a 
disgruntled rancher – international public opinion coalesced around the contributions of 
Brazilian smallholders in preventing deforestation and sustaining their economic 
livelihoods (Hall, 2008, p. 1926; Schwartzman, 2015, p. 3).  
In the following decades, the Brazilian federal government moved to address 
deforestation that was rapidly accelerating in its territory, particularly in the Amazon. The 
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government’s official position recognized that climate change, brought on in part by 
forest-based GHG emissions, is a serious threat to the environmental health of the 
country, and hits low-income groups particularly hard (Government of Brazil, 2008, p. 
7). It also recognized that forests provide numerous ecosystem services, including CO2 
sequestration, so reducing deforestation would be essential in protecting these functions 
(p. 17). Economic practices that lead to deforestation, like agriculture and cattle ranching, 
would have to become more sustainable to foster low-emissions economic growth (pp. 7, 
9-10).  
One measure the government took was amending the Brazilian Forest Code, 
which stipulates that a certain percentage of each private landholding – which varies by 
region – must be protected as a forest reserve (Nepstad et al., 2014, p. 1118). In 1996, the 
government increased the forest reserve requirement for Amazonian landholdings from 
50 to 80% (p. 1119). Notably, the federal government was skeptical of carbon trading 
programs as an incentive for landowners to meet this requirement. At COP 3, Brazil 
opposed the inclusion of avoided deforestation projects in the Kyoto Protocol, framing 
them as a free pass for Annex I countries to forego emissions cuts at home, while also 
undermining national sovereignty (Corbera et al., 2011, p. 318).  
A decade later, the government imposed moratoriums on soy and beef production 
that took place on recently cleared lands as part of its “Plan for Preventing and 
Controlling Deforestation in the Amazon” (Richards, Arima, VanWey, Cohn, & Bhattari, 
2017, p. 1). Farmers who grew soy on land cleared after July 26, 2006, and cattle 
ranchers who deforested after 2009 would not be allowed to sell their products to 
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wholesalers (Nepstad et al., 2014, pp. 1118-1120). The Brazilian government also passed 
its National Policy on Climate Change in 2008. One of the deforestation-related goals of 
this measure was a proposal to eliminate net forest cover loss by 2015. The government 
aimed to accomplish this by planting 11 million hectares of forest and reducing 
Amazonian deforestation by 80% – compared to the average deforestation rate from 1996 
to 2005 – by 2020 (Government of Brazil, 2008, p. 14; Nepstad et al., 2014, p. 1119). 
Other measures included expanding protected areas and indigenous territories to 
encompass 68% of the Brazilian Amazon, as well as incorporating satellite imagery data 
through the national PRODES mapping system to monitor changes in forest cover 
(Nepstad et al., 2014, p. 1118; Richards et al., 2017, p. 2). 
 Another way the Brazilian government sought to eliminate net forest cover loss 
was by addressing the ongoing, land reform-minded peasant movements. By giving land 
titles to forest dwellers, the government believed it could hold these new landowners 
liable for deforestation in violation of the Forest Code (Thomas, 2011, p. 1134). In 2009, 
the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture launched the Terra Legal (Legal Land) program. 
Over the course of three years, Terra Legal was supposed to give formal land titles to 
300,000 smallholders who occupied and claimed rights to non-designated public land 
(Duchelle et al., 2014a, p. 55). To qualify for the program, forest dwellers needed to 
submit proof that they had peacefully occupied the land and cultivated a portion of it 
since 2004, were Brazilian citizens, and did not own rural property elsewhere in the 
country (p. 55). They also had to maintain 80% forest cover within their property as 
mandated by the Forest Code, and register their plot in a Rural Environmental Registry 
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(CAR) with the Ministry of Agriculture (Duchelle et al., 2014a, p. 55; Nepstad et al., 
2014, p. 1119). 
 However, when Terra Legal began, large landholders began to acquire the rights 
to these lands at a far greater rate than smallholders, widening the already sizeable gap 
between the number of large and smallholder properties (Lang, 2013b; Osborne et al., 
2014, p. 64). Indeed, 8% of the individuals who requested land titles for parcels between 
400 and 1,500 hectares accounted for 49% of the total land area up for titling under Terra 
Legal (de L.T. Oliveira, 2013, p. 271). Additionally, the 80% land cover requirement 
under the Forest Code – which the government found difficult to enforce as deforestation 
rates rose in the early 2000s – was amended in 2012, thanks to heavy lobbying by the 
agribusiness industry. Under the new revision, Amazonian landholdings under 440 
hectares that were deforested prior to 2008 were not required to maintain the 80% 
threshold. Combined with separate alterations on preservation requirements in small 
properties and those located in protected areas, the new Forest Code lowered the amount 
of land to be restored by an estimated 29 million hectares (Soares-Filho et al., 2014, p. 
363).  
One state where the consolidation of public lands in the hands of large, private 
owners escalated was Acre. In 2003, 444 landowners in the state possessed 2.8 million 
hectares of land, but by 2010, 583 landowners possessed 6.2 million hectares (Lang, 
2013b). This means that as the number of landowners increased by 31%, the total area 
they controlled increased by 121%, amounting to nearly 79% of all registered land in the 
state. Given that Terra Legal allowed an individual to obtain up to 1,500 hectares of land 
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when the average Amazonian settlement is 50 hectares, representatives for large 
landowners and companies could theoretically apply for multiple land titles without 
penalty (Thomas, 2011, p. 1139). The difficulties of implementing Terra Legal add to the 
complex and often uncertain nature of land tenure regimes in the Amazon. 24% of the 
Brazilian Amazon is still comprised of unclassified public land, which features 
competing claims to land and unclear tenure rights between different groups (Larson et 
al., 2013, p. 682).  
More recently, Brazil’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), a 
country’s individual emissions reduction strategy under the Paris Agreement, calls for the 
state to restore and reforest 12 million hectares of forests by 2030 (Federative Republic of 
Brazil, 2015). Brazil has also softened its stance on carbon trading somewhat in its 
INDC, which acknowledges that any emissions reductions produced in the country “will 
be subject to prior and formal consent by the Federal Government” before allowing 
another state to purchase these reductions as credits (Federative Republic of Brazil, 
2015). Still, the INDC prohibits other signatories to the Paris Agreement from using 
emissions reductions produced on Brazilian territory for use outside the UNFCCC 
channels (Federative Republic of Brazil, 2015). Critically, this makes the legality and 
feasibility of the California-REDD+ linkage uncertain, given that offset credits from Acre 
would count as emissions reductions in California.  
To recap, it is important to understand the context in which deforestation and 
subsequent environmental policies in Brazil have occurred. Deforestation in the second 
half of the 20th century has resulted from favourable sales of unclaimed land to extractive 
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industries, and to a much lesser extent, from smallholders fulfilling productive use 
requirements under land redistribution and titling programs. The land tenure history in 
Brazil is important to consider for the introduction of REDD+ schemes as well. If carbon 
forestry programs were to restrict or alter access to the many forested areas with 
unclaimed or unclear tenure rights, rural communities could be subjected to more land 
grabs or conflicts. Furthermore, while some might claim that REDD+ programs may be 
an opportunity for marginalized groups to gain legal title, evidence from the rollout of 
Terra Legal shows how these efforts may backfire (de L.T. Oliveira, 2013; Larson et al., 
2013; Thomas, 2011). Already, this section has revealed some of the effects of 
deforestation and land tenure reform in Acre, from mobilizing rubber tappers threatened 
by the entrance of cattle ranching, to the consolidation of landholdings under Terra 
Legal. Moreover, as the federal government tried to implement these environmental and 
land tenure policies to curb deforestation, the government of Acre was carving out its 
own subnational climate change plan. 
4.3 SISA: Jurisdictional REDD+ in Acre 
 Acre’s SISA program, the model for jurisdictional REDD+ and the potential 
source of market-based offsets for the California Cap-and-Trade Program, can trace its 
start to the turn of the 21st century. From 1999 to 2010, the “Forest Government” 
administration of Acre governor Jorge Viana built upon the legacy of Chico Mendes by 
carrying out a forest-based development model for the state, which would protect the 
environment and provide socio-economic benefits for forest dwellers (Duchelle et al., 
2014b, p. 37; Schwartzman, 2015, pp. 4-5).  
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 In 2001, the government implemented the Acre Forestry Law, which created a 
legal framework in sustainable forest management for both forest dwelling communities 
and private sector groups that operated on public land (Faustino & Furtado, 2014, pp. 10-
11). The Acre Ecological-Economic Zoning Plan followed in 2007, which called for the 
development of economic and environmental strategies for reforestation and forest 
restoration in cleared areas, and payments to landowners and forest users in exchange for 
sustainable management practices in heavily forested areas (Duchelle et al., 2014b, p. 33; 
Schwartzman, 2015, p. 7). A year later, the Acriano government implemented the Policy 
for Valuing Forest Environmental Assets, which emphasized assigning a monetary value 
to ecosystem service provision (Faustino & Furtado, 2014, p. 14). One program under 
this measure, the Certification of Sustainable Production Units, provided certification and 
technical assistance to 3,000 family farms for cutting out slash-and-burn agriculture 
(Schwartzman, 2015, p. 7). 
The culmination of these policies was unveiled in Acre’s SISA program in 2010, 
which included many “principles, guidelines, institutions, and instruments” to guide 
ecosystem service provision (qtd. in Centro de Memória, 2013, p. 1). To receive SISA 
funding, ecosystem service providers must submit the boundaries of their landholding to 
a CAR (Schwartzman, 2015, p. 8). The state then uses satellite imagery to assess the 
holding’s compliance with the 80% forest cover threshold mandated under the Forest 
Code (Duchelle et al., 2014a, p. 55). Acriano citizens are eligible for payments under the 
law when they engage in sustainable forestry and agricultural practices and programs 
defined in SISA (Schwartzman, 2015, p. 12). In large part, these programs under SISA 
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incorporate Acre’s earlier efforts to avoid deforestation, like the Certification of 
Sustainable Production Units and Acre Ecological-Economic Zoning Plan. These 
programs also intend to increase funding for measures like subsidizing wild rubber 
production, in order to discourage clear cutting forests for monoculture plantations 
(Bastos Lima, Visseren-Hamakers, Braña-Varela, & Gupta, 2017, p. 12; Duchelle et al., 
2014a, p. 59).  
Notably, as McAfee (2015, p. 338) comments, since there is no standardized 
criterion, model, or enforcement mechanism to deem an avoided deforestation project 
“REDD+”, observers have branded SISA as the world’s first jurisdictional REDD+ 
initiative (CARB, 2015, p. 43; Duchelle et al., 2014b, p. 33). Indeed, Acre has developed 
its own remote sensing technology and deforestation reference level, separate from the 
federal government’s, to use in measuring deforestation and distributing payments for 
forest conservation (Schwartzman, 2015, pp. 9-10).10 The government has also created 
several agencies to oversee the various components of SISA. These include the Institute 
of Climate Change and Regulation of Environmental Services (IMC), which regulates 
SISA and monitors private REDD+ projects, the Commission for Validation and 
Accompaniment, which monitors SISA and approves program regulations and 
implementation approaches, and the Company for Development of Environmental 
Services, which implements SISA and attracts and administers private funding (Duchelle 
et al., 2014b, pp. 36-37). 
                                                 
10 To achieve comparability with other states, Acre is still using the federal government’s 
PRODES remote sensing satellite imagery for its official rate (Schwartzman, 2015, p. 9).  
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One funding source for SISA was reached in 2012, when the government of Acre 
signed an agreement with the German Development Bank KfW. KfW agreed to transfer 
EUR 16 million (USD 17 million) through its REDD Early Movers Programme to SISA 
in exchange for Acre’s commitment to pursue measures that limit deforestation (Duchelle 
et al., 2014b, p. 37). Though KfW cannot offset its own emissions through the REDD 
Early Movers Programme, the payments are still conditional on the state of Acre reducing 
its emissions below an agreed-upon level (Kill, 2014, p. 15). The federal government’s 
Amazon Fund, overseen by the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES), also has 
contributed to Acre’s deforestation reduction efforts, transferring BRL 60 million (USD 
19 million) to the state to help roll out the implementation of SISA (Kill, 2014, p. 14). 
The government of Acre also put forth a carbon reduction proposal, in which the state 
pledged to recover 50% of degraded or altered rural property holdings that are registered 
in a CAR, and to eliminate illegal deforestation in conservation units, settlement projects, 
and private rural holdings in the state by 2030 (Governado do Estado do Acre, 2015). 
The government of California learned about Acre’s plans to implement SISA 
even earlier, through each government’s membership in the GCF. CARB viewed the 
“payments-for-forest conservation” model under SISA as a potential source of 
international, sector-based REDD+ offsets for industry use in the California Cap-and-
Trade Program. Joint policy efforts have consequently produced the 2010 MOU between 
the two states, the basis for the proposed California-REDD+ linkage (CARB, 2015, p. 
43). Supporters have argued that market-based payments for REDD+ offsets in Acre 
would provide a critical resource to build upon SISA’s framework and reduce GHG 
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emissions, create jobs, and preserve cultural identity for forest dwelling Acrianos, 
particularly when considering that deforestation in Brazil is increasing again after a lull 
from 2005-2012 (CARB, 2015, p. 14; Nepstad, Swette, & Horowitz, 2014, p. 7).  
Within Acre though, questions have arisen as to how a California-REDD+ linkage 
under SISA might worsen economic inequality in the state. One area identified to receive 
early attention under SISA is called the Priority Assistance Zone, a collection of several 
rural Acre municipalities that share unclear property rights to their land (Duchelle et al. 
2014a, p. 57). Although the Priority Assistance Zone is only 4% deforested, recent road 
paving is opening the area to increased settlement. The activity is further obfuscating the 
land rights of forest dwellers who claim the right to the land through usucaption, where 
one gains ownership of land after working it for a certain period of time (Duchelle et al., 
2014, p. 58; Pacheco, 2009, p. 1339). Indeed, of the four communities surveyed within 
the Priority Assistance Zone, Duchelle et al. (2014a) found that two of them did not 
possess the right to exclude others from their property, while all felt that their land tenure 
was insecure (p. 58).  
The SISA program has identified the process of giving land titles based on 
customary ownership and payments for sustainable agriculture as two ways to improve 
the twin problems of land insecurity and deforestation. However, these actions still may 
not guarantee a better socio-economic situation or livelihood for Acriano communities. 
Under SISA, there is no formal process to address conflicts between land users that may 
arise during titling, and no detail on how the rights to carbon emissions will be distributed 
by the state (Duchelle et al., 2014a, p. 60). Increased demand for carbon sequestration in 
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a California-REDD+ linkage could amplify both issues if numerous groups claim to 
sustainably manage their forests in exchange for REDD+ payments. As Chomba et al.’s 
(2016) study of the Kasigou Corridor REDD+ Project in Kenya cautions, even an agreed-
upon breakdown of offset payment distribution can be meaningless if market payment 
totals do not reach expectations. In this sense, Acre forest dwellers could see their 
relationship to their land and resources deteriorate if they are not adequately compensated 
for withholding from other activities to sequester CO2.  
4.4 Carbon Forestry and Green Grabs: Cases from Brazil and Nigeria 
 One of the main concerns about a California-REDD+ linkage is that it could 
worsen the lives of Acrianos in the form of a green grab. To recall Fairhead et al. (2012), 
green grabs do not only take place through outright enclosures, but can also occur when 
an environmental project negatively alters use rights, access to land and resources, labour 
relations, and human-environment interactions (p. 239). In past carbon forestry projects, 
forest dwelling communities have been removed from project areas, or have had their 
access and use rights in these spaces restricted to generate offset credits (Beymer-Farris 
& Bassett, 2012; Cavanagh & Benjaminsen, 2014; Chomba et al., 2016). This may occur 
in forested landscapes where various forms of land tenure and forest access overlap or 
conflict with one another. REDD+ schemes can thereby worsen the socio-economic 
standing of forest dwellers and indigenous groups that are newly affected by the addition 
of a carbon forestry project (Larson et al., 2013, p. 680). Evidence from three carbon 
forestry programs in Brazil and one in Nigeria demonstrate the various ways that green 
grabs can take shape.  
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The first example of green grabbing in a Brazilian carbon forestry initiative is the 
Guaraqueçaba Climate Action Project, located in the southern state of Paraná. The 
multinational companies American Electric Power, Texaco/Chevron, and General Motors 
began funding the project in 1999 to generate “2 million tons of carbon benefits” in the 
form of emissions reductions credits (qtd. in Kill, 2014, p. 24). The companies would 
then use the credits for corporate marketing or offsetting purposes (p. 24). Soon after 
project implementation though, the Caiçara mixed Indigenous-European community 
found themselves barred from the natural reserves that were utilized to generate the 
carbon credits. Historically, the Caiçara used the forests in the project area for small-scale 
agriculture and the collection of palm hearts for food, even doing so after the government 
created the Guaraqueçaba Environmental Protection Area throughout their lands (pp. 22-
23). 
Despite the Caiçara’s claim to the land, three private nature reserves were created 
within these forests for carbon credit generation, and the Caiçara could no longer access 
them. The Brazilian NGO Society for Wildlife Research and Environmental Education 
(SPVS) that ran the project worked closely with the environmental police in Paraná, 
Força Verde (Green Force), to restrict Caiçara subsistence and livelihood activities on the 
now-privatized lands (Kill, 2014, pp. 28-29). In fact, some villagers who continued to 
access the nature reserves were thrown in jail by Força Verde for activities as simple as 
cutting down a tree to build a canoe or repair a house (p. 29). Additionally, the 47 jobs 
provided by SPVS to Caiçara villagers had largely vanished roughly 10 years after the 
project began, despite the fact they were promised to last for the entire 40 years of the 
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project duration (p. 27). Many of the jobs that were created were forest rangers for Força 
Verde, putting employees in an incredibly difficult position of having to report on fellow 
Caiçara community members for forest incursions (p. 27). This example also clearly 
showcases Bachram’s (2004) concept of carbon colonialism. Here, three large fossil fuel-
dependent companies in the North enclosed Caiçara lands in the South to offset their 
emissions instead of reducing them at the source. In the process, the demand for carbon 
offset commodities by the companies criminalized Caiçara villagers for their long-
standing subsistence practices.  
 Second, the case of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project is a current example of how 
REDD+ initiatives can heighten tension within communities. The project began in 2009 
to stop illegal deforestation from occurring on the Paiter Suruí indigenous territory in the 
Brazilian states of Mato Grosso and Rondônia. By 2013, the project had been verified by 
both the VCS and Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Standards (CCBS) for 
achieving social and environmental sustainability in international offsetting (West, 2016, 
p. 7). It had also generated 251,530 tCO2e worth of offset credits, 120,000 of which were 
purchased by the Brazilian company Natura at a price of USD 4.30/tCO2e (p. 7). 
Supporters of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project have previously hailed it as an example of 
a successful indigenous-led REDD+ project (Lang, 2015a). Shortly after the CCBS had 
verified the project, many members of the Paiter Suruí indigenous community were also 
engaged with the goals and strategies of the project (West, 2016, p. 8).  
 Recently though, a rift has formed within the Suruí community regarding whether 
or not the REDD+ project should continue. The anti-REDD+ camp, led by Henrique 
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Suruí and the Indigenous Missionary Council, has called for the project to cease 
operation. They contend that many Suruí villagers have not received promised payments 
for forest preservation, and that in turn, some villagers have resorted to illegal logging in 
the protected territory to generate income and compensate for this payment gap (Lang, 
2015a). Indeed, Suruí chief Almir Narayamoga Suruí noted in an October 2016 appeal 
that due to a lack of alternatives, some community members have engaged in illegal 
logging, which the chief claims has contributed to an estimated 600 hectares of 
deforestation a day since the beginning of 2016 (Lang, 2016a). Henrique Suruí and 
several other members of the Paiter Suruí even travelled to the state capital of Brasília in 
early 2015, where they unsuccessfully petitioned the Federal Public Ministry and 
National Indian Foundation to help suspend the project (Lang, 2015c).  
 Indeed, the concerns among this group regarding carbon market payments are 
well-founded when considering the state of carbon prices globally. Over the past several 
years, the price of carbon on both the VCM and CDM had dropped precipitously as 
buyers of carbon credits have declined. On the VCM, REDD+ offsets dropped from an 
average price of USD 12.00/tCO2e in 2011 to only USD 3.30/tCO2e in 2015 (Forest 
Trends, 2012, p. 22; Forest Trends, 2016, p. 3). On the CDM, the price of CERs also 
dropped from EUR 7/tCO2e (USD 7.40) in 2011 to only EUR 0.28/tCO2e (USD 0.30) in 
February 2017 (Ervine, 2013, p. 663; ICE, 2017). Yet, the Suruí Forest Carbon Project 
needs revenue of around USD 3 million to implement all aspects of its land management 
plan for sustainable food production, forest protection, and furthering education and 
employment in the community (Metareilá, Kanindé, & ACT-Brasil, 2009, p. 13; West, 
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2016, p. 6). Although NGOs involved with the project hope to bring in revenue from 
outside of carbon markets –through private investments and national and international 
aid, for example – the drop in offset buyers and prices adds a new level of precarious to 
the project. Imposing market relations on the Paiter Suruí despite the depressed and 
volatile state of offset prices can thereby produce new inequalities through market-
dictated enclosures.  
 On the other hand, the pro-REDD+ camp, led by the Suruí chief Almir 
Narayamoga Suruí and the Metareilá Association responsible for the project’s 
management, have defended the Suruí Forest Carbon Project. A statement from the 
Metareilá Association insisted that monthly BRL 2500 (USD 804) payments were 
distributed in early 2014 to the seven Suruí clan associations. However, the Metareilá 
association then withheld the payments 5 months later when it claimed the clans had 
become too dependent on the payments, while not developing sustainable initiatives they 
had agreed to for the Forest Carbon Project (Lang, 2015b). Although the Metareilá 
Association insists payments and training have been and will be implemented over the 
30-year length of the scheme, one is justified in questioning this possibility. Fisher (2012) 
documents how villagers in a Ugandan reforestation and CO2 sequestration project were 
primarily motivated by monetary incentives to conserve their forests. Payments in the 
scheme were dispersed at the beginning, and despite the 25-year project span, 
approximately half of community respondents reported that they harvested the trees early 
to plant crops and generate steady income (Fisher, 2012, p. 51). For the Suruí Forest 
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Carbon Project, this case exemplifies how individual monetary needs, especially for 
poorer groups, can take precedent over community land management.  
 The third example of green grabbing in Brazilian carbon forestry projects comes 
from the Purus Project in Acre, which was the first private REDD+ project to be 
registered with the IMC under SISA in 2012. Originally, 18 smallholder families lived on 
the site that would host the Purus Project, and they asserted their right to the land through 
usucaption, as they did not hold formal title to it (CarbonCo, TerraCarbon, Carbon 
Securities, and Moura & Rosa, 2012, p. 24; Centro de Memória, 2013, p. 6). Many of 
these families were originally rubber tappers, but starting in the second half of the 20th 
century, the Brazilian government began to undermine the rubber industry. Cattle 
ranchers were given tax breaks and subsidies to purchase old rubber plantations, which 
were in turn cleared for large livestock holdings (Centro de Memória, 2013, pp. 5-6; 
Schwartzman, 2015, p. 3). Subsequently, families in the eventual Purus Project area, like 
others throughout the Amazon region, took up small-scale livestock ranching and 
subsistence farming to make ends meet when they could no longer find work in rubber 
tapping (Centro de Memória, 2013, p. 5).  
 A pair of landowners, Normando Sales and Wanderley Rosa, came to acquire the 
property. The two planned a large cattle ranching operation that would deforest 20% of 
the project area, while a logging operation would commence on the other 80%. If carried 
out, the 18 families that that lived on the land, some who had resided there for several 
decades, would be forced off it (CarbonCo et al., 2012, p. 24; Centro de Memória, 2013, 
pp. 4, 6). However, once the new owners acquired the land, they discovered its potential 
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to store CO2 emissions. They could then sell carbon offsets on the VCM to protect the 
forest instead of chopping it down, which in their view would not only generate revenue 
from ecosystem preservation, but also provide sustainable development to the existing 
families and allow them to stay put (CarbonCo et al., 2012, p. 24). Essentially, the Purus 
Project was to function as a public relations move for the landowners, in which they 
could avoid the political backlash for displacing the community while generating carbon 
credit-based income for themselves and the forest dwellers.  
Together, Sales and Rosa started the company Moura & Rosa to manage the daily 
operations of this new carbon sequestration project (Faustino & Furtado, 2014, p. 16). At 
the end of the fifth year of credit generation, communities in the project area could start 
to receive offset credit revenue based on how much forest they preserved, and in addition, 
Moura & Rosa would finance new socio-economic initiatives like a health centre and 
primary school (CarbonCo et al., 2012, pp. 41-42). Moura & Rosa also guaranteed the 
families living in the Purus Project area 100 hectare parcels of land, provided they 
obtained titles to their land in court (Centro de Memória, 2013, p. 6). The international 
soccer organization FIFA also used the Purus Project to offset its emissions from the 
2014 World Cup in Brazil (FIFA, 2014). 
There are several concerns though with how the Purus Project may change 
smallholders’ relationship with their land and resources. For one, positioning these 
families as “deforestation agents” is disingenuous, as even the Project Design Document 
written by CarbonCo et al. (2012) acknowledges that most deforestation by smallholders 
is done for subsistence purposes (p. 28). The thought of comparing the large-scale cattle 
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ranching and logging activities that the landowners Moura & Rosa could undertake on 
their property to the mostly subsistence-based deforestation of smallholders contains the 
overtones of green grabbing, an appropriation of land from the lower to the upper classes. 
 Additionally, Moura & Rosa’s consent to give families 100 hectare parcels, 
provided the land is titled in court, is not a simple task. Forest dwellers face an uphill 
battle in receiving formal title when considering the few financial and legal resources 
these groups possess vis-à-vis large landholders, the potential for manipulation and 
corruption in the legal process, and the lack of education to read and interpret legal 
documents (Centro de Memória, 2013, p. 6). Furthermore, some families had occupied 
well over 100 hectare plots in the past, which would constitute a more visible type of 
green grab if they were to lose part of their lands to the REDD+ project (pp. 6-7). 
Because of these concerns, community support for the project declined. Residents 
became fearful that the project would infringe on their access to land in the project area 
and to their small-scale subsistence and income-generating activities that involved 
deforestation (Centro de Memória, 2013, p. 9; Faustino & Furtado, 2014, pp. 17-18). In 
the end, the case shows how sustainable development endeavors can create serious rifts 
between marginal forest dwellers and more powerful project developers, even if Moura & 
Rosa really believed the carbon offset project would easily lead to land titling and benefit 
the community.      
 REDD+ projects outside of Brazil are also leading to green grabs as well. 
Especially relevant to Acre’s jurisdiction-wide SISA program is the REDD+ project 
ongoing in Nigeria’s Cross River State. To start the development of a REDD+ scheme 
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across Nigeria, the UN REDD- Programme transferred a USD 4 million readiness fund to 
the federal government in 2011, with an additional USD 3.6 million coming from the 
FCPF in 2013 (Asiyanbi, 2016, p. 148) Currently, 3 REDD+ pilot projects in the Cross 
River State are serving as trials for the future nationally-administered REDD+ scheme, 
but the government of Cross River has changed several of its policies to coordinate 
deforestation-reduction efforts across the entire jurisdiction. Governor Liyel Imoke 
removed the state’s revenue target from the forest sector, declared a logging ban 
throughout Cross River, and implemented a militarized organization, the anti-
deforestation Task Force (ATF), to enforce the moratorium (p. 147). 
 The government of Cross River and ATF’s application of what Asiyanbi (2016) 
calls “carbonized exclusion” is also undoubtedly a green grab, as access and use rights 
and human-environment interactions are negatively altered to facilitate environmentally-
based capital accumulation. Perhaps most obviously, the moratorium on timber 
harvesting has deprived local communities of a critical source of income. Before the ban, 
communities in Cross River were to receive 70% of the royalties from the state’s timber 
harvest. Yet, after the moratorium was enacted, the government put forth a replacement 
carbon credit sharing formula that only sought to distribute 10% of carbon benefits to 
communities (Asiyanbi, 2016, p. 151). This economic injustice is even worsened by the 
fact that the ATF generates much of its income by selling confiscated timber and issuing 
fines on violators – revenue from timber sales and fines amounted to 64% of the ATF’s 
total income in the Fiscal Year 2012-2013 (p. 153). Thereby, a perverse incentive exists 
to allow communities to illegally harvest trees and non-timber forest products (which 
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were also given a ban after the initial logging moratorium) so that elites in the military 
and government, closely associated with the ATF, can financially benefit from their sale 
(p. 153). As Asiyanbi (2016) observes, the contradiction between how elites receive 
money from carbon credits and confiscated timber, while forest dwellers lose essential 
income streams and forest access, is part and parcel of the dynamic that REDD+ drives 
and is shaped by (p. 147). 
4.5 Conclusion 
 To summarize, like California, Acre has forged ahead in crafting environmental 
policy in a more rapid and robust manner than the federal government. The California-
REDD+ linkage proposal builds off nearly two decades of work within Acre to lower 
deforestation and encourage socio-economic development, and would add a market-based 
offset component to Acre’s jurisdictional REDD+ program in SISA. While clamping 
down on deforestation is an important step in the fight to mitigate climate change, 
questions remain about how amending SISA to provide offsets for Californian industries 
could worsen the lives of Acrianos. REDD+ offsetting necessarily entails the preservation 
of forested spaces for the benefit of wealthy market actors, among them high-emitting 
companies in the North. In this arrangement, the activities of forest dwelling populations 
must align with the requirements necessary to commodify CO2 reductions for market 
trade. This commodification process has unfolded as offset project developers have 
banned or negatively altered communities’ subsistence-based activities and land tenure 
arrangements, framed poor forest users as major deforestation agents, or created rifts 
within communities that concern the unclear or volatile nature of offset project payments. 
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Above all, REDD+ offsetting is a green grab, and the above case studies 
demonstrate why it is plausible to predict that the negative environmental, socio-
economic, and cultural effects of the above carbon forestry projects may follow a 
California-REDD+ linkage. Yet, the detrimental outcomes of green grabbing are not the 
only reasons that this international offset proposal is troubling. The next section 
combines the background information provided on California, Brazil, and Acre in the 
past two chapters to analyze why the linkage would represent both an ineffective climate 
change mitigation strategy and an environmental injustice.  
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Chapter 5: Analyzing the Environmental Injustices of the California-
REDD+ Linkage 
5.1 Introduction 
 The previous chapters have laid out the histories of carbon trading and REDD+ in 
both California and Acre, examining the context in which the California Cap-and-Trade 
Program and SISA developed, how they are structured, and what the arguments for and 
against each of them are. Although Californian industries cannot use REDD+ offsets 
from Acre at the present to meet their emissions reduction commitments, by building 
upon the existing knowledge of carbon forestry offsetting laid out in this thesis, one can 
make a strong case for why the linkage cannot be used to effectively or equitably mitigate 
climate change. Environmentally, REDD+ offsets in Acre cannot guarantee credible or 
lasting emissions reductions under the California Cap-and-Trade Program. Furthermore, 
the linkage outsources the responsibility to cut emissions from wealthy industries in 
California to poorer, rural populations in Acre, while also furthering social injustices.  
 Section 5.2 argues that REDD+ offsets do not contain environmental integrity, 
because even from a jurisdictionally-administered program like SISA, they would not 
yield the “real, measurable, and long-term emissions reductions” that CARB requires in 
mitigating climate change. Section 5.3 focuses on the socio-economic ramifications of 
the linkage and argues that like domestic offsets, REDD+ credits would benefit the 
heaviest emitters in California, while directing cap-and-trade revenue out of state and 
imposing carbon colonialism on populations in Acre. The section also summarizes how 
green grabs may unfold through the linkage using the case studies described in Chapter 4. 
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Section 5.4 concludes the thesis by emphasizing that capitalist development drives 
ineffective responses to the climate crisis – like carbon trading – to protect or foster 
economic growth for heavy emitters and other entities. Lastly, Section 5.5 considers the 
daunting task that simultaneously combatting climate change and resisting global 
capitalism will entail, and touches on what just alternatives to current climate policy and 
REDD+ might look like.  
5.2 Environmental Integrity 
 Contrary to the claims of CARB, Californian businesses, offset project 
developers, and some environmental NGOs, there is ample reason to believe that the 
California-REDD+ linkage will produce neither “proven” nor “substantial” emissions 
reductions to mitigate climate change.  Certainly, the “cost-effective” and “flexible” 
monikers given to the linkage by its supporters make sense. REDD+ offsets on the VCM 
only averaged a price of USD 3.30/tCO2e in 2015, nearly four times cheaper than the 
current price of allowances in the California Cap-and-Trade Program at USD 
13.57/tCO2e (CARB, 2017a; Forest Trends, 2016, p. 3). Under the growth imperative of 
capitalist development, REDD+ offsets represent a cheap compliance strategy for 
Californian industries, one that allows them to sustain their profits while also attesting to 
mitigate climate change.  
 Instead, the assertion that REDD+ projects yield “proven” and “substantial” 
emissions reductions runs counter to the established scientific knowledge on biotic CO2 
emissions and the difficulties of commodifying them. Larry Lohmann (2015) points out 
in his critique of the 2015 CARB White Paper that fossil carbon emitted by Californian 
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industries permanently adds to the carbon cycle, whereas vegetation and soil-based 
carbon does not (pp. 4-5). Nevertheless, in arguing for a REDD+ linkage, Californian 
politicians and cap-and-trade supporters have pointed to the serious climatic impacts that 
the state will face if worldwide deforestation, especially in the tropics, does not stop 
(CARB, 2015, pp. 9-11).  
Yet, what these groups either neglect or forget to realize is that in a REDD+ 
offsetting scheme, standing forests are protected from expected deforestation, while fossil 
fuel emissions may continue at the firm that purchases the offsets, negating a total 
reduction in emissions. The forests that are saved from destruction or degradation can 
also still easily release CO2 in the future as well (Dooley, 2014, p. 6). For example, if 
trees were to die, the permanent emissions reductions promised by the REDD+ project 
would not exist. In all, carbon forestry does not challenge the growth imperative of fossil 
capitalist industries in California, and moreover, it allows REDD+ proponents to falsely 
assert that emissions would be reduced through forest-based offsetting, rather than just 
cancelled out (Lohmann, 2015, p. 5).  
In short, the climatic impossibility of equating fossil emissions with biotic 
emissions should be enough to dissuade any entity dedicated to achieving actual 
emissions reductions from pursuing forest-based offsets. Putting aside this critical 
distinction for the time being, CARB and its supporters have called for guidelines to 
bolster the environmental integrity of REDD+ credits, under the assumption that REDD+ 
can indeed mitigate climate change. These guidelines include measures to prove 
additionality and set a credible deforestation reference level. As stated previously, offsets 
 123 
are deemed to be additional when emissions reductions occur that were not expected in 
the absence of project finance (which in turn made the offset project itself possible) 
(Ervine, 2013, p. 657).  
To prove additionality, the REDD Offsets Working Group recommended setting a 
reference level equal to or below the 10-year average of deforestation in the jurisdiction 
(ROW, 2013, pp. 4-5). Deforestation that falls below this reference level is assumed to 
have come from Californian industry payments, and the jurisdiction can then generate 
offset credits for use in the Cap-and-Trade Program. On this note, CARB has stated its 
additionality requirement for international, sector-based offsets outright. The jurisdiction 
implementing the REDD+ initiative “must show that real, measurable, and long-term 
emissions reductions would occur in addition to what would be BAU reductions from 
existing environmental laws and regulations” (qtd. in CARB, 2015, p. 24, emphasis in 
original).  
However, it is challenging, to say the least, to prove that an emitter in California 
would have explicitly caused emissions reductions (i.e. “additional” offsets) in Acre 
through its REDD+ payments, especially when there are other environmental policies in 
play that also intend to reduce deforestation (Haya, 2016, p. 4). For instance, Brazil has 
passed the 2008 National Climate Change Plan, its INDC to the UN Paris Agreement, soy 
and beef moratoriums, and Terra Legal to clamp down on both large and small-scale 
deforestation nationwide (Duchelle et al., 2014a, p. 55; Federative Republic of Brazil, 
2015; Nepstad et al., 2014, pp. 1118-1120). In Acre specifically, the REDD Early Movers 
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Programme has provided the government with a USD 17 million financial incentive to 
reduce emissions across its jurisdiction as well (Schwartzman, 2015, p. 17).  
Additionally, a drop in commodity prices for soy, beef, and other agricultural 
products could also influence deforestation rates. Decreased revenue from producing 
these goods could eliminate the financial incentive for landowners in Acre to clear their 
lands for agriculture or cattle ranching, without REDD+ payments from Californian 
industries factoring in at all. As Nepstad et al. (2014) document, a crash in the price of 
soy was one of the reasons for a decline in Amazonian deforestation in the mid-2000s (p. 
1118). Therefore, it would be an immense challenge to isolate how deforestation in Acre 
had declined when factoring in each funding source, change in commodity prices and 
global product demand, and national policies and regulations.  
Despite these external influences, supporters of the California-REDD+ linkage 
have claimed that setting a credible reference level can help to accurately establish the 
BAU deforestation rate from which to produce additional offset credits. Consistent with 
the REDD Offset Working Group’s (2013) recommendation, the government of Acre has 
developed a baseline deforestation rate of 496 square kilometers (km2) per year based on 
the state’s ten-year average deforestation rate from 2001 to 2010 (Schwartzman, 2015, p. 
10). Barbara Haya (2016), a researcher from the Berkeley Climate and Energy Institute, 
has projected that using this baseline rate to generate REDD+ offsets is not low enough to 
avoid “non-additional” crediting though. Non-additional crediting occurs when an offset 
project generates emissions reduction credits without sufficient evidence that project 
finance was responsible for those reductions. The 496 km2 rate is substantially above the 
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2006-2015 average deforestation rate of 266 km2, meaning that offset credits could be 
generated without any changes occurring on the ground, an example of the “hot air” 
phenomenon (Haya, 2016 p. 2; Seyller et al., 2016, p. 235). Combined with the funding 
from REDD Early Movers and the BNDES to limit deforestation, it would be extremely 
difficult to identify what portion of emissions reductions were explicitly caused by 
Californian industry payments.    
The REDD Offset Working Group (2013) is quick to point out that reference 
levels can be updated over time and set lower than the average deforestation rate. This is 
supposed to stimulate so-called “jurisdictional own effort”, where a government must 
take additional steps to reduce deforestation that are not provided by market payments 
(ROW, 2013, p. 25). Yet, even jurisdictional own effort does not answer an integral 
question that even CARB (2015, p. 35) has posed: can it be proven that “a forest was or is 
actually destined for deforestation”? Based on all the other factors that can influence 
deforestation outside of market payments, the knowledge of how many emissions will be 
avoided through a REDD+ project requires information that is impossible to predict 
(Lohmann, 2012, p. 99; Lohmann, 2015, p. 4). Therefore, if one cannot calculate the 
jurisdiction’s future deforestation rate with complete certainty, then setting a credible 
BAU reference level to generate additional REDD+ offsets is perhaps an impossible task, 
and negates the basis for offsetting entirely (Lohmann cited in Lang, 2016c). 
The environmental integrity of a REDD+ program also depends on emissions 
reductions lasting well into the future. A guideline adopted by the CDM and VCS 
suggests that carbon forestry projects should operate for at least 30 years, be monitored 
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and reported on for 20 years, and factor in risks for 100 years in order to prevent reversals 
in deforestation, and therefore increases in emissions (Leach & Scoones, 2013, p. 959). 
The REDD Offset Working Group (2013) has asserted that jurisdictional REDD+ 
programs would be better able to account for reversals than project-based schemes, since 
the governing body of the program would monitor changes in forest stocks across an 
entire region rather than in one specific location. In addition, it has also suggested using a 
“buffer” to set aside a certain number of offset credits from being issued in case of 
reversals (ROW, 2013, pp. 24, 38). 
A buffer would only do so much good, though, as the factors that accelerate 
unplanned deforestation and degradation are becoming more frequent. REDD+ offsetting 
allows for permanent, fossil fuel-based CO2 emissions to continue, which in turn, 
contribute to rising global temperatures and shifting climate patterns. One effect of 
climate change so far has been less frequent rainfall in the tropics, exposing the Amazon 
rainforest to more catastrophic fires. As this occurs, the Amazon turns from a carbon sink 
into a carbon source. For example, a 2005 drought caused the Amazon to release between 
1.2 and 1.6 billion tCO2 into the atmosphere (Lang, 2016b). The Amazon has also taken 
in one-third less carbon than usual from the 1990s onwards because of losses in tree 
stocks (Brienen et al., 2015). Even trees not ravaged by fire or drought are losing their 
ability to store CO2 as well, as Curran and Curran’s (2016) study shows that the Northern 
Hemisphere biosphere has sequestered less CO2 every year since 2006. Although the 
reason why is unknown, this evidence only adds to the urgency in cutting down on fossil 
fuel-based emissions that power climate change (Curran & Curran, 2016, p. 227).  
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There would also be difficulties to ensure that offsets from Acre would be 
permanent, because its government continues to subsidize BAU, non-sustainable forms of 
agriculture. Between 2011 and 2014, the state of Acre received the equivalent of USD 56 
million in public agricultural credit for BAU livestock farming, over twice the amount 
that KfW gave the Acriano government though REDD Early Movers (Bastos Lima et al., 
2017, p. 12). Furthermore, SISA programs that promote sustainably harvested non-timber 
forest products, like wild rubber and fruits, do not receive steady demand or specialized 
market access (p. 13). Coupled with the fact that cattle meat is a produce in high-demand 
in Brazil and internationally, and one that serves as a “savings account” for farmers to 
sell in times of hardship, there are significant barriers to achieving sustainable practices 
that could prevent deforestation and thus generate REDD+ offsets (p. 13). Unless these 
agricultural subsidies are addressed alongside SISA, forest dwellers may find that BAU 
agricultural activities will generate more revenue than sustainable options in the long run.  
 Additional claims that a jurisdictional REDD+ program is designed to better 
prevent against leakage do not quite hold up under scrutiny either. The REDD Offset 
Working Group has suggested that the Partner Jurisdiction hosting the REDD+ program 
(in the event of a California-REDD+ linkage, Acre or Chiapas) should address the drivers 
of deforestation within its boundaries to clamp down on leakage (ROW, 2013, p. 6). In 
addition to the above example of cutting BAU agricultural subsidies – which requires 
government action to properly address –  one suggested strategy to avoid leakage is 
intensifying livestock, agriculture, and timber production on already-cleared land, rather 
than expanding outward into intact forests (p. 6) 
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However, in their analysis of the growth of the soy industry in Brazil and 
neighbouring South American countries, Gustavo Oliveira and Susanna Hecht (2016) 
have found the opposite to have occurred. Agribusiness owners and soy farmers have 
chosen to reinvest their profits into new areas, like Brazil’s less regulated Cerrado region 
south of the Amazon, rather than intensifying production on already-existing land (p. 
270). Consequently, deforestation in the dry, woodland Cerrado region has dramatically 
increased, leaving 70% of the region affected by human incursion (Hecht, 2005, pp. 397-
398). The government of Acre has also given cattle ranchers an 80% value-added tax 
exemption to slaughter their herds in neighbouring states, effectively relocating a driver 
of deforestation out of its jurisdiction (Bastos Lima et al., 2017, p. 12).  While the REDD 
Offsets Working Group (2013) has called for strategies to track shifts in deforestation out 
of the Partner Jurisdiction, the fact that leakage is a constant, viable threat to producing 
credible REDD+ offsets is incredibly problematic, because a jurisdictional REDD+ 
program cannot control global prices for commodities like soy and beef. Additionally, if 
landowners, labourers, and others can attract more revenue from expanding production 
elsewhere than they will receive from market-based REDD+ payments to intensify 
production on their existing plots, the leakage potential will not disappear.  
The above problems with equating fossil-based and biotic-based CO2, 
demonstrating additionality, setting credible reference levels, and preventing against 
reversals and leakage all demonstrate why the notion that REDD+ has generated 
“proven” and “significant” emissions reductions is misleading. Despite these concerns, 
understanding the capitalist growth imperative of fossil fuel-dependent Californian 
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industries explains why “flexible” and “cost effective” market trade in forest-based 
offsets, however questionable, takes precedence over the environmentally suspect nature 
of REDD+ in complying with the cap. In addition, there are also numerous social 
consequences of a California-REDD+ linkage for communities in both California and 
Acre that deserve a critical analysis.  
5.3 Environmental Injustice, Carbon Colonialism, and Green Grabs 
 Previously, Chapter 3 revealed how past market-based pollution trading programs 
in California led to the creation of pollution “hot spots”. Pollution became more 
concentrated in areas where industries chose to offset their pollutants rather than reduce 
them at the source at an increased cost (Drury et al., 1999, p. 253; Truong, 2014, p. 506). 
Based on statistics from the first compliance trading period (2013-2014) of the California 
Cap-and-Trade Program, there is reason to believe that offsetting would become even 
more attractive to fossil fuel-intensive industries in California with REDD+ credits 
permitted in the scheme, lessening the gains that environmental justice communities 
could make in the absence of the linkage. 
Indeed, a study by researchers from four California universities found that the top 
10 offset users during the first compliance period of the Cap-and-Trade Program were not 
only responsible for 36% of covered emissions under the cap, but also used a whopping 
65% of all available offsets (Cushing, Wander, Morello-Frosch, Pastor, Zhu, & Sadd, 
2016, p. 9). The firms in possession of this massive number of offsets were either fuel 
and gas suppliers like Chevron, Shell, and Southern California Edison, or gas power 
plants like Calpine Energy. This suggests that these industries used cheaper domestic 
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offsets, which currently retail for an average of 20-25% below the price of CARB-issued 
allowances, to protect their fossil fuel-led business models instead of purchasing 
additional allowances at auction, on the market, or cutting emissions at the source 
(California Carbon, 2017). In fact, 9 of these top 10 companies offset the full 8% limit of 
their emissions allowed by CARB (Vanderwarker, 2016). Over the duration of the first 
compliance period, Californian industries in total offset more than 12 MtCO2e. 
Remarkably, this accounts for more than four times the amount of reductions expected to 
occur under the cap during the first compliance period (Cushing et al., 2016, p. 9).  
With 76% of these offsets also sourced from out-of-state projects, it is certainly 
feasible that a California-REDD+ linkage will further delay emissions reductions at the 
source (Cushing et al., 2016, p. 8). Indeed, Cushing et al.’s (2016) same study reported 
that 61% of high-emitting facilities in California saw an increase in their localized GHG 
emissions during the first compliance period of the Cap-and-Trade Program (p. 4). The 
use of offsets also diverts funds away from auction revenue, which through SB 535, 
could be channelled toward green energy projects and other initiatives that benefit these 
disadvantaged communities. Thus, disadvantaged communities in California face another 
struggle to both improve their resilience to climate change and cut down on the health 
effects from co-pollutants that accompany GHG emissions.  
The California-REDD+ linkage does not only represent an injustice to 
communities in California, however. As the NGO Food and Water Watch has stated, the 
proposal is “ill fated and racist”, a neocolonial method that restricts the development of 
nations in the Global South while letting fossil fuel-based emissions in California persist 
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(Nussbaumer & Lupien, 2016). Additionally, in April 2013, over 25 Brazilian 
indigenous, environmental, and social justice organizations and 40 individuals penned a 
letter to Governor Brown in which they rejected the linkage. The letter criticizes it as 
another instance of wealthy populations in the Global North appropriating commodities, 
in this case CO2 reduction credits, from the South as a mechanism to cheaply sustain their 
overly-consumptive and emissions-intensive habits (Lang, 2013b).  
Perhaps the simplest way to show the inherently colonial nature of a California-
REDD+ linkage is by comparing the GHG emission totals from each state. In 2010, GHG 
emissions in the state of California totaled 456.1 MtCO2e, of which over 75% came from 
the industrial, electricity generation, and transportation sectors (CARB, 2012). By 
contrast, GHG emissions in Acre were far less at under 23 MtCO2e in 2010, and nearly 
all this amount (97%) came from deforestation and land use change (Schwartzman, 2015, 
p. 10). The implication from these statistics is that fossil-fuel intensive production and 
consumption patterns have caused the majority of California’s contribution to climate 
change. As a largely forested, rural state, Acre has not emitted anywhere close to 
California’s industrial and transportation-based emissions totals. Therefore, the fact that 
forest users in Acre would need to stop deforestation in part so that oil and gas companies 
in California can avoid more stringent cuts in emissions is an unmistakably colonialist 
issue that exposes the inequalities between the two subnational bodies.  
The Brazilian and Nigerian carbon forestry projects also show how green grabs 
can unfold through offset initiatives. By altering access and use rights to land, forest 
products, and human-environment interactions, these projects have worsened the socio-
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economic situations of forest dwelling communities or created conflicts within these 
communities over the future of the projects. In the Guaraqueçaba Climate Action Project, 
villagers were barred from collecting food and practicing agriculture in the project area, 
and even thrown in jail by a police force created from these same community members 
(Kill, 2014). The Suruí Forest Carbon Project has engendered resistance among some 
members of the Paiter Suruí who claimed that promised payments were not being 
received, consequently leading some community members to engage in illegal logging to 
generate income (Lang, 2015a; Lang, 2016a).  
In the Purus REDD+ Project, subsistence-based forest dwellers were somewhat 
ironically portrayed as “deforestation agents” by the project developer, who originally 
wanted to start a cattle ranching and logging operation on this group’s land. Furthermore, 
these forest dwellers face an uphill battle in obtaining legal title to the land they have 
occupied for decades, a requirement stipulated by the project developer (Centro de 
Memória, 2013; Faustino & Furtado, 2014). Finally, the Cross River State REDD+ 
project has forwarded “carbonized exclusion” by banning poor, rural communities from 
harvesting timber, while militarized, anti-deforestation patrols and connected elites profit 
off the confiscation of illegal lumber (Asiyanbi, 2016).  
Therefore, the above examples demonstrate the numerous social injustices that 
could follow a California-REDD+ linkage. Combined with the inability of forest-based 
offset credits to ensure “proven” or “substantial” emissions reductions, REDD+ offsetting 
constitutes an environmental injustice, failing to mitigate climate change and negatively 
impacting the lives of vulnerable populations in both the North and South. To reiterate 
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the theoretical implications behind this argument, the next section recaps the main themes 
from this thesis.   
5.4 Conclusion: Capitalism Drives Ineffective Climate Policy 
  The California-REDD+ linkage is another example of an ineffective and unjust 
carbon trading proposal, which functions primarily to accommodate the insatiable growth 
imperative of capitalist development. To summarize, capitalist firms must continuously 
grow or else they will go out of business in competitive marketplaces. This, in turn, leads 
these firms to undertake strategies that maximize profits and expand commodity 
production. Fossil fuels have provided these entities with an incredibly efficient energy 
source that has revolutionized the rate and scope at which they can grow and profit. In the 
process, GHG emissions have also become embedded within the circuit of capitalist 
production, ushering in the climate crisis through the heavy use of fossil fuels in the 
advanced capitalist countries of the Global North and recently industrialized countries of 
the Global South. Thus, anyone who desires a complete solution to climate change must 
recognize that GHG emissions are intertwined with the dominant socio-economic form of 
organization globally, capitalism. 
 In the era of neoliberalism, public and private sector interests alike have touted 
free markets as the most efficient way to distribute societal goods and services and 
stimulate economic growth. When the climate crisis became too difficult to ignore, 
proponents of neoliberal economic thinking applied their ideology to environmental 
protection: markets could reduce GHG emissions in the most cost-effective fashion, and 
consequently, in the way least-harmful to BAU, fossil fuel-dependent growth. Some 
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market actors could profit off the new trade in GHGs by developing, facilitating, or 
selling carbon market allowances and offsets; others could minimize their costs of 
environmental compliance by purchasing allowances and offsets. In either case, the effect 
is the same: through the commodification of GHGs for market trade, powerful, 
influential, carbon market proponents (corporations, governments, international 
institutions) have normalized the capitalist mode of production as a solution to the very 
same environmental crisis it caused in the first place (Ervine, 2012, p. 6). Furthermore, 
carbon trading and carbon offsetting schemes uphold the economic and political 
dominance of market actors – often wealthy, heavy emitters in the Global North – who 
respond to their growth imperative by either profiting off the new trade in GHGs, or 
using this trade to continue BAU development. 
 Moreover, the capitalist, market-led logic of carbon trading, where cost-
effectiveness guides emissions cuts rather than climatic necessity, will not effectively or 
justly mitigate climate change in California or Acre for several reasons. First, 
environmentally suspect REDD+ schemes gain legitimacy by equating reductions in 
fossil fuel usage to the preservation of standing forests, which is neither an actual nor 
permanent means of cutting GHG emissions. In reality, this is a strategy to give emitters 
“flexibility” in meeting their emissions targets as cheaply as possible. Second, the 
commodification of CO2 for market trade goes against the principles of environmental 
and climate justice. REDD+ offsets allow Californian industries to avoid cuts at the 
source of emissions, which would not only benefit disadvantaged communities in the 
state environmentally and economically, but also tasks poorer Acrianos to withhold from 
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deforestation to preserve these industries’ capacity to emit. Third, the commodification 
process also necessarily brings CO2 into the ownership of wealthy, powerful actors, 
leading to green grabs as forest dwellers experience negative changes in their land tenure 
arrangements, socio-economic activities, and livelihoods. In all, carbon trading, including 
REDD+ offsetting, is characteristic of the environmentally destructive and highly 
unequal development of capitalist production. While the obvious solution to this might be 
enacting more effective and just climate policies outside of carbon trading and REDD+, 
the final section reflects on just how difficult this task will be. 
5.5 Beyond Carbon Trading: Towards Effective and Just Climate Change 
Mitigation 
As this thesis has shown, capitalist growth and the proliferation of fossil fuel-
based GHG emissions are two sides of the same coin. Emissions from fossil fuel sources 
have grown from an average rate of 11 billion tCO2 per year in the 1960s to over 34 
billion tCO2 per year from 2006 to 2015, as global gross domestic product (GDP) has 
risen from USD 1.3 trillion to USD 74.2 trillion over the same period (Le Quéré, 2016, p. 
625; World Bank, 2017).11 Therefore, any climate policy intent on averting climate 
catastrophe must immediately phase out and ultimately abolish fossil fuel-based forms of 
energy. One report by Climate Analytics (2016) states that the EU and OECD countries 
will need to phase out coal power by 2030, China by 2040, and all other countries by 
2050 to limit global temperature rise to 2°C above pre-industrial levels (p. 2). Another 
                                                 
11 Note: Le Quéré et al.’s (2016) original figures were quoted in gigatonnes of carbon 
(GtC). My figures were attained by multiplying these figures by 3.67, as the atomic 
weight of CO2 is 3.67 times larger than that of carbon.  
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study suggests that to keep global temperatures below 2°C, 80% of known fossil fuel 
reserves must stay in the ground, which would represent roughly USD 10 trillion in 
stranded assets for fossil fuel companies (Hayes, 2014). 
However, one cannot ignore the monumental struggle that uprooting the political-
economic power of high-emitting industries and fossil fuel-dependent governments will 
entail. Fossil fuels are not only entrenched in capitalist production, but countless numbers 
of the poor and middle classes also depend on fossil energy and production for their 
livelihoods. With the dominance of free market economic thinking and the rollback of the 
welfare state in the neoliberal era, unemployment and higher energy prices will also hit 
the working class especially hard. Therefore, it is crucial to think through the many 
barriers to overcoming the dominance of capitalist development and fossil fuel 
dependence before putting forth strategies of how to attain effective and just climate 
policy.  
Take, for instance, the recent developments in coal and oil production in Canada 
and the US. In November 2016, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced a plan to phase 
out coal-fired electricity federally by 2030. The undertaking follows the success of the 
province of Ontario fully doing so in 2014, which helped contribute to a 20% drop in 
GHG emissions in the province since 2005 (Littlecott & Schwartzkopff, 2015, pp. 11-12). 
Yet, the province of Nova Scotia was granted an extension that will allow it to continue 
coal production past the 2030 end date, a measure the provincial government claims will 
keep electricity prices from skyrocketing (Harris, 2016). While eliminating coal – the 
most emissions-intensive of all fossil fuels – is an integral part of combatting climate 
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change, the threat of higher energy prices without accompanying compensation 
understandably will not appeal to poorer communities.  
Another development that problematizes capitalist society’s commitment to clean 
energy – and shows how central of a role fossil fuels play in labour-capital relations – is 
the TransCanada Keystone XL pipeline. The project was originally intended to transport 
oil extracted from the Albertan tar sands, which emit 14-20% more GHGs than regular 
crude oil, to refineries in the US (Tollefson, 2013). In 2015, former President Barack 
Obama vetoed the construction of the pipeline; however, in January 2017 new president 
Donald Trump issued a memorandum that encouraged the TransCanada corporation to 
reapply for a construction permit and complete the project. Prime Minister Trudeau 
welcomed the change as a potential boost to the struggling Albertan economy, even 
though his administration has proposed to cut Canada’s GHG emissions to 30% below 
2005 levels by 2030, as part of its INDC under the Paris Agreement (Canada, 2015; 
Tasker, 2017). In these cases, the juxtaposition between effective climate policy and the 
economic interests of fossil capital, government allies, and labour is a key obstacle in 
both substantially and equitably reducing emissions. What, then, might some possibilities 
be for forging effective and just climate policies and movements that can occur outside 
the coalition of private and public fossil capital?  
One concept that has gained traction in recent years is the “just transition”, which 
highlights the necessity of securing or creating well-paying jobs for the working classes 
who are affected by climate policy, while simultaneously decarbonizing the economy 
(Cock, 2014, p. 31; Newell & Mulvaney, 2013). Cock (2014) documents how the 
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Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) has incorporated the notion of a just 
transition into its “Climate Change Framework of 15 Principles”. Not only does the 
COSATU identify capital accumulation as the driver of climate change (and oppose 
market mechanisms to solve the climate crisis), it also calls for its vision of a 
“fundamentally transformed society” to incorporate the connection between 
environmental protection and socio-economic benefit as a part of a just transition (Cock, 
2014, pp. 31-32). One member of COSATU, the National Union of Metalworkers of 
South Africa (NUMSA), has taken the concept even further, stating that: 
A just transition must be based in worker controlled, democratic social ownership 
of key means of production and means of subsistence…without this…the just 
transition will become a capitalist concept, building up a capitalist “green 
economy” (qtd. in Cock, 2014, p. 32).  
In a recent piece for Jacobin, the geographer Matt Huber also summarizes the 
danger of relying on capitalist markets to yield serious climate action as expressed by 
NUMSA.   
Climate change is not an exceptional market failure that can be corrected by 
getting the prices right. Capitalist markets are simply not wired to meet social and 
ecological needs — they will always “fail” in this regard. We cannot cede our 
future to a game of market competition by simply hoping renewables will 
overtake fossil fuels in the market. Collective action and public-oriented solutions 
are our only hope for survival. (Huber, 2016). 
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Though one should applaud the results of organized labour in obtaining the 
environmental and political commitment that COSATU and NUMSA have, the clear 
majority of workers the world over do not have the bargaining power or means to put 
forth this vision, much less achieve it. While Malm (2015), for example, advocates for 
the working classes to overhaul the means of production through a “planned economic 
recession” or “war against capital” to usher in a sustainable economy, he also 
acknowledges the immense power of capital to prevent these changes (p. 114). 
Historically, when labour has obtained too much power, the owners of capital have 
undertaken what Harvey (2001) termed the “spatial fix”, transferring the means of 
production to cheaper, more docile locations amenable to accumulation (Malm, 2015, p. 
112). Therefore, in an era where fossil fuels and free market economics have given the 
owners of capital tremendous spatial mobility, the alignment of climate policy with 
material benefits for workers remains a great challenge.     
Fortunately, some groups have started to push for more effective and just climate 
change policies, specifically by rejecting or amending REDD+. In September 2016, the 
El Salvadoran Roundtable on Climate Change (SLV-RCC), comprised of 25 
environmental and indigenous organizations, released a statement that asked the 
Salvadoran government to drop its REDD+ plans in coordination with the FCPF. The 
SLV-RCC listed many of the same environmental and social reasons for opposing 
REDD+ as those laid out in this paper – that REDD+ carbon offsetting is not additional 
nor permanent, that it cannot ensure the environmental integrity of uncertain and 
technically complex emissions reductions, and that it restricts or alters food sovereignty 
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and land use rights in a negative fashion (Lang, 2016d). Instead, the SLV-RCC is 
demanding that the government eliminate REDD+ as a mechanism to reduce CO2 
emissions in its INDC to the UN Paris Agreement, and better inform the public of the 
controversies and drawbacks of becoming involved in a REDD+ project (Lang, 2016d). 
Other groups are seeking to rid REDD+ of its market-driven orientation, and 
instead use it to recognize forest dwelling communities’ longstanding contributions to 
forest preservation and foster economic development. In 2010, the Inter-Ethnic 
Association for the Development of the Peruvian Amazon introduced the concept of 
REDD+ Indígena Amazónico, or Indigenous REDD+. The Coordinator of Indigenous 
Organizations of the Amazon River Basin started to formally support Indigenous REDD+ 
a year later (Climate Alliance & ATSM, 2015, p. 16). Indigenous REDD+ is designed as 
an alternative to the market-led, results-based avoided deforestation model. Funds for 
forest conservation would come not from industries offsetting their fossil-based 
emissions (under Indigenous REDD+, heavy-emitting industries should not be allowed to 
offset industrial emissions) but from bilateral and multilateral development agencies and 
governments (COICA, 2013, p. 9). 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to envision significant funding flowing towards 
Indigenous REDD+ projects anytime soon. International organizations already face a 
shortfall in funds for climate change mitigation and adaptation projects, including the UN 
REDD Programme. The UN REDD Programme has so far only received USD 15 million 
out of its requested USD 200 to 300 million for the 2016 to 2020 period to deliver 
payments and technical assistance to its partner countries (Lang, 2016e). As evident by 
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the low prices of REDD+ credits on the VCM and CERs on the CDM, if private finance 
is not demanding forest emissions reductions, the public sector is not likely to have the 
funds to invest in them either.  
 Instead, making a serious contribution to reducing deforestation emissions will 
involve addressing the drivers of deforestation globally. Many of these drivers are linked 
to capitalist production and consumption patterns in the North and newly industrialized 
countries like China, so tasking the South with reducing their emissions through REDD+ 
schemes and offset programs underscores the colonial nature of carbon trading itself. For 
example, a recent study has found that US demand for imported oil, processed partly in 
Californian refineries, is a large contributor to deforestation in the Amazon (Amazon 
Watch, 2016). Additionally, the Foreign Agriculture Service to the US Department of 
Agriculture reports that Brazil is now tied with India as the world’s largest exporter of 
beef and veal (Foreign Agriculture Service/USDA, 2016). Perhaps it is no coincidence, 
then, that Brazilian deforestation in 2016 reached its highest level since 2008 (Butler, 
2016). These examples are what REDD+ project developers and policymakers miss in 
their quest to halt deforestation: market-based payments for forest preservation can only 
accomplish so much if global demand still finances activities that contribute to 
deforestation.  
In sum, avoiding climate catastrophe will be a monumental struggle, one that 
directly confronts both society’s faith in capitalism and markets to bring about 
environmental protection, and the dominance of public and private entities that depend on 
or profit off the production and consumption of fossil fuels. Yet, as the case of the 
 142 
California-REDD+ linkage demonstrates, carbon markets will struggle to bring about 
credible, significant, and equitable reductions in GHGs. While the logical solution to this 
problem might be to suggest that state governments and the working classes unite to push 
for a “just transition” or “war against capital”, doing so is far easier said than done, 
requiring an extraordinary, coordinated effort of an unforeseen magnitude to accomplish. 
Although this may be a bleak outlook, ongoing movements from within organized labour, 
environmental justice groups, indigenous communities, and others show what actions and 
trends can be built upon to effectively and equitably avert climate catastrophe. The 
thought of doing so has never been more daunting, but the consequences of not acting 
have never been greater.   
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